Public Reason

Journal of Political and Moral Philosophy

Public Reason is a peer-reviewed journal of political and moral philosophy. Public Reason publishes articles, book reviews, as well as discussion notes from all the fields of political philosophy and ethics, including political theory, applied ethics, and legal philosophy. The Journal encourages the debate around rationality in politics and ethics in the larger context of the discussion concerning rationality as a philosophical problem. Public Reason is committed to a pluralistic approach, promoting interdisciplinary and original perspectives as long as the ideal of critical arguing and clarity is respected. The journal is intended for the international philosophical community, as well as for a broader public interested in political and moral philosophy. It aims to promote philosophical exchanges with a special emphasis on issues in, and discussions on the Eastern European space. Public Reason publishes two issues per year, in June and December. Public Reason is an open access e-journal, but it is also available in print.

Editors

Editor in Chief

Advisory Board

Romulus Brancoveanu , University of Bucharest

Radu J. Bogdan, Tulane University

Sorin Baiasu , Keele University

Paula Casal, University of Reading

Associate Editor

Fred D’Agostino, University of Queensland

Thomas Pogge , Yale University

Rainer Forst , Goethe University, Frankfurt am Main

Gerald Gaus, University of Arizona

Editorial Team

Axel Gosseries Ramalho, Catholic University of

Assistant Editors

Louvain

Mircea Tobosaru, Politehnica University of

Alan Hamlin, University of Manchester

Bucharest

John Horton, Keele University

Cristina Voinea , University of Bucharest

Janos Kis , Central European University, Budapest

Carmen-Viviana Ciachir, University of Bucharest

Jean-Christophe Merle , University of Tübingen

Editorial Board

Adrian Miroiu , SNSPA Bucharest

Ovidiu Caraiani, University Politehnica of Bucharest

Adrian W. Moore , University of Oxford

Luigi Caranti, University of Catania

Philippe Van Parijs , Catholic University of Louvain

Radu Dudau, University of Bucharest

Mark Timmons , University of Arizona

Mircea Dumitru , University of Bucharest

Adrian - Paul Iliescu, University of Bucharest

Ferda Keskin , Istanbul Bilgi University

Valentin Muresan, University of Bucharest

Alina Romascu, Université de Corse Pasquale Paoli

Constantin Stoenescu , University of Bucharest

Ion Vezeanu, University of Grenoble

Public Reason is available online at http://publicreason.ro

ISSN 2065-7285

EISSN 2065-8958

© 2018 by Public Reason

Public Reason

Journal of Political and Moral Philosophy

Vol. 10, no. 1, 2018

ArTiclEs

Julian Katz

Kant’s ‘ Bund’: A Voluntary Reading . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3

Leonidas Makris

Mill’s Political Perception of Liberty: Idiosyncratic, Perfectionist but essentially

Liberal . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .15

Alexandros Manolatos

Rawlsian Stability and the Hazards of Envy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .33

Jens Peter Brune

Capabilitarianism without Paternalism? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .49

Hossein Dabbagh

The Problem of Explanation and Reason-Giving Account of pro tanto Duties in

the Rossian Ethical Framework . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .69

Adelin Costin Dumitru

Feminism, Agency and Objectivity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 81

Public Reason 10 (1): 3-14

© 2018 by Public Reason

Kant’s ‘ Bund’: A Voluntary reading

Julian Katz

Tulane University

Abstract: In ‘Kant’s Changing Cosmopolitanism’ and Kant and Cosmopolitanism: The

Philosophical Ideal of World Citizenship, Pauline Kleingeld argues that, in ‘Idea for a Universal History with a Cosmopolitan Intent,’ Kant meant for the Bund (usual y translated as

‘federation’) of states to be a coercive federation. Kleingeld admits that there is a disparity between this earlier coercive idea of the Bund and Kant’s talk of a voluntary (i.e., non-coercive) congress in Toward Perpetual Peace and The Metaphysics of Morals. She explains this disparity by: (1) appealing to a semantic ambiguity in the term ‘ Bund’; (2) making claims about with which contemporary 18th century works Kant was acquainted; and ultimately (3) attempting

to draw a paral el between the unsocial sociability of individual people within a state and the unsocial sociability of individual states in a larger community of states. In this paper, I argue that while Kleingeld’s claims are superficial y supported by the text, her claims depend on her apparent conflating of teleology and morality.

Key words: Kleingeld, Kant, teleology, Just State, Bund, Federation, Congress, Inter-

Governmental Organization.

Kant’s contribution to the peace project of the 18th century (i.e., the Just State

considered both in a local civil condition and considered global y as a union of states)

is still a great source of disagreement among scholars. This disagreement mirrors

contemporary political debates concerning what it is about certain Intergovernmental

Organizations (IGOs) (e.g., the UN, the European Union, the G8, and the United

States) that leads to, or maintains, peace.1 After al , we seem to have had some peace

in the latter half of the 20th century and even now; but there is still the question of

how IGOs contribute to this peace. IGOs could bring about peace through coercive

means or it could be that the particular form of democracy in many of the countries

that constitute the members of those IGOs promote a voluntary peace. Regarding the

latter, for example: it seems that countries that hold similar political values seem to not go to war as easily, especial y when those countries are democratic (Doyle 1983a, 212-13).2 But what exactly it means for countries to share political values is itself a point

of argument. For instance, in his book, Kant’s Political Legacy: Human Rights, Peace,

Progress, Luigi Caranti discusses the disagreement as to whether liberal democracies and republics are identical (2017, 9). In Toward Perpetual Peace Kant, himself, seems to make a distinction between democracies and republics:

So that a republican constitution will not be confused with a democratic constitution

(as usual y happens), the fol owing must be noted. […] [D]emocracy in the strict sense of the word is necessarily a despotism because it establishes an executive power in

1] I use the abbreviation ‘IGO’ in line with Caranti’s usage of the same (2017, 10, 164, 193, 197-98).

2] There is disagreement on this claim. For further discussion see: Caranti (2017), Doyle (1983), and Babst (1964; 1972).

4

Kant’s ‘Bund’: A Voluntary Reading

which all decide for and, if need be, against one (who thus does not agree), so that al ,

who are nevertheless not al , decide; and this is a contradiction of the general will with

itself and with freedom. ( TPP, 8:351-52)3

I will leave aside the obvious issue of what sort of voting situation Kant expects in

republics that would not lead to a similar situation where the majority have somehow left out the minority from particular decisions. But suffice it to say, there is much

one can say on whether countries that seem to share enough of the right democratic

republican values can promote a peace. For my purposes, though, I wish to discuss

Kant’s views on what kind of IGO contributes to a world peace; and I will be including Caranti’s discussion of the historical context of Kant’s view (Caranti 2017, 108-15).

Kant argues that a very specific kind of intergovernmental organization is necessary

for the peace between nations; however, there is disagreement, as one would expect,

as to what constitutes the just IGO for Kant’s perpetual peace.

In the Metaphysics of Morals, Kant tells us that, even among neighboring states,

we must (that is, we have a duty to) leave the state of nature among nations “to enter

a lawful condition.” He describes this lawful condition (what we are calling an IGO)

among states as a “voluntary coalition of different states which can be dissolved at

any time, [and specifically] not a federation (like that of the American states) […]”

( MM, 6:350-351).4 In other words, it is to be a congress of states without a coercive federal government. So, even though the Just State (JS), at the local level, has this

form of government, the congress of states (the JS construed as a universal state, in

other words) has no such federal government.5 This is in contradistinction to Pauline

Kleingeld’s position that Kant really did, at one time in his intellectual development,

mean for his ‘congress’ to ultimately be one ruled by a single federal government

analogous to the government of a local state (2009, 173-74, 177-79; 2012, 45-46).

She explains this development by: (1) appealing to a semantic ambiguity in the term

‘ Bund’; (2) making claims about with which 18th century works Kant was acquainted;

and ultimately (3) attempting to draw a parallel between the unsocial sociability of

individual people within a state and the unsocial sociability of individual states in

a larger community of states. In this paper, I argue that while Kleingeld’s claims are

superficially supported by the text, her claims depend on her apparent conflating of

teleology and morality.

3] TPP refers to Toward Perpetual Peace.

4] MM refers to the Metaphysics of Morals.

5] This is contextual y important to a larger project which discusses the local and global conditions of the JS. In the course of my larger project, I raise the point that Kant’s teleological view, portrayed in ‘Idea for a Universal History with a Cosmopolitan Intent,’ is meant only to be an optimistic view of how our teleology leads us to the same outcome as that which we ought to bring about. I will not discuss the local or global conditions of the JS. There will be some al usion, though, to the discussion of these conditions and some al usion to this agreement of our teleology with our moral goals.

Julian Katz

5

I. AN INTRODUCTION TO THE INTERNATIONAL CONDITIONS OF JS

Kant asks us to think of ourselves as cosmopolitan citizens of the world (and not

just as citizens of our individual and respective countries) in both the MM and ‘Idea for a Universal History with a Cosmopolitan Intent’ ( MM, 6:352; UH, 8:22).6 In the latter, Kant has a couple of theses regarding our natural teleology that are relevant to this point. Note the fifth thesis: “The greatest problem for the human species, whose solution nature compels

it to seek, is to achieve a universal civil society administered in accord with the right”

(UH, 8:22). This thesis refers to a universal civil society, or in other words: a civil society

“for the [whole] human species.” Skipping forward to the seventh thesis: “The problem of

establishing a perfect civil constitution depends on the problem of law-governed external

relations among nations and cannot be solved unless the latter is [solved]” (UH, 8:24). So

clearly there are some implicit global conditions on what counts as a JS.

Similarly, to our duty to leave the state of nature and enter in the civil condition

between individual humans in close proximity, we have a duty to leave the state of

nature among nations ( MM, 6:344-45). I write ‘similarly’, because the duties to leave the respective states of nature are actual y very different. The conditions that bring on the

duty are, however, the same (hence I use ‘similarly to’ and not ‘exactly as’). Just to expound briefly on the difference: The duty to enter in a civil condition involves the implementation of the irresistible constitution of the civil condition itself (the general united wil ) uniting all in that local civil condition. But the duty to enter into a civil condition with other

nations specifical y restricts that union from having such an irresistible authority over the nations in that global civil condition. Consider the fol owing:

The elements of the right of nations are these: (1) states, considered in external relation

to one another, are (like lawless savages) by nature in a non-rightful condition. (2)

This non-rightful condition is a condition of war (of the right of the stronger), even if it is not a condition of actual war and actual attacks being constantly made (hostilities).

Although no state is wronged by another in this condition (insofar as neither wants

anything better), this condition is in itself still wrong in the highest degree, and states

neighboring upon one another are under obligation to leave it. (3) A league of nations

in accordance with the idea of an original social contract is necessary, not in order

to meddle in one another’s internal dissensions but to protect against attacks from

without. (4) This al iance must, however, involve no sovereign authority (as in a civil

constitution), but only an association (federation); it must be an al iance that can be renounced at any time and so must be renewed from time to time. ( MM, 6:344-45)

In other words, the countries are in a state of nature with each other until they form this

league of nations. Even if the countries are not at war, the condition is considered non-

rightful because the states are in close proximity to one another and might war with each

other in the future. The potential for the sovereignty of any particular general united

will (of even one state among all nations) to be overtaken by some other general united

6] UH refers to ‘Idea for a Universal History with a Cosmopolitan Intent.’

6

Kant’s ‘Bund’: A Voluntary Reading

will is enough to obligate the nations to enter into a sort of civil condition with the other nations of the world. Furthermore, and in the same vein, the reason they cannot have a

sort of federal government forcing them to stay in a union is that to create such a super-

government would be to create something more sovereign than all the sovereign general

united wil s (all of the states) in such a federation. Thus, this league of nations must be a voluntary congress of states where each state can choose to leave that union at any time.7

II. KLEINGELD’S DEVELOPMENTAL VIEW

However, there is a contention in the contemporary literature that this congress,

at one time in Kant’s intel ectual development (specifical y in UH), involved a federal

government. Most notably Kleingeld argues this in her book Kant and Cosmopolitanism:

The Philosophical Ideal of World Citizenship and in her essay ‘Kant’s Changing

Cosmopolitanism’ (2012; 2009).8 In the former, for example, she writes:

In [ Idea for a Universal History from a Cosmopolitan Perspective], [Kant] advocates the establishment of a strong federation of states with coercive authority at the federal

level, and […] he appeals to the enlightened self-interest of rulers to defend the

feasibility of this ideal. He does not propose a merely voluntary association but argues

that a strong, state-like federation of states is required to guarantee the external

security of states. (Kleingeld 2012, 45)

In the latter, she writes:

Kant uses [the term ‘cosmopolitan condition’] to refer to a situation in which the

external relations among states are governed by enforced laws. This of course requires

a higher-level political institution, which he refers to as a ‘federation of peoples’ or

a ‘federation of states’ […] (8:24) This is to have legislative, executive, and juridical

powers at the federal level, including a ‘united power giving emphasis to that law’

(8:26).9 (Kleingeld 2009, 174)

She essential y argues in both works that in line with what Kant argues about unsocial

sociability concerning the JS at the local level, unsocial sociability can only real y help us 7] Kant says as much: “By a congress is here understood only a voluntary coalition of different states which can be dissolved at any time, not a federation (like that of the American states) which is based on a constitution and can therefore not be dissolved. – Only by such a congress can the idea of a public right of nations be realized, one to be established for deciding their disputes in a civil way, as if by a lawsuit, rather than in a barbaric way […], namely by war.” ( MM, 6:351).

8] To be fair to Kleingeld, she ultimately al ows that Kant rejects this federal government over states. She reads him as having changed his mind between having written UH and TPP. While I admit that Kant’s thought had to have evolved as he wrote, I do not think his fundamental system changed as much as Kleingeld is arguing. That said, I am only arguing against her interpretation of UH, and not also against her developmental claims about Kant’s thought, in general. Such an argument would require an altogether different paper.

9] All citations within this quote are meant to refer to AK pagination in UH. They are not my citations, but they are accurate to the text.

Julian Katz

7

to acquire that moral whole if the unsocial aspect of individual nations in a community of nations is tempered by the irresistible authority of a constitution over and above the states in that community.10

Part of Kleingeld’s argument is purely historical. She points out that Kant is

presenting his cosmopolitan ideal in a long tradition of proposals, and not in a vacuum.

“[Kant] himself acknowledges the Abbé de Saint-Pierre and Jean-Jacques Rousseau as his

predecessors (IaG 8:24, GTP 8:313).”11 Saint-Pierre, Kleingeld points out, had argued for

something like this over and above the Christian rulers of Europe “with a permanent senate

and an international court of arbitration, backed up by an international military force,

to settle disputes between the member states.”12 Rousseau had apparently summarized

Saint-Pierre’s views and presented them, in 1761, under the title: ‘Extrait du Projet de Paix Perpétuel e de Monsieur l’Abbé de Saint Pierre’ (1761). However, in ‘Jugement sur la Paix

Perpétuel e,’ written around the same time as the former, Rousseau distances himself

from Saint-Pierre’s views (1782).13 Kleingeld argues that it fol ows from this information

that Kant could not have read this latter text of Rousseau’s since Kant clearly wants to

espouse some of Saint-Pierre’s views concerning international peace.14 In this historical

vein, she points out that Kant “does not propose a merely voluntary association but argues

that a strong, state-like federation of states is required to guarantee the external security of states” (Kleingeld 2012, 44-45).15

Another line of argument (and perhaps the main line of argument) she makes is to

simply interpret the creation of a league of nations as exactly like the creation of a local JS, in that they both teleological y explain how the unsocial sociability of humanity leads to

the creation of a moral whole (in the sense of the JS, anyway).16 Here is a notable quote to

this effect from both Kant on Cosmopolitanism and ‘Kant’s Changing Cosmopolitanism’: Kant argues, [in Idea for a Universal History], that the way in which states leave

the international state of nature to join into a state-like federation is structurally

10] In the larger project I work out how the JS and the Kingdom of Ends are connected and what exactly one should understand by ‘moral whole.’ For now, it is sufficient that we are aware that there is a moral whole toward which unsocial sociability is meant to help us strive. Kleingeld and I agree that such a moral whole exists, though we may disagree as to what constitutes it.

11] By IaG, Kleingeld means to refer to UH. By GTP, she means to refer to ‘On the Proverb: That may be true in Theory, but is of No Practical Use.’

12] She is getting this from St. Pierre’s Projet pour rendre la Paix Perpétuel e en Europe. (1713) 13] Rousseau wrote ‘Extrait’ and ‘Jugement’ around the same time, but ‘Jugement’ was published posthumously in 1782. (Kleingeld 45).

14] I am here presenting Kleingeld’s position; not my own. Obviously, she is assuming her position on international government to be correct in making this assertion; a position with which I explicitly disagree.

15] I will respond to each part of what I perceive to be Kleingeld’s position, but only after first presenting all the lynch pins of that position.

16] I just mean that it is not clear what role the Kingdom of Ends plays with this talk of a moral whole.

I resolve this in the larger project, of which this paper is a small part.

8

Kant’s ‘Bund’: A Voluntary Reading

similar to the way individuals leave the state of nature to join into a state.

[…] Individuals unite into a state ‘in which freedom under external laws can be encountered combined, in the greatest possible degree, with irresistible power’

(IaG 8:22). Similarly, Kant claims, states will ultimately be forced, by the hardship resulting from the rivalry and wars between them, to exit the state of nature and

enter a juridical condition. States exhibit ‘the same unsociability’ as individuals;

they experience ‘precisely the ills that pressured individual human beings and

compelled them to enter into a lawful civil condition,’ and thus states too will

come to see the advantages of joining a federation with common laws and law

enforcement (IaG 8:24). (Kleingeld 2012, 45-46; 2009, 177-78)

In other words, on Kleingeld’s reading, Kant has argued that individuals in the state of

nature have a kind of unsocial sociability that can only have the teleology of serving to help us create a moral whole. Furthermore, this moral whole is understood (by both myself

and Kleingeld) to include not just the JS at the local level, but also at the global level (i.e., not merely local y, but international y as wel ).17 This is apparent, she argues, from the fifth, sixth, and seventh theses in UH. The seventh thesis says essential y that the civil condition requires solving the problem of international relations between nations: “a perfect civil

condition depends on the problem of law-governed external relations among nations and

cannot be solved unless the latter is [solved]” (UH, 8:24). It is within the discussion of this seventh thesis that Kleingeld finds the textual evidence that states, like individuals, must

enter into a union with an irresistible constitution over and above them. That is: since

states exhibit the same unsocial sociability, they must need to enter into the very same

type of civil condition as individuals.

Final y, Kleingeld further supplements her argument for her position through

a semantic point about the chosen German word for what we see in the English as

‘federation’: the word ‘ Bund.’ She points out that ‘ Bund’ “is itself neutral as to whether or not the institution has the power to enforce its laws” (Kleingeld 2009, 178). Her argument

here is essential y that since ‘ Bund’ can be understood either as (1) a coercive federal government over and above the states that are unified within it or as (2) a non-coercive

voluntary congress (as I interpret the concept), it clearly can mean the former in UH and

then change in meaning to the latter in TPP. Again, relying on the historical point made earlier about Saint-Pierre, Kleingeld claims that the semantical y neutral term al ows her

to make this claim about Kant’s position in UH.

III. A REVIEW OF THE HISTORICAL CONTEXT OF KANT’S BUND

Before I show what seems odd to me about this argument, there are some historical

considerations that have already been discussed by Caranti: he points out that while

Kleingeld is correct to claim that Kant is writing in a tradition, she is wrong to claim that 17] Of course, we disagree primarily on what Kant means in UH by the global conditions of that JS.

Julian Katz

9

Kant agreed with St. Pierre as a result.18 There were two different traditions from which Kant drew: “(a) the natural law tradition, which includes the ancient ius gentium, and (b) preceding peace projects crafted and forceful y proposed by authors with whom Kant

was certainly familiar.” But the second tradition, which is surely that to which Kleingeld

was appealing, is not a clear case of simply carrying on the same view from thinker to

thinker. There are few interesting and connected reasons to think this: First of al , Kant

was living during the French Revolution, and there were very few democracies at the time.

“France was perceived by the European autocracies not ‘merely’ as a dangerous model for

domestic rebels but also as a new power ready to export its principles through some sort of

republican crusade” (Caranti 2017, 108). Kant himself was living under a monarch when

he wrote the MM and TPP, and thus his writing of them constitutes a break from what many in his country must have felt about the rabble in France. Thus, Kant’s view of the

just IGO, while certainly influenced by St. Pierre (one can hardly deny the seventh thesis’s

mention of St. Pierre by name), was more likely the culmination and evolution of a peace project going on in the 1700s. (Caranti 2017, 111-12)

According to Caranti, Kant argues against ius gentium, putting his view at odds with

St. Pierre’s (thus simultaneously also denying the Rousseauvian claim that this federation

would be created and enforced through the use of force). (2017, 110-13)19 “[…] [ Ius]

gentium was mainly an attempt to identify […] the conditions that make war between

states just, thus taking for granted that some wars were legitimate. […] [Kant] simply

declares all wars as il egitimate” (Caranti 2017, 110-11).20 The evidence for Caranti’s claim comes from TPP:

[…] [F]or Hugo Grotius, Pufendorf, Vattel, and the like (only sorry comforters) –

although their code, couched philosophical y or diplomatical y, has not the slightest

lawful force and cannot even have such force (since states as such are not subject to a common external constraint) – are always duly cited in justification of an offensive war […]. ( TPP, 8:355)

18] While Caranti never actual y writes that Kleingeld is wrong, his assertions show that she could not possibly be right from this historical context. Caranti admits that “Kant’s ‘philosophical project’ does not arise from a void” (Caranti 2017, 108). But, as the reader will see, this already does a lot to undermine Kleingeld’s position.

19] I share some views in common with Caranti, but we do differ in some respects. In this case, I do think that Kant was real y more interested in talking about peace than what justifies war, and except for rare cases of defensive wars where they are arguably legitimate, wars are general y il egitimate on my reading of Kant. Caranti’s claim that they are always il egitimate seems a bit strong to me.

20] Of course, it is a matter of debate whether Kant real y thought all wars to be il egitimate. He seems to defend defensive wars, for example. “As for active violations which give a right to go to war, these include acts of retaliation […], a state’s taking it upon itself to obtain satisfaction for an offense committed against its people by the people of another state, instead of seeking compensation (by peaceful methods) from the other state” ( MM, 6:346). This undermines Caranti’s claim in my view. But, in agreement with Caranti, it does seem to be the case that Kant was aiming for the conditions that might sustain a peace, rather than the conditions that would make it ok to go to war.

10

Kant’s ‘Bund’: A Voluntary Reading

Kant uses this kind of argument against both the justification to go to war and the

justification for rebel ion. Hence this represents a departure from one fundamental aspect

of St. Pierre’s coercive IGO: namely the idea that it can justly use war to enforce that countries act ‘rightly’ with each other. Even if, therefore, we grant that Kleingeld is right that Kant was not aware of ‘Jugement sur la Paix Perpétuel e,’ it seems odd to have Kant espouse a

view that directly contradicts this position. Kleingeld, of course, ultimately agrees that

Kant’s ‘ Bund’ was to be non-coercive by MM and TPP. It is her claim that Kant changed his mind that is at issue. But I just want to point out that Caranti is not, here, merely saying that she should have noticed this from his latter works. Rather, his claim is stronger: from

a historical point of view Kant likely was trying to juggle many different aspects of a longer peace project than merely one book by L’Abbé de St. Pierre, and perhaps Kant’s works

should be interpreted to reflect that juggling act.

In paral el with this, Caranti notes that the political conversation, by the time of TPP, had developed some complexity; this natural y leads Kant to a more nuanced and evolved

response to the peace project. Published only months before TPP, an anonymously

published pamphlet, entitled Épitre du Vieux Cosmopolite Syrach à la Convention Nationale de France, debated the same issues that Kant had debated in TPP: 1) there is no right of interference between states, in line with the 5th preliminary article; 2) the world republic

would not be created by force like its individual nation counterparts; and 3) the ‘world

federation’ is attainable and thus a legitimate political goal. What is important about this, Caranti explains, is that it shows that TPP “appears as the answer [to these questions] by a world famous philosopher to the hottest political issues debated in the European context.”

Kant was struggling to balance a few things: 1) the need for valuing the “autonomy

and sovereignty of each people” as against Enlightenment principles; 2) how hard it

is to implement perpetual peace as against the moral duty to strive for it; 3) admitting

that violence can promote positive change as against the notion that there is no right to

rebel ion; 4) the practicality of provisional rules as against the necessity of permanent

rules; and final y 5) that while we have a duty to strive for perpetual peace, and while it is perhaps guaranteed anyway (as in UH), it is not also the case that there is no need for that

moral obligation as a result (Caranti 2017, 113-14). It seems that, on Caranti’s reading,

Kleingeld has not offered us the whole picture of that to which Kant was responding, and

perhaps the historical leg of her argument is broken.

IV. KLEINGELD’S SEEMINGLY QUESTION-BEGGING STR ATEGY

In any case, the historical claims, along with what Kleingeld argues about the word

‘ Bund’, seem to me to beg the question. Perhaps it would be fairer for me to say that Kleingeld depends on her main argument concerning unsocial sociability to be cogent. Certainly,

if she is right about what Kant says in UH, and if Kant’s hope was to be in agreement with

Saint-Pierre, then it would stand to reason that Kant might have either ignored or not

read Rousseau’s counter proposals in ‘Jugement sur la Paix perpétuel e.’ But she ought not

Julian Katz

11

to claim the reverse, as she seems to: that Kant’s having ignored Rousseau’s latter work,

along with his agreeing with St. Pierre, further supports her claims that Kant meant for

the federation to be coercive. Furthermore, the ambiguity in the term ‘ Bund’ does not support her claims unless she has succeeded already at convincing us that Kant meant

for the federation to be coercive due to the unsocial sociability of states. Nevertheless,

Kleingeld presents the ambiguity in the term as a kind of support for her historical point

about Kant’s changing his view on what a ‘federation’ is supposed to be. Since we real y

cannot do much more here until we tackle what she says there about unsocial sociability,

I will deal with that now.

Kleingeld does use the text effectively to argue for her position, but it seems to me

that textual support from elsewhere (notably, in UH itself) re-contextualizes what Kant

says in discussing the seventh thesis (and there is, thus, no need to build in the assumption that Kant has changed his mind to explain what he says there). Consider, for example, the

very next, the eighth, thesis (and some of the discussion of this thesis):

One can regard the history of the human species […] as the realization of a hidden plan of nature to bring about an internal y, and for this purpose, also an external y perfect national constitution, as the sole state in which all of humanity’s natural capacities can be developed.

[…] One sees that philosophy also has its chiliastic vision, but one whose occurrence

can be promoted by its idea […], though only from afar, and it is thus anything but

fanciful. (UH, 8:27)

The reference to a “chiliastic” view in the second sentence only supports the claim that Kant thought of the JS itself as a mere ideal; something that we cannot ultimately achieve, but

for which we nonetheless have a duty to strive ( MM, 6:350). Thus, though, we initial y wil attempt to go through a step similar to Saint-Pierre’s coercive federal government, it is in

service of getting toward an external y perfect national constitution (teleological y, we may try to form coercive federations, but ultimately, we will want to make a voluntary congress to form that ‘external y perfect constitution’).21 We can therefore al ow that the seventh thesis speaks of a universal coercive federation, without at the same time making the ideal of the JS

(the chiliastic vision) synonymous with this coercive federation. On my reading, the eighth

thesis refers to the voluntary federation to which Kant al udes in the latter works.

We should not confuse teleological claims about what is true about us with what

ought to be true. Some of the teleological claims will coincide with what we ought to do,

but some will not. For example, we have unsocial aspects. We are violent when we are in

too close a proximity. Teleologically, we can find a use for this unsociability in terms of how it brings out our other natural capacities best, in the context of our also having sociability.

But we should not add that we ought to be unsocial. Otherwise Kant would be guilty, in UH, of the naturalistic fal acy. Rather, we simply have a teleology that ultimately does help us to 21] In a separate paper, I plan to make a positive argument for this claim. My presenting it here is meant merely to show that the text would seem to contextual y support this simpler resolution to the dilemma Kleingeld is trying to resolve (simpler, that is, than the solution she espouses).

12

Kant’s ‘Bund’: A Voluntary Reading

bring about what ought to be. Similar, then, to unsocial sociability (and the inherent violence that goes along with it when humans are forced in close proximity in the state of nature),

the creation of a Saint-Pierre style federation can be part of what we will do, in service what we ought to do later: i.e., to create that voluntary congress. Thus, Saint Pierre’s vision is not clearly what Kant has in mind as part of what we ought to bring about (but only, at most, what Kant thinks is part of our teleology on the way to making the world a moral whole).

V. CONCLUSION

Since making sense of the teleological arguments in UH cannot stop at the seventh

thesis, when Kant has nine theses there, one must endeavor to understand the others.

The eighth thesis is located only a couple of pages after the relevant passages quoted by

Kleingeld and actual y does a lot to explain the disparity between the explanation of

the seventh thesis and what is said in the MM and in TPP. An “external y perfect civil constitution” serving all of humanity seems most straightforwardly to describe the JS

considered global y (and not, say, the Kingdom of Ends).22 It seems to me that this global

22] It is noteworthy that another way to read the eighth thesis is that it refers to the Kingdom of Ends, and that the seventh thesis, and all of Kant’s discussion there about St. Pierre, real y does refer to the JS. In fact, the easiest way to make Kleingeld’s picture fit with Universal History is to read the eighth thesis this way. Kleingeld seems to make this move when she writes: “The final end of history according to the Idea seems to be identical to the ‘moral world’ discussed in the Critique of Pure Reason under the name of the highest good. In the first Critique, this is the ideal […] in which all agents act moral y, and in which, as a consequence of their virtuous action, all are happy (A 809/B 837)” (2009, 185-86). The purpose of this paper, however, is merely to show that my way of reading the text keeps Kant consistent between his works on the topic of the JS considered global y.

I will just briefly say here that the Kingdom of Ends seems out of place in UH, since the work is about our teleology, and the Kingdom of Ends, in no work of Kant’s, is talked about in terms of teleology. Rather, the Kingdom of Ends is talked about as a hope that we must have as a result of our being moral. The question of the final ends of our existence are asked in the context of determinism; namely the questions in UH are asked in terms of cause and effect and what we can expect will happen as a result of what has happened. “Whatever concept one may form of freedom of the will in a metaphysical context, its appearances, human actions, like al other natural events, are certainly determined [ bestimmt] in conformity with universal natural laws. History

– which concerns itself with providing a narrative of these appearances, regardless of how deeply hidden their cause may be – al ows us to hope that if we examine the play of the human wil ’s freedom in the large, we can discover its course to conform to rules [ regelmä ssig] as well as to hope that what strikes us as complicated and unpredictable in the single individual may in the history of the entire species be discovered to be the steady progress and slow development of its original capacities” (UH, 8:17). Kant’s position is hopeful, in that when we look at UH and at the moral works, we see agreement between that which we ought to do and that which eventual y will happen. But there are two points that need to be addressed: Firstly, the Kingdom of Ends is not something we ought to bring about, but rather a hoped for consequence of our doing what we ought to do (determined, so to speak, by the categorical imperative). For example, in the “Canon of Pure Reason” in the first Critique, Kant distinguishes between that which we ought to do (which he says is not appropriate to discuss in there in the first Critique) and that for which we can hope ( CPR, A 805/B 833). Second, the Kingdom of Ends is noumenal and nothing phenomenal can cause anything noumenal, for the noumenal is defined as being separate from the laws of cause and effect ( CPR, A 252/B 308). Thus to include the Kingdom of Ends in UH

is, in a strict sense, unreasonable, from a teleological point of view.

Julian Katz

13

view of the JS must be a voluntary congress of states (even in UH), and this seems further supported by the fol owing two interesting bits from TPP: (1) aside from the rights of people in a given state, and aside from the rights of states in their voluntary congress, there is also the concern of the right of people to have a kind of world citizenship in “a universal nation of men ( ius cosmopoliticum).” Kant writes that this latter right is “necessary in relationship to the idea […] of perpetual peace” ( TPP, 8:349). Furthermore, (2) in Kant’s discussion of the second definitive article for perpetual peace – “The right of nations shall be based on a federation of free states” ( TPP, 8:354) –, he writes concerning this federation: This league [of peace] does not seek any power of the sort possessed by nations, but

only the maintenance and security of each nation’s own freedom, as well as that of the

other nations leagued with it, without their having thereby to subject themselves to

civil laws and their constraints (as men in the state of nature must do) ( TPP, 8:356).

Thus, it seems to me to be a bit myopic to view the seventh thesis as referring to the JS and to assume that Kant means for the eighth thesis to describe some other universal ideal

(e.g., the Kingdom of Ends). We need not add the assumption that Kant has fundamental y

changed his mind as to what constitutes the JS at the global level (unless we think he did

this in the course of only two pages!).

jkatz9@tulane.edu

REFERENCES

Babst, D. 1964. Elective Governments – A Force for Peace. Wisconsin Sociologist 3: 9-14.

———. 1972. A Force for Peace. Industrial Research 14/2: 55-58.

Caranti, L. 2017. Kant’s Political Legacy: Human Rights, Peace, Progress. Cardiff: University of Wales Press.

Doyle, M. W. 1983a, 1983b. Kant, Liberal Legacies, and Foreign Affairs. Parts I and II, Philosophy and Public Affairs 12/3 and 12/4: 205-35, 323-53.

Kant, Immanuel. 1983. Idea for a Universal History with a Cosmopolitan Intent. In Ted

Humphrey (trans. and ed.), Perpetual Peace and Other Essays: on Politic, History, and Morals, 29-40. Indianapolis, IN: Hackett Publishing Company. [UH]

———. 1983. On the Proverb: That may be true in Theory, but is of No Practical Use. In Ted

Humphrey (translated and edited), Perpetual Peace and Other Essays: on Politic, History,

and Morals, 61-92. Indianapolis, IN: Hackett Publishing Company. [TT]

———. 1996. Metaphysics of Morals. Translated and edited by Mary J. Gregor. New York, NY: Cambridge University Press. [ MM]

———. 1996. Toward Perpetual Peace. In Mary J. Gregor (edited and translated), The Cambridge Edition of the Works of Immanuel Kant: Practical Philosophy, 311-51. New York, NY:

Cambridge University Press. [ TPP]

———. 2003. Critique of Pure Reason. Translated and edited by Norman Kemp Smith. New

York: Plagrave Macmil an. [ CPR]

Kleingeld, Pauline. 2009. Kant’s Changing Cosmopolitanism. In Amélie Oksenberg Rorty

and James Schmidt (eds.), Kant’s ‘Idea for a Universal History with a Cosmopolitan Aim’: A critical guide, 171-86. New York: Cambridge University Press.

14

Kant’s ‘Bund’: A Voluntary Reading

———. 2012. Kant and Cosmopolitanism: The Philosophical Ideal of World Citizenship. New York: Cambridge University Press.

Rousseau, Jean-Jacques. 1761. Extrait du Projet de Paix Perpétuel e de Monsieur l’Abbé de Saint Pierre. In Bernard Gagnebin and Marcel Raymond (eds.), Oeuvres Complètes vol. III, 563-89. Paris: Gal imard, 1964.

———. 1782. Jugement sur la Paix Perpétuel e. In Bernard Gagnebin and Marcel Raymond

(eds.), Oeuvres Complètes vol. III, 591-600. Paris: Gal imard, 1964.

Saint-Pierre, Charles-Irénéé Castel, Abbé de. 1713. Projet pour rendre la Paix Perpétuel e en Europe.

Utrecht: Schouten.

Public Reason 10 (1): 15-32

© 2018 by Public Reason

Mill’s Political Perception of liberty: idiosyncratic,

Perfectionist1 but essentially liberal

Leonidas Makris

Aristotle University of Thessaloniki

Abstract: There is a dominant perception of liberty among most contemporary liberals. It is one close to empiricism’s portrayal of freedom as a natural right of every person to advance her interests. According to this view, there are no demanding conditions under which people can

be regarded as free agents but their unfettered behaviour from external inhibitions. It is widely thought that Mil ’s liberalism does not deviate considerably from this tradition. The present text suggests a different reading of the gist of Mil ’s political rationale. Highlighting the positive

– in Berlin’s sense – aspects of his political y demanding concept of liberty which successful y combines facets of different traditions serves the purpose to stress the alternative features of his approach. Underlining the active political intervention Mill is instructing by implicating the state to preserve the essence of freedom and induce it in society, manifests how his position diverges from that of mainstream neutralist liberals.

Key words: liberty, autonomy, individuality, perfectionism, Mill John Stuart.

Mill is often portrayed just as an unambiguous defender of the freedom to engage in

any human behaviour not perceived harmful to others. It will be claimed that such a view of

his moral and political philosophy is an unfair and incomplete one. His concept of liberty

is overall consistent with his ideal of human flourishing and of a liberal society; a society prospering only when it promotes civic patterns and values transcending the picture of

an individual concentrated exclusively in self-interested activity. This conclusion is not

though as straightforward as it might sound. Mil ’s conception of freedom carries strong

influences from different and, to a certain extent, antagonistic traditions. They range from

empiricism’s view of freedom as a natural right of every individual securing her self-interest to ancient Greek and romantic groundings of liberty in the capacity of humans to act in

accordance to rational moral law. Contrary to many interpretations of Mil ian liberty

as prioritizing empiricism’s emphasis on the freedom to pursue one’s private passions2 I

believe that the latter pole of thought had a more profound impact on his understanding

of freedom. The German Romantics as well as a direct recovery of Greek ideas of self-

development are active influences shaping Mil ’s ethical thought. “[His] liberal idea was

1] There is an ample range of interpretations attributed to ‘perfectionism’, e.g. Wall (2008), Haksar (1979), Finnis (1987), Gray (2000b), Hurka (1993), Rawls (1973). The way I use the term here follows more that of Wal . It does not specify the precise content of activities qualifying as perfectionist nor does it dictate political authorities to maximise them. Promoting ideals of human flourishing does not equal promoting excel ence. Perfectionism here is compatible with the harm principle in advancing autonomy but in the way I see Mill as interpreting the notion of ‘harm’ i.e. promoting both negative and positive duties in order for people not to be harmed. It resembles also Hurka’s perfectionism in the sense that it pursues as a worthwhile political aim (valuable) autonomous agency.

2] See Berlin (1969), Rees (1985), Ryan (1991), Fiss (2003), Elshtain (2003), etc.

16

Mil ’s Political Perception of Liberty: Idiosyncratic, Perfectionist but essential y Liberal

[more] a romantic-hel enic idea of free self-development in every aspect of one’s human

power.” (Skorupski 1999, 224-25)

Notwithstanding the above, Mill chal enged the view that ancient classical and

modern as well as German romantic and its al eged counterpart, British empiricist views of

liberty are at irreconcilable odds. While Mill values empiricism’s protection of individual

rights, he also shares with the romantics the need for a more substantive view of freedom,

one of a competent individual using freedom wel . By embracing in his concept of liberty

self-legislation and self-determination, he refutes justice as a mere adherence to rules

assigning to it an ethical outlook. By encouraging the cultivation of human perfection and

general moral development Mill attempts to chal enge the view that there is an established

antithesis between self-interest and universal obligations in the decision-making process.

Chal enged forceful y also by Krause (2002) this dichotomy is easily traceable in current

political theory and philosophy. It consists, on the one hand, of empiricism’s self-interests as expressed by some of its advocates3 and, on the other hand, of moral idealism’s

autonomy as expressed for the most part by Kant and Rousseau. Freedom identified

with self-interested activities, without a higher or lower content or a direct relation to the public good, contrasts autonomy as a higher form of freedom focusing on acting for the

universal good and not for ourselves. Mill opposes this dichotomy by maintaining that

forms of self-interested conduct can also be higher forms of freedom and contributors to

the general good.

The current prevalent strand of liberalism, dominated by a neutralist approach

towards the good, can certainly benefit from such an interpretation of Mil . The influence

of such a classical and fervent supporter of freedom on the course of liberal thinking

can be powerful since the interpretation of the core concept offered here is distinctive.

Particularly when in opposition to what most contemporary liberals suggest, what I see

as the gist of his perception of liberty, justifies an interventionist state expected to take active measures in order to be able to essential y defend it. The fact that I will be largely disregarding the utilitarian component in Mil ’s theory of freedom is not only related

to the huge attention his utilitarianism has already attracted. It is also an outcome of the

perfectionist analysis that I here suggest as cogent in order to grasp the gist of Mil ian

liberalism. According to this analysis, Mil ’s thought is permeated by a particular type of

perfectionism. Thus, even his concept of utility has a hierarchical and qualitative aspect

3] Devigne (2006) classifies as important empiricists promoting self-interested activities, among others, Hobbes, Locke and Hume. Indeed, Locke follows Hobbes in linking the idea of the good with human desires, pleasure and pain with good and evil (Locke 1975). However, Locke and Hobbes differ considerably since Locke believed in stringent divine limits in the self-interested action (Patten 2006).

Thus, Devigne mistakenly classifies him as chiefly instigating self-interest. For Locke God created man and we are God’s property (Uzgalis 2007). It follows for example that for him man ‘has no liberty to destroy himself’ or commit suicide (Locke 1966) restricting accordingly his self-directed activities.

Leonidas Makris

17

(Utilitarianism CW x, 1985) which lies on a perfectionist basis and undermines the

fundamental principles of utilitarianism.4

I. USING DIFFERENT FREEDOMS

Leaning towards positive freedom as a self-directed moral existence yet not opposed

to the classic liberal tradition as original y conceived, Mill uses indeed the term liberty in various ways. As he acknowledges when young he was more sympathetic to the empiricist

thesis accepting the link between ‘unprocessed’ necessity and freedom. Somehow

apologizing for such earlier ideas, in his Autobiography (CW) Mill criticizes the lack of a self-conscious state of mind in empiricism’s rationale where there is no difference between being

“conscious of a feeling” (or desire) and “merely having the feeling.” (CW xxxi 1989, 138)

It is not only during his younger age that Mill uses liberty in a different way. A very

thoughtful typology of the various uses that we can encounter throughout his work is

offered. “Negative freedom”, “rational self-direction”, “autarchy” and “autonomy” (Gray

1996, 74). This last notion though transmits better the kernel of Mil ’s liberalism and as

such deserves more attention here. Mill should not be associated with libertarianism and

a negative conception of autonomy that misrepresents his notion of self-development. It is

unfair to Mil ’s liberalism to use a primarily negative right of autonomy, which, when coming into play, describes solely Mil ian individuals with powers already partly developed. Such

an approach is faithful neither to Mill nor to current accounts of autonomy. It attempts

to distance Mil ian political philosophy from a more col ectivist, social democratic

version of liberalism, leading it towards its libertarian pole (Donner 1991). Despite

getting right Mil ’s overall evaluation, his ‘social y embedded’ concept of liberty and his

cardinal commitment to help all people to lead meaningful lives, a two-folded comment

should complement Donner’s position regarding Mil ian freedoms. Firstly, it is a fact that

throughout his work Mill uses the term liberty in different ways. In Logic and Hamilton’s Philosophy for instance Mill argues that in essence only some individuals do in fact self-amend. But overall Mill also confirms Donner’s egalitarian description postulating that

all individuals should have options to self-amend their character (Devigne 2006, 70). In

any case, we should stress that it is not justified to argue that Mill was a restrictive negative libertarian. Even Gray, who is accused for doing that (Donner 1991), actual y sees in

Mil ’s work a “positive state action to benefit” people and “a large range of desirable state 4] Bentham’s utilitarianism (1996) entitles humans to pursue as an end pleasure and the biggest amount of happiness they can get. This is regardless of how each individual indulges in pleasure since this can be very subjective. His utilitarianism evaluates actions simply based upon their consequences and in particular the overall happiness created for everyone affected by the action. Contrary to this, Mil ’s utilitarianism (CW x 1985, 212-14) is dominated by the verdict of ‘competent judges’ who are better equipped to decide the best among pleasures and modes of existence. The ‘judges’ are people who manage to experience both higher and lower pleasures, and if they have to choose, they opt for the former. This is yet another strong evidence of Mil ’s perfectionism, an aspect which deserves our attention and dominates not only his liberalism but also his concept of utility.

18

Mil ’s Political Perception of Liberty: Idiosyncratic, Perfectionist but essential y Liberal activities having nothing to do with harm prevention”, adding that the Mil ian principle

of liberty is not at all violated by such interventions providing they are not authoritative

(Gray 1996, 61-63). Secondly, it is true that despite being blamed for identifying always

autonomy with negative freedom, Gray clearly distinguishes between the two of them

(1996, 74, 77). He also finds in On Liberty “unmistakable traces of a Kantian conception of autonomy, absorbed by Mill […] from Humboldt” (1996, 78), a romantic view that clearly

criticized the empiricist negative conception of liberty.

To thinkers like Rousseau and Kant liberty as self-determination is not just the

unfettered pursuit of someone’s empirical desires. If people are to be really free they must be autonomous managing and regulating their lives in a mode presuming the distinction

between the environment and self (Rousseau 1987; Kant 1996). This is exactly the

autonomy attributed to Mill when he says that, on top of exercising rational capacities in

objective choice-conditions, an autonomous agent should be to some extent disentangled

from the conventions of his social environment and from other people’s influence. Such

an ideal of personal autonomy is among Mil ’s cardinal commitments. Mil ian autonomy

should by no means be identified with a passive, negative, libertarian and individualistic

tradition. Mill argues for liberty not because its protection reassures a society of free men; Mill seeks to promote a society of autonomous people whose actions express principles, fruits of a process of critical reflection. More openly than it is with ‘autarchy’, Mil ian

‘autonomous agency’ is something to be achieved and should not be regarded as a natural

endowment or inheritance. (Gray 1996)

Gray’s typology with the different nuances of freedom is therefore apt to describe

not only the strictly negative ‘self-regarding area’ but also the positive notion of ‘self-

development’ supported strongly by a robust concept of liberty as autonomy, both

encountered in Mil ’s work. They are respectively described by Mill himself: “[Negative

freedom as] a sphere of action in which society […] has if any, only an indirect interest;

comprehending all that portion of a person’s life and conduct which affects [mainly]

himself”. Simultaneously, Mill relates the positive perception of freedom with people’s

interconnectedness. Since the conduct of any society member affects others, the positive

encouragement of her development can potential y prevent harm to others. “No person

is an entirely isolated being; it is impossible for a person to do anything seriously or

permanently hurtful to himself, without mischief reaching at least to his near connections,

and often far beyond them” (CW xvi i 1977, 225, 280). Mill indeed uses the term liberty

for two complementary, but distinct, conceptions of freedom. The first concentrates on

limiting the individual’s external coercion by the state and society and the second on

cultivating developed human beings capable of forming their own decisions and desires.

The co-existence of different concepts of freedom does not constitute an inability from

Mil ’s part to define and distinguish adequately self-regarding from other-regarding

spheres or the concept of ‘effects’ from ‘interests’. Niggling about such differences seems

to be more related to the inappropriateness of an account to accommodate Mil ian

autonomy expressed as perfectionist individuality, supported positively as self-mastery

Leonidas Makris

19

and linked with a particular type of human flourishing (On Liberty CW, chap.3). Rees

(1985) general y subscribes to the view of Mill as a leading exponent of the negative

idea of liberty as plainly the absence of restraint. Due to the absence in his work of a

methodological y cogent typology of liberty, in reaching conclusions of the outmost

importance for the essence of freedom, Mill indeed sometimes uses indiscriminately

the term liberty to convey its normative (positive) as well as its more neutral (negative)

meaning. This surely explains the agreement between many5 that his ‘one very simple

principle’ of liberty is anything but simple.

II. PREVAILING AUTONOMY

Despite the ramifications of a process needed to elicit the terminology6 and the

evaluation of the different Mil ian freedoms, an overall conclusion about the moral

and political core of Mil ’s celebrated principle can be quite effectively deduced.

Notwithstanding the ambiguity that a distinction between negative and positive

understanding of liberty posits to interpret Mil ’s spirit as establishing a negative thesis

concerning freedom is mistaken (Berger 1984). Berlin commits this mistake when he

interprets Mill as primarily focusing on a limited area of personal freedom which should

by no means be violated (1969). As Devigne (2006) observes, nearly all contemporary

commentators portraying Mill as the archetypical theorist of negative liberty do it by

disregarding his concern for wisdom.7 Construing chiefly Mil ’s theory as ruling out

strictly interference with the freedom of others and forbidding social control, just because

Mill said that society may interfere with individual conduct only “to prevent harm to

others” (CW xvi i 1977, 223), oversimplifies his notion of ‘harm’ as well as his account of

freedom overal . Thus seen, the essence of Mil ’s work is directed at establishing a negative thesis of freedom. Berger is right to find this misleading since it greatly underestimates the most distinctive features of his work. His liberalism, as Berger puts it, is clearly a powerful, innovative and positive doctrine. “This is the doctrine of the importance to human well-being of individual self-development, or, as I prefer to call it, autonomy.” (1984, 229)

Berger’s view affirms that such a notion of autonomy – interconnected well with

his concept of happiness of the competent judges – is in accord with Mil ’s perfectionist

notion of self-development. It is such a concept of autonomy that can express better the

essential spirit of his freedom and his liberalism by combining – as mentioned above – two

seemingly different traditions. On the one hand, Mill stresses intel ectual development

as the core of rational and critical reflective skil s indispensable to achieve autonomy, he

emphasizes the importance of liberty of choice and of self-determination and he combines

individuality and authenticity. On the other hand, he articulates clearly his view of the

5] For example, Gray (1996) and Rees (1991).

6] Mill never uses for example the term autonomy to describe his freedom.

7] Devigne (2006) regards as notable exceptions Thompson (1976) and Berkowitz (1998).

20

Mil ’s Political Perception of Liberty: Idiosyncratic, Perfectionist but essential y Liberal ideal person – one who has achieved balance and harmony between moral, intel ectual

and affective development – of freedom and individuality with sociality, attachment and

caring for others. He enunciates a view of human flourishing postulating no inconsistency

in the need to combine in a happy human life these sides of self-development. Such an

enriched ideal concept of autonomy combining self-mastery and exertion of social

solidarity approximates the essence of Mil ’s account of liberty and resonates in Donner’s

explication of it. This is because the latter is aware of the overlapping between such

treatments of autonomy and parts of Mil ’s self-development i.e. what Donner sees as his

quintessence of liberty. (Donner 1991)

Such a concept of autonomy as self-development expresses better Mil ’s gist of

liberty and his view of social feelings; in addition, it is also in accordance with his notion of happiness. Mill sees liberty as a prerequisite of happiness for specific reasons. For

him human development – a prerequisite of elevated happiness – is feasible only when

people are free. An objectively sound ideal is necessary to achieve genuine happiness with

altruistic life being such an ideal. While it cannot be imposed as a moral obligation – a

condition for the ideal of altruism is its spontaneity – when people embrace it voluntarily

it becomes a great source of self-realising happiness. For Mill self-development is linked

with ideals of living and forms part of an overall argument connecting happiness and

freedom; thereby it has a prominent place in his theory (Skorupski 2006). Mil ’s liberty

does not rest on “the idea of abstract right, as a thing independent of utility”; a utility based on human flourishing depicted in the ideal decisions of competent judges and conceived

in order to promote human development, that is, “in the largest sense, grounded on the

permanent interests of man as a progressive being” (CW xvi i 1977, 224). Such ‘permanent

interests’ in Mill stem from people’s potential for free self-development incorporated

deeply in the core of his ethical and political outlook; an essence of human good as

something dynamic, developmental and individual (Skorupski 2006). In order to achieve

specific human potentialities that Mill clearly favoured, what idealists of the nineteenth

century cal ed ‘self-realisation’, or what he cal s ‘moral freedom’ (see Logic and Hamilton’s Philosophy, CW), he supported good social institutions enabling the flourishing of free self-development. The perfect compatibility between Mil ’s liberal ideal of self-culture

and his greatest happiness principle is evident. Only free self-culture combined with rules

protecting society can lead to full self-development, and solely by completing the self-

development of people’s potential we can obtain high forms of happiness. Once again,

we can see that Mill is in favour of self-realisation or autonomy expressed in Aristotelian

fashion but possibly via a rationale of romanticism. The teachings of Coleridge, Kant

and others had an impact on Mil ’s initiative to emphasize the capacity for individual

self-mastery and the exertion of wilfulness. “A person feels moral y free who feels that

his habits or his temptations are not his masters, but he theirs: who even in yielding to

them knows that he could resist” (CW vi i 1974, 841). Mill refers to an advanced quality

of rational will as ‘moral freedom’ and like Kant, identifies it with reliable virtue. This

is evident in the fol owing: “[W]e must feel that our wish, if not strong enough to alter

Leonidas Makris

21

our character, is strong enough to conquer our character when the two are brought into

conflict in any particular case of conduct. And hence it is said with truth, that none but a

person of confirmed virtue is completely free.” (CW vi i 1974, 841)

Mill evidently distinguishes between better and worse ways of life and he associates

this differentiation closely with freedom. He ranks freedom through self-mastery higher

than servility to custom or to pressing physical needs. His freedom resonates the stated

Aristotelian view for the priorities of human soul, with reason guiding the mortal clay’s

passions toward virtue (Aristotle 1985). Unlike Aristotle, though, Mill does not identify

in detail the particular life a self-directed individual should lead or the exact choice-

worthy goods and virtues he should favour, widening thus the range of life-styles within

which any person may hope to attain his excel ence. It is what Gray cal s Mil ’s affinity for pluralism (1996) which merges smoothly with the culmination of his freedom, that is, the

ability to desire “for its own sake, the conformity of [one’s] own character to [a] standard

of excel ence, without hope of good or fear of evil from other source than [one’s] own

inward consciousness” (CW x 1985, 95). It is clear Mill promotes an ideal of a certain type

of individual as the capable one to attain ‘complete freedom’ (Logic, CW). This stems also

from his discussion in Utilitarianism (CW x 1985, chap. 2) where he favours a developed mind forming a type of character that evolves into a good in itself. And this preference can be attributed, among other things, to “love of liberty and personal independence” (CW x 1985,

212). Moral freedom implicates the reassurance of the opportunity for the development of

character based on the cultivation of mental faculties and a level of self-consciousness that permits someone to reflect upon his own state of mind. It is a kind of character re-evaluation and self-amendment. “[The] feeling of our being able to modify our own character if we

wish, is itself the feeling of moral freedom which we are conscious of” (CW vi i 1974, 841).

Again, we can observe Mil ’s emphasis on romantic aspects of individual and liberty. This is

because he opposes “the supposed [empirical] alternative of admitting human actions to be

necessary” and inevitable, i.e. a result of an excessively deterministic process, “inconsistent with […] instinctive consciousness, as well as humiliating to the pride and even degrading

to the moral nature of man.” (CW vi i 1974, 836)

III. INDIVIDUALITY AS AUTONOMY

It is not only the concept of moral freedom or liberty that occasional y conveys the

message of what I cal ed autonomy but also Mil ’s notion of individuality: “It is desirable

[…] that in things that do not primarily concern others, individuality should assert itself.

Where […] customs of other[s] […] are the rule of conduct, there is wanting one of the

principal ingredients of human happiness and quite the chief ingredient of individual

and social progress” (CW xvi i 1977, 261). Crisp too draws a paral el between Mil ’s

individuality and a notion of autonomy defined in a perfectionist way. Apart from seeing

Mil ian individuality as a minimum requirement to run our own life and not merely

rely on social custom, his elucidation approximates the present one. “We might call this

22

Mil ’s Political Perception of Liberty: Idiosyncratic, Perfectionist but essential y Liberal autonomy, though that term is not found in Mil ” (Crisp 1997, 196). Based on a simple

analysis of the word’s etymology, Crisp attributes to Mill a notion not merely envisaged

as a capacity adding to one’s welfare but as exertion of that capacity in self-government.

Combining the indispensable role of rationality, the value of intel ectual development for

good self-government and components of individuality – all of foremost importance for

Mil ’s ‘true liberty’ – Crisp fuses these elements in his notion of autonomy. While involving spontaneity, Crisp’s autonomy is not just that. As a constituent of individuality and so of

welfare, autonomy necessarily implicates the development of people’s own potentialities.

Pointing to the ideal-regarding aspect of Mil ian freedom he draws the paral el between

reflective arrival at true belief and the exercise of autonomy as consisting in the cultivation and use of intel ectual capacities. (Crisp 1997, 196)

Crisp’s assertion finds abundant support in Mil ’s work. Fol owing Humboldt (1993),

Mill ascertains that “individuality of power and development”, the “end of man”, has two

prerequisites, “freedom and variety of situations”. Individuality of development and

freedom are fused in autonomy because “the human faculties of perception, judgement,

discriminative feeling, mental activity, and even moral preference, are exercised only

in making a choice”. And the constituents of individuality – ‘freedom and variety’ –

through their union give rise to “individual vigour and manifold diversity, which combine

themselves in ‘originality’”. It is of a pre-eminent significance for Mill to stress that “the faculties are cal ed into no exercise by doing a thing merely because others do it, no more

than by believing a thing because others believe it”. “He who does anything because it

is the custom, makes no choice” while the one who fol ows his “own reason”, “his own

feelings and character” is the one “who employs all his faculties” and therefore “chooses

his plan for himself” (CW xvi i 1977, 261-62). Subsequently, individuality expressed with

originality portrayed in one’s own strong feelings, impulses and will – filtered with their

appropriate cultivation – is outspokenly linked with a particular ideal of character and

grounded in Mil ’s view of human nature. “To say that one person’s desires and feelings

are stronger and more various than those of another, is merely to say that he has more of

the raw material of human nature and is therefore capable […] of more good”. Construed

like this, as plentiful of “the sternest self-control”, individuality is delineated as the source of “love of virtue” and “energetic character” (CW xvi i 1977, 263-64).

A person whose desires and impulses are his own – are the expression of his own nature,

as it has been developed and modified by his own culture – is said to have a character. One

whose desires and impulses are not his own, has no character, no more than a steam-engine

has a character. If, in addition to being his own, his impulses are strong, and are under the government of a strong wil , he has an energetic character. (CW xvi i 1977, 264)

Summing up the arguments unfolded here we could claim that vital for the

understanding of Mil ’s liberalism is to recognize that loss of freedom is not identified

with coercion by others. Lack of self-development of character also entails loss of liberty.

As we can see human perfection for Mill consists not solely of the application of

rationality and of an active attitude towards life. He makes it conspicuous that it also

Leonidas Makris

23

demands the elevation of the wil . He notices the positive role impulse can play to render

the individual capable of gaining self-command. Consistent with his analysis of the ancient

Greek spirit, Mill links powerful desires with strong wil s and postulates that a stronger

will facilitates the path to an autonomous and ingenious existence. “There is no natural

connexion between strong impulses and a weak conscience. […] Desires and impulses are

as much a part of a perfect human being as beliefs and restraints”, providing the former

ones are “properly balanced” (CW xvi i 1977, 263). Hence, Mill contends that when

guided internal y by wil , justice, and reason, desire “contributes to human perfection”; if a society neglects the role of strong desires it impedes progress and it undermines the general good (Devigne 2006, 167). The authenticity therefore of a developed individuality, which

among other things presupposes a will forged around strong desires, evokes the picture

of human perfection which, in order to be complete, includes promoting the public good.

The gradual unravel ing of the Mil ian autonomy seems to be disclosing a very

rich and detailed vision about human flourishing. Genuine individualism is decisively

supported by reason, wil , strong desires, dignity and duty to oneself; only when such

individuality is approximated real social and political progress becomes attainable. The

thorough and unfeigned conception of freedom, linked with the ability to overcome

barriers like a dominant public opinion and personal impediments like unbridled desires,

is in Mill closely tied to self-development. If one wants to pursue an active self-development and determination – in turn linked with Mil ’s view of human nature and excel ence –

he “must use observation to see, reasoning and judgement to foresee, activity to gather

materials for decision, discrimination to decide, and when he has decided firmness and

self-control to hold to his deliberate decision”. He definitely requires all these qualities

and their exercise to be employed precisely by “his own judgment and feelings” (CW xvi i

1977, 263). Without them, the whole merit of human existence is chal enged: “What wil

be his comparative worth as a human being? It real y is of importance, not only what men

do, but also what manner of men they are who do it”. And in a direct link between self-

development and the underlying basis of forming an admirable human essence, he adds

that the task of self-development is to exemplify this kind of man. “Among the works of man,

which human life is rightly employed in perfecting and beautifying, the first in importance

is surely man himself”. Yet seeing development as multifaceted, Mill stresses that human

nature is not a machine to be programmed according to a detailed prescription. It should

be treated like “a tree, which requires to grow and develop itself on all sides, according to the tendency of the inward forces which make it a living thing.” (CW xvi i 1977, 263)

Mill derives his concept of individuality from an explanation of human well-

being which takes account of our developmental and ‘progressive’ nature. Human

nature, well-being and individuality are interwoven in a two-fold argument. With

complete development of potential, we can reach highest forms of well-being. Also,

his liberal ideal of full personal development aims at people’s wholeness by stressing

both education of feeling and education of reason and wil . While Mil ’s individuality

aspires to touch philosophic truth as such, it does so via an innovatively synthesized

24

Mil ’s Political Perception of Liberty: Idiosyncratic, Perfectionist but essential y Liberal perspective combining different elements. His individuality weaves together romantic

ideas of authenticity, revealing the unrepeatable and ingenious parts of a person, and the

classical “perfectionist emphasis on development” aiming at advancing the higher powers

of human nature (Muirhead 2004, 116). Mill does indeed combine several elements of

different perspectives in his enriched concept of individuality discerned as autonomy. In

addition to the Humboldtian and Kantian perception of autonomy – “the ground of the

dignity of human nature and of every rational nature” (Kant 1993, 41) – Mill uses for the

development of his individual ingredients from various analyses. His affinity to cultivate

reason and promote strong will and desires comes from the ancient Greek tradition; his

picturing of human perfection combining creativity and concern for the public good used

religious and aesthetic culture as instruments of inspiration; his idea of human excel ence

builds on modernity’s fidelity to universal authority while praising Humboldt’s view that

variety of situations is a requisite to individuality (Devigne 2006). The extended array of

different strands of thought that have exerted an influence on Mil ’s multifaceted concept

of liberty could provoke, justifiably at a first glance, an objection about the coherence of

such a notion. In addition, if it is to be interpreted as such, a growing scepticism could arise about its compatibility with liberalism as it is commonly perceived. Reconciling Mil ’s

views on reason and the will and identify how they contribute to the individual’s freedom

is not an easy task.

IV. THE CORE OF MILL’S FREEDOM IS CONSISTENTLY LIBER AL

It is true that Mill faces a chal enge when he attempts to reconcile forms of

individuality implicating higher thoughtfulness and the habitual pursuit of desires.

By attempting to integrate in his thought the reformed platonic dialectic, Coleridge’s

synthetic dialectic and the morality of German Romantics, he formulates a conception

of liberty that combines empiricism’s causality and the romantic conception of free

will aiming at overcoming the common oscil ations in political theory and philosophy.

Oscil ations between al egedly antagonistic conceptions of liberty, empiricist versus

romantic, ancient versus modern. Galston’s interpretation of Mill suggests that liberal

tradition has space for a conception of an intrinsic individual excel ence intertwining

freedom with these diversified components: influenced by romanticism, Mill devises

a liberal conception of individual excel ence as the full flowering of individuality; it

innovatively combines the classical Greek impetus to develop human powers through

activity with the modern realization of the idiosyncrasy of each individual blending

such powers (Galston 1988). Given though Mil ’s stance to introduce an idea of human

excel ence, the question if it can be effectively merged with freedom and variety of

situations as requisites for human individuality remains. Does Mil ’s morality of freedom

fail to meet the chal enge to combine exalted individuality and habitual desires? Can the

habitual and the conscious comprise at the same time key features of the free individual?

How can the personified expression and strenuous identity and will of his liberal self be

Leonidas Makris

25

reconciled with his ideal of self-development? To reply to such queries we should recall

that while Mil ’s liberalism values self-mastery and advances its preconditions, the latter

do not presuppose only objective rational and emotional skil s conceived independently

of our personal inclinations to want certain things. Using our faculties efficiently involves partly the resolute pursuing of the desires we desire. Conscious volition is juxtaposed

beside cultivated reason and fortitude which through continuing practices make the free

individual approximate “the case of the person of confirmed virtue.” (CW x 1985, 238)

The rapprochement of seemingly antithetical components in Mil ’s autonomy is

attained by his commitment to human liberation implying an ideal of the person which

suggests a conception of the good. There is a profound connection between good life as

autonomous and life performed necessarily by a particular ideal type of human being,

the autonomous agent. On the one hand, this ideal excludes heteronomous existence

dominated by unrestrained emotions or by a tradition which people accept without any

chal enge. On the other, as Mill postulates the free approach to customs fosters a certain

type of person. “A different type of human excel ence […] a conception of humanity as

having its nature bestowed on it for other purposes than merely to be abnegated”; more

of a “Pericles” than “John Knox” or “Alcibiades” (CW xvi i 1977, 265-66). Pericles was

indeed Mil ’s greatest hero of antiquity (Bain 1882). Mill compares these historical figures

to il ustrate his preferred notion of human perfection; a fusion of certain qualities leading to ‘the highest possible good’. Aiming at that he consistently puts forward Pericles as an

exemplar of human excel ence (Devigne 2006). Only a personality of such calibre, and no

other with possible concessions in his individual skil s, seems to have made it to comply

with the demanding requirements of Mill inspiring his ideal of a strong autonomy; an

ideal dominating his liberal apprehension of the good. Mil ’s formulation of a distinctively

liberal conception of the good associates the best polity with that which secures that good,

the flourishing of the individual conceived as “strongly autonomous”. “On this reading,

the liberalism of […] Mill is thus ‘perfectionist’ [even] in Rawls’s sense; […] it effectively asserts and enforces a particular conception of the good life.” (Crowder 2002, 36)

It is evident that the Mil ian ideal of autonomy thus conceived could be included

in a species of narrow perfectionism8 as Hurka (1993) defines it, that is, with strong and

exclusive foundations in human flourishing. Despite being one of the focal points of Mil ’s

political message and the one that characterizes the distinctive nature of his liberalism, as mentioned above, it cohabits with different, of minor importance for this matter, exegeses

of liberty. Whilst his ideals of autonomy and happiness convey the perfectionist weight

of Mil ’s morality, their coexistence with freedom defined – fol owing Gray’s typology

– as a negative concept9 confuse Hurka to the extent that he attributes to the latter an

8] The terms ‘broad’ and ‘narrow’ perfectionism here signify respectively accounts where autonomous life is presented either in combination with other basic principles (e.g. utility and rights) or as the cardinal one against which the claims of a morality are weighted. I believe Mil ’s liberalism is described better by the first type of perfectionism. Hurka too uses the above criterion to distinguish ‘narrow’ from ‘broad’ perfectionism.

9] Negative freedom is of secondary importance behind Mil ’s autonomy as exemplified in his

26

Mil ’s Political Perception of Liberty: Idiosyncratic, Perfectionist but essential y Liberal absolute weight. Thus, while I agree with Hurka that Mil ian autonomy as an intrinsic

good can cohabit with another intrinsic good like utility – and in that sense being of

broad nature – they are both in turn linked with a particular perception that Mill has

about human flourishing. To achieve that Mill does not attribute absolute weight to any

free choice negatively defined, as Hurka implies, but to autonomous choices expressing

his perfectionist aim for individual development. Yet, Mill retains a certain commitment

to a negatively defined liberty, meaning that he fosters restrictions on what others can do

to the individual by the exercise of their wil s.

Thus far, negative liberty is an essential condition for the individual’s freedom but

freedom as autonomy is not realised merely because one of its conditions has been met.

Mil ’s central aim remains forming individuals capable of exercising choices skilful y, and

autonomously. That is exactly the autonomy which Hurka incorporates in his Aristotelian

perfectionism and cal s “deliberated autonomy”. The formerly mentioned Mil ian test

of value as expressed by ‘competent judges’ presumes some negotiation of liberty. But

this ‘transfer’ of liberty is permissible only to a lower ‘negative level’, through consulting non-coercive means “because there is much non-coercive promotion of the good that

perfectionism approves” which is consistent with the liberal ideal (Hurka 1993, 151, 159).

And this negotiation of liberty can only take place to the extent that it contributes to the

formation of an autonomous character. Mill clearly supports such a developed character-

individual which can result only by ‘directing’ liberty to such an ideal result. His liberal

ideal could “never gain widespread acceptance until most develop the type of personal

character requisite to its implementation” (Riley 1998, 157). Hence, his notion of negative

liberty independently from his autonomy – proving here the aptness of Gray’s (1996)

terminology – is clearly not absolute but only of an instrumental role in a wider plan that

leads to a perfectionist understanding of liberalism. For Mill a free and potential y happy

individual is expected to express her good and competent nature and developed character.

Therefore, he establishes a link between liberty as autonomy and perfection.

V. THE ROLE OF THE STATE

While Hurka is decisive in defending autonomy from a perfectionist standpoint and

imputing to Mill a similar defence of it, he is ambiguous about Mil ’s freedom negatively

perceived. This specific flaw in Hurka’s superficial analysis of Mil ’s freedom, overly

interpreting it as an absolute principle, is demonstrated in the ambiguity of his view on the Mil ian state. Firstly, he suggests that Mill never wanted the state to interfere with citizens’

lives. Then, confirming Mil ’s perfectionism, he verifies that “neutrality is not a traditional liberal ideal, for it is rejected by Mil : He thinks a person’s choosing badly, although no

reason to coerce her, does justify ‘remonstrating’ and ‘reasoning’ with her”. And Hurka

ideas of individuality and self-development. Baum – like I do here – cal s the latter Mil ’s ‘freedom as autonomy’ (Terchek 2002).

Leonidas Makris

27

(1993) uses this Mil ian argument precisely to stress why the state should be using these

means actively to support the liberal ideal and why therefore his perfectionism is against

state neutrality. Indeed, for Mil , self-development and genuine liberty have certain specific requisites – mental material, institutional – so meaningful development cannot take place

under just any conditions. Favourable conditions do exist for Mill (Val s 1999) and under

them the human potentiality for autonomous agency must be developed. (Baum 1998)

As it is the case with his happiness, he is in favour of the state and society being

actively involved in promoting his ideal of individuality and autonomy. He actual y does

not see the need why a good state should be a power independent from a society where

individual interest and autonomy can flourish. “What was now wanted was that the rulers

should be identified with the people, that the interest and will was the interest and will of the nation. There was no fear of its tyrannizing over itself” (CW xvi i 1977, 218). A good

government should be representing every citizen and hence no one should be afraid of

its influence and policies. Mil ’s view is affected by Coleridge’s stance that there is a need for the institutions to help create a national culture which can moral y help to develop

the citizenry (Coleridge 1983). Mill appears sceptical towards the incentives of many

in England who insist in supporting state neutrality claiming that in an opposite case

its action would be inimical to the public and private interest. “In England […] there is

a considerable jealousy of direct interference by the legislative or executive power with

private conduct, not so much from any just regard for the independence of the individual

as from the still subsisting habit of looking on the government as representing an opposite

interest to the public” (CW xvi i 1977, 222-23). Mill is critical of the obsessive focus to

restrain the government’s ability to confine liberty of action because it disregards whether

the agent’s desires and motives are his own or not. Although he often argues forceful y

against the state’s direct and intrusive interference in private affairs, Mill also maintains that there is enough space for society – within which a functional state operates in

accordance to its directives – to mould the “goodness and wisdom” of its individuals. “If

society lets any considerable number of its members grow up mere children, incapable

of being acted on by rational consideration of distant motives, society has itself to blame

for the consequences”. As it can be inferred, the state should assume an active role in

trying to prevent such an event not only by participating in the shaping of “all the powers

of education” but in influencing positively with its policies “the ascendancy which the

authority of a received opinion always exercises over the minds who are least fitted to

judge for themselves.” (CW xvi i 1977, 282)

The qualities required for full self-development and autonomy are “self-regarding

virtues” as well as “social” ones. “It is equal y the business of education to cultivate both”

(CW xvi i 1977, 277). Mill endorses an activist state which contributes to the material

and institutional prerequisites for self-development. There is a moral obligation in Mil ’s

society to help each other cultivate self-regarding virtues. Failing to comply with such

duty legitimizes society to censure people or raise taxes guaranteeing state education

in self-regarding duties. All this is compatible with Mil ’s liberty principle and whether

28

Mil ’s Political Perception of Liberty: Idiosyncratic, Perfectionist but essential y Liberal society actual y employs such methods is a question of efficient policy, not a matter

touching on liberty. “So Mill is not an ethical neutralist about the state” (Skorupski 2006,

49-50). The enforcement of universal education, the aid to help educate the poor, the duty

of the state to supervise the educational system (On Liberty CW, chap. 5), are not the only

means the state should use to promote the best conditions for an autonomous existence.

This is because education should not be perceived as strictly related only to traditional

teaching; rather “knowledge and culture, which have no obvious tendency to better the

fortunes of the possessor, but solely to enlarge and exalt his moral and intel ectual nature, shall be […] obtruded upon the public” (CW vi 1982, 259). Opposing the libertarian wing

of liberalism Mill also promotes a legal y enforceable taxation for purely redistributive

purposes. In addition, he closely relates taxation with an underlying concept about what is

good for people and how they can acquire more knowledge about it. “It is hence the duty of the state to consider, in the imposition of taxes, what commodities the consumers can best

spare” and select “those of which it deems the use […] to be positively injurious”. Thus, the state should “indirectly discourage conduct which it deems contrary to the best interests

of the agent.” (CW xvi i 1977, 297-98)

In a rare direct intervention of a moralistic sense Mill is even wil ing to relinquish to the state the power to “forbid marriage unless the parties can show that they have the means of

supporting a family” (CW xvi i 1977, 304). Mill usual y suggests solutions for similar issues and does not resort to moral y objectionable imposing measures like this one. The latter

though is yet another indication of the significance he attributes to the ideal conditions for mental advancement and consequently for self-development. Mental cultivation is such a

laudable goal for Mill that can even entail restricting some individual liberties to ensure a good level of education linked with the well-being of the families. Generating conditions

for high forms of individuality is for Mill as significant as establishing equal rights for al .

Against the ‘free-marketeers’ of the time Mill is also in favour of legislative interventions ameliorating the context within which individual choices are made. The legislation to

restrict the working week is an example (Skorupski 2006). The imposed limits to free trade

and the rules enforced on employers by increasing the amount of public control to prevent

fraud or to ensure sanitary conditions and protect the workforce are other examples. “Such

questions involve considerations of liberty, only in so far leaving people to themselves is

always better, caeteris paribus, than control ing them: but that they may be legitimately control ed for these ends, is in principle undeniable” (CW xvi i 1977, 293). Promoting

self-realisation, self-mastery and self-development, ingredients of Mil ian autonomy, is

a task with which the state should comply. Actively seeking to improve people, the most

important feature of good government is “the virtue and intel igence of the human beings

composing the community” (CW xix 1977, 390), something which is certainly not an

infringement of legitimate liberty. As Skorupski puts it, “a liberal state can legitimately

promote conceptions of the good” and “it is not a principle of Mil ian liberalism that the

state should be ethical y or aesthetical y neutral” or that it “should not have a conception

of the good among its core al egiance-inspiring values”. A society with a duty to educate its

Leonidas Makris

29

members about better ways of living should employ the state too for its objective: It breaks

no Mil ian principle to do that through all public institutions and activity funded by a

democratic vote of the citizens. (Skorupski 2006, 103-104)

VI. CONCLUSION

Most of the above-mentioned arguments as well as the perfectionist grounds on

which Mill is defended here clearly separate him from many contemporary liberals.10 Most

of them, fol owing the dominant current of today’s liberalism, think that the state should

not promote any conception of the good. Mill consistently focuses on the problem of

reconciling wisdom and liberty under his concepts of individual exertion and development

as autonomy; to accomplish this he employs the state as an additional help for people’s

moral education. He criticizes a state sterile and neutral towards its citizens’ mental

expansion, questioning the value of an administration of justice perfecting its operating

machinery while ignoring the task of moral education (Devigne 2006). The government

should actively seek to aid and stimulate people’s exertion and development. “The worth

of the State”, Mill asserts, “is the worth of the individuals composing it; and a State which postpones the interests of their mental expansion and elevation […], a State which dwarfs

its men […] will find that with small men no great thing can real y be accomplished” (CW

xvi i 1977, 310). A good polity with a functional government should aim at promoting the

health of the individual’s character, leading it to flourish in both the public and private

domains. Mill contends that whether people become or not autonomous is contingent

upon factors – educational, political, economic and psychological – which can advance

their capacities for autonomy. And the Mil ian state plays an active role in ameliorating all the autonomy-generating conditions. Hence, Mil ’s conception of freedom as autonomy,

presupposing the implication of means and the availability of opportunities for self-

development and self-government, refutes the ostensibly oppositional relationship

between freedom and power; this is because the state’s active intervention in favour of

this freedom-autonomy often personifies power. The misfortune is that the same negative

liberal tradition that assumes this permanent antithesis mistakenly perceives an active

Mil ian state as inimical to freedom. (Baum 1998)

Recapitulating the role of Mil ’s state in contributing to the active promotion

of liberty as autonomy we could claim that it stems from the same perfectionist basis inspiring the conception of the notion itself. Hurka’s propounded model for the liberal

perfectionist state verifies this. Mil ’s state complies with all the criteria which the

Hurkian perfectionist state puts forward. This is because its intervention comes into

play in order to defend a particular concept of liberty which comprises the gist of Mil ’s

political thinking. Respecting citizens’ autonomy by promoting non-coercively the

good, the state favours education not only in its strict sense but also as universal mental

10] E.g. Rawls, Ackerman, Larmore, Nagel, R. Dworkin, etc.

30

Mil ’s Political Perception of Liberty: Idiosyncratic, Perfectionist but essential y Liberal cultivation, provided through taxation and subsidization. While human propensity to

fol ow the good materializes under favourable conditions, people also have other desires

which presuppose help to resist or to accomplish. As Mill proves and as Hurka (1993)

concludes, it is therefore fitting that political y we can favour liberty but reject the ideal of state neutrality.

lmakris2@yahoo.com

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Ryan, Alan. 1991. John Stuart Mil ’s Art of Living. In J. S. Mill On Liberty in Focus, edited by John Gray and G. W. Smith. London: Routledge.

Skorupski, John. 1999. The Ethical Content of Liberal Law. In Ethical Explorations. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

———. 2006. Why Read Mill Today? London and New York: Routledge.

Terchek, Ronald. 2002. Review of B. Baum’s Rereading Power and Freedom in J. S. Mil . The American Political Science Review, 96(2): 397.

Thompson, Dennis. 1976. John Stuart Mill and Representative Government. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

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Mil ’s Political Perception of Liberty: Idiosyncratic, Perfectionist but essential y Liberal Uzgalis, Wil iam. 2007. John Locke. In The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Summer Edition), edited by Edward N. Zalta, http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/sum2007/entries/locke/

(accessed 24 May, 2018).

Val s, Andrew. 1999. Self-Development and the Liberal State: The Cases of John Stuart Mill and Wilhelm von Humboldt. The Review of Politics, 61(2): 251-74.

Wal , Steven. 2008. Perfectionism in Moral and Political Philosophy. In The Stanford

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edu/archives/fal 2008/entries/perfectionism-moral/. (accessed 24 June, 2018).

Public Reason 10 (1): 33-48

© 2018 by Public Reason

Rawlsian Stability and the Hazards of Envy

Alexandros Manolatos

National and Kapodistrian University of Athens

Abstract: This paper explores the role of envy in the third part of A Theory of Justice and chal enges a wide-spread game-theoretic view of stability. The proponents of this view see

Rawls’s account of stability as an attempt to solve a collective action problem. I claim that Rawls treats the development of envious feelings as a distinct source of instability which is not part of a collective action problem and has to be addressed separately. My thesis entails that we shouldn’t read the congruence between the right and the good as the culmination of Rawls’s

overall argument for stability. This reading is supported by the revised account of stability in Justice as Fairness: A Restatement and leads to a better understanding of Rawls’s political turn.

Key words: Rawls, stability, envy, game-theory, Weithman, congruence.

The problem of stability is according to Rawls fundamental to political philosophy.

A political conception of justice must be utopian and at the same time realistic. It must

contain principles and ideals that can be seen as possible, given the circumstances of

justice and the laws and tendencies of the social world.

The central role of stability in Rawls’s political theory is reflected in the structure

of A Theory of Justice.1 The third part of the book is devoted to an examination of the questions of stability and congruence. As Rawls (1971, 55) writes in ΤJ, however attractive a conception of justice might be, it is defective if it fails to engender in human beings a

desire to act upon it. So the main aim of the third part of Rawls’s magnum opus is to show

that the principles selected in the first part are going to generate their own support and are more stable than other principles. This is shown by the assessment of the relative strength

of the sense of justice they cultivate and of the opposite temptations to act unjustly.

The significant role of stability in Rawls’s political philosophy is reflected also by

his turn to Political Liberalism. 2 In the introduction to PL he informs the readers that he decided to revise his theory because the account of stability he presented in TJ was not realistic enough. These revisions were necessary because “the problem of stability is

fundamental to political philosophy and an inconsistency there is bound to require basic

readjustments” (Rawls 2005, xvi ).

Surprisingly, even after the publication of PL, Rawls’s account of stability remained initial y at the margins of the overall academic discussion on his work. Freeman (2007)

has remarked accurately that from all the voluminous commentary on Rawls’s work, very

little of significance has been written on his argument for stability in the third part of TJ. 3

1] All references to A Theory of Justice are to the original edition, unless otherwise stated. The book is cited hereafter as TJ.

2] All references to Political Liberalism are to the expanded edition. The book is cited hereafter as PL.

3] Freeman made that remark almost ten years after the publication of PL. He was one of the first who stressed the importance of stability in Rawls’s work.

34

Rawlsian Stability and the Hazards of Envy

One possible explanation is that most critics saw Rawls’s political turn as a response to the critique of communitarianism. 4

The first significant exclusive commentary on Rawls’s argument for stability was

Paul Weithman’s book Why Political Liberalism? On John Rawls’s Political Turn. Weithman offers a thorough and novel analysis of the third part of TJ, which reveals the role of ideals in Rawls’s argument for stability. The publication of his book revamped the debate

on Rawls’s political turn and sparked an interest in the role of stability in his political

philosophy. At the same time, Weithman’s book established a game-theoretic view of

Rawls’s account of stability in TJ.

In this article my main goal is to oppose this game-theoretic view and to stress the

importance of the special psychologies in Rawls’s overall stability argument.5 I will claim

that the game-theoretic view distorts how Rawls conceives the problem of stability in TJ, since it focuses solely on the congruence argument and the chal enges of mutual assurance

and isolation. I will first outline the game-theoretic view of Rawlsian stability and then I

will propose a different reading that gives equal weight to the problem of envy. This reading reveals the inherent connection of stability with the issue of distributive justice and social status. Envy is a serious chal enge for the justification of justice as fairness because the

inequalities sanctioned by the difference principle are theoretical y unlimited and they

could arouse hostile feelings that threaten social unity. Α large part of Rawls’s account

of stability aims to show that this chal enge can be met by the reciprocal and egalitarian

character of the two principles. If we see the problem of stability only through the lens of

game theory we lose this important aspect of Rawls’s view.

In the final section of the article, I claim that if we abandon the game-theoretic view

we can have a better understanding of Rawls’s political turn.6

I. THE GAME THEORETIC VIEW OF R AWLSIAN STABILITY

In TJ the problem of stability is examined in the third part of the book, which

comprises of three chapters. In the first chapter Rawls presents his theory of the good

and the Aristotelian principle. In the second chapter he discusses how the citizens of a

well-ordered society acquire a sense of justice and he compares the stability of the two

principles of justice with other conceptions. The final chapter examines whether the sense

4] Freeman notes that there is a widespread perception that the revisions Rawls has made to TJ leading up to PL have come largely in response to communitarian criticisms (2007, 175).

5] In TJ Rawls presents envy and spite as special psychologies or special attitudes that limit rational behavior. The will for domination and submission and a peculiar aversion to risk and uncertainty are the other special psychologies he cites in TJ.

6] In a series of papers between 1980 and 1987 Rawls started modifying his theory and revising some of his arguments. These revisions led to the publication of PL and the recasting of justice as fairness as a political and not as a comprehensive conception of justice. In the section “The Revised Account of Stability” I will discuss in more detail the main differences between TJ and PL.

Alexandros Manolatos

35

of justice coheres with our good. The three chapters are interlinked, but the way the overall argument is structured is not so straightforward and has to be reconstructed.

One possible reconstruction is based on the assumption that Rawls conceives the

problem of stability in game-theoretic terms.7 The proponents of this game-theoretic view

interpret the problem of stability in TJ as a col ective action problem that arises from two sources of instability which threaten a well-ordered society.8 The first source of instability arises from the fact that citizens of a well-ordered society will respect the two principles of justice only if they have the assurance that others will act in the same way. This is cal ed by Rawls “the assurance problem” (1971, 270). The second source of instability arises from the

fact that if they know that others comply with their duties, they will be tempted to ignore

their duties and act as free-riders.

Those who support this view hold that Rawls’s argument for stability is targeted

exclusively at solving a generalized prisoner’s dilemma and the related problem of assurance.

They claim that the goal of the third part of TJ is to show that a well-ordered society would not suffer from these two sources of instability and that this is achieved by the congruence

between the right and the good.9 The congruence argument is presented in the section

“Τhe Good of the Sense of Justice”. In this section Rawls argues that citizens of a well-

ordered society would affirm their sense of justice because in that way they could satisfy

four desires. The desire to express themselves as free and equal rational beings, take part in forms of social life that call forth their own and others talents, avoid the psychological cost of hypocrisy and have ties of friendship. The advocates of the game-theoretic view see this

7] The influence of game theory in TJ is not evident only in the argument for stability. Rawls uses a general analogy between society and games which helps him emphasize the idea of fairness (Galisanka 2017). In TJ Rawls refers to this analogy when he discusses the rule of law (1971, 235), the idea of pure procedural justice (1971, 85), the idea of social union (1971, 525) and when he compares institutions with games (1971, 55). Τhere is also an input of game theory in the argument for the selection of principles from the original position, where Rawls introduces the maximin rule (1971, 152). I would like to thank an anonymous referee for constructive comments regarding the overall use of game theory by Rawls.

8] This view is expressed by McCLennen (1989), Weithman (2010), Thrasher and Val ier (2015), Quong (2014) and Freeman (2003, 2007). Freeman and Weithman have contributed decisively in il uminating Rawls’s distinctive understanding of stability. Freeman (2007) reveals how the congruence argument is connected with the Kantian interpretation of justice as fairness. In his seminal book on Rawls’s political turn, Weithman (2010) highlights the role of ideals of conduct, friendship and association in the justification of the congruence argument. Ι find these reflections convincing and I do not intend to challenge them. My objection centers on the fact that they both see the congruence argument as a culmination of the overall argument for stability.

9] John Thrasher and Kevin Val ier (2015) contend that in TJ Rawls attempts to solve the assurance problem by showing that citizens have reason to endorse their sense of justice as part of their good, namely that the right and the good are congruent. This congruence ensures that “each person in the wel -ordered society will be motivated by a sense of justice to comply with the public conception of justice and will know that everyone else is motivated in the same way” and this “common knowledge of compliance” preserves mutual assurance between citizens (Thrasher and Val ier 2015, 937).

36

Rawlsian Stability and the Hazards of Envy

section as the culmination of Rawls’s reasoning on stability, where all the elements of his

theory of the good and his moral psychology are combined and tied together.10

Their view has definitely some textual support. Rawls presents the problem of

stability in game-theoretic terms in two sections of TJ. Ιn the section “Εconomic Systems”

he presents two problems that arise in distributive systems, the problems of isolation and

assurance. He compares the problem οf isolation with “the general case of the prisoner’s

dilemma of which Hobbes’s state of nature is the classical example”, which arises

“whenever the outcome of the many individuals decisions made in isolation is worse for

everyone than some other course of action, even though, taking the conduct of the others

as given, each person’s decision is perfectly rational” (Rawls 1971, 269). Τhe assurance

problem in contrast is associated with the fact that “each person’s wil ingness to contribute is contingent upon the contribution of the others” (Rawls 1971, 270).11

In another section of TJ Rawls writes that there are two tendencies leading to

instability. The first one, arises from the fact that some citizens may be tempted to avoid

fulfil ing their duties, if they believe that they will still benefit from the distribution of public goods. Τhe second one, arises from the fact that citizens may stop contributing

their share if they believe or suspect that others are not contributing theirs. Rawls notes

that this instability is likely to be strong, when the risk of sticking to the rules when others are not, is too high (1971, 336).

There is also textual support that the congruence argument aims to solve the free-

rider and mutual assurance problems. In the end of the section “Τhe Good of the Sense of

Justice” Rawls claims that “the hazards of the generalized prisoner’s dilemma are removed

by the match between the right and the good” (1971, 577). The hazards of the generalized

prisoner’s dilemma refer to the instability that threatens a well-ordered society by the

forces that prompt its citizens to skip their duties. As I mentioned above, Rawls identifies

these forces as the temptation to adopt a free-riding behavior and the lack of assurance

that others will comply with their duties. The match between the right and the good,

namely their congruence, restricts the temptation to act as a free-rider because citizens

in a well-ordered society would judge that they are better off by being just persons than

10] This claim is supported by the fact that at the beginning of the section Rawls writes that “now that all the parts of the theory of justice are before us, the argument for congruence can be completed”

(Rawls 1971, 567). Freeman (2003, 277) for example writes that the congruence argument “begins in Part III of Theory of Justice (TJ), is developed for over 200 pages, and culminates (in Section 86) at the end of a very long book”.

11] It is important to note that Rawls makes clear that his view on stability is different from that of Hobbes. Rawls aims to ensure a moral stability or a “stability for the right reasons” and not a mere modus vivendi. Unlike Hobbes, the aim is not to achieve the obedience to law by the existence of some external mechanism that delivers sanctions. Instead, Rawls purports to show that the two principles of justice can be internalized by the citizens of a wel -ordered society and become a part of their good.

Alexandros Manolatos

37

they would be if they took advantage of others. And the fact that it is publicly known that

everyone is motivated in the same way,12 solves also the problem of mutual assurance.13

II. THE SPECIAL PSYCHOLOGIES AND THE HAZARDS OF ENVY

The game-theoretic view seems well justified if one takes into account the excerpts

mentioned above. Υet there are other parts of this very long book that do not confirm

this view and raise doubts as to whether Rawls was focused solely on the free-rider and

mutual assurance problems. Α large part of the chapter “Τhe Good of Justice” seems to

be completely independent of the overall game-theoretic thinking. More specifical y, in

the three sections where he discusses the problem of envy (80-82), Rawls seems to regard

envy as a separate source of instability that threatens a well-ordered society. There are a

number of passages that support this claim.14

In the section “The Problem of Envy” Rawls presents envy as a col ectively

disadvantageous propensity which is dangerous and worsens the situation of all the

parties involved. He writes that after a conception of justice is selected in the original

position, we must check if it is going to arouse envy at such an extent that “the social

system becomes unworkable and incompatible with the human good” (Rawls 1971,

531). He then notes that regarding justice as fairness, we have to assess if the inequality

al owed by the difference principle is so acute that it generates destructive feelings of envy (Rawls 1971, 532). Consequently, Rawls explains the reasons why envy is so dangerous.

First, when we envy other persons we no longer value what we have and this loss arouses

hostile feelings. Second, we are wil ing to deprive them of their benefits even if we have to 12] The public knowledge of this fact could mean for example the data published by tax authorities and other public institutions.

13] This solution to the assurance problem is briefly mentioned by Rawls (1971, 336) in another part of TJ, where he says that the assurance problem “is to maintain stability by removing temptations of the first kind, and since this is done by public institutions, those of the second kind also disappear, at least in a wel -ordered society”.

14] Rawls uses some aspects of game theory to clarify the special psychology of envy. He notes for example that envy can be collectively disadvantageous. “When others are aware of our envy, they may become jealous of their better circumstances and anxious to take precautions against the hostile acts to which our envy makes us prone. So understood envy is collectively disadvantageous: the individual who envies another is prepared to do things that make them both worse off, if only the discrepancy between them is sufficiently reduced”. Rawls (1971, 532). At the same time envy can also prompt us to excel, which can be collectively advantageous. “A somewhat different case is that of emulative envy which leads us to try to achieve what others have. The sight of their greater good moves us to strive in social y beneficial ways for similar things for ourselves” (1971, 533). In TJ Rawls examines how the first kind of envy can threaten the stability of justice as fairness. This threat is triggered by psychological and social conditions that are separate from the ones that are related with the problems of mutual assurance and free-riding behavior. The problem with envy is not that we don’t have the assurance that others are doing their share, is that we judge ourselves “happy or unhappy only by comparison with others” (Kant 2009, 27). I would like to thank an anonymous referee for comments regarding the relation between envy and game theory in TJ.

38

Rawlsian Stability and the Hazards of Envy

give up something ourselves. Third, when others know that we envy them they may take

preventive measures against possible hostilities (Rawls 1971, 532).

The problem of envy is mentioned by Rawls also in the chapter “The Original

Position”, where he presents stability as one of the criteria that the parties have to take

into account when they choose a conception of justice. In this chapter Rawls relates the

problem of envy with that of stability, while he doesn’t make any reference to the mutual

assurance problem. In particular, he notes that in the last part of TJ he will try to show that the selected principles lead to a well-ordered society where envy and other destructive

feelings are not likely to be strong and that the conception of justice undermines the

circumstances that trigger disruptive attitudes (Rawls 1971, 144).

The above passages from TJ indicate that Rawls treated the problem of envy as

a distinct destabilizing power which is not part of a col ective action problem and a

prisoner’s dilemma. They also indicate that Rawls regarded the problem of envy as an

important test for the two principles of justice.

One possible reply by the supporters of the game-theoretic view is that the

examination of the problem of envy is not distinct from the overall reasoning on the

assurance and isolation problems and the congruence between the right and the good.

For example, Weithman (2010, 141) believes that the conclusions Rawls draws about the

mitigation of envy by the two principles of justice are integrated in the final congruence

argument. He thinks that these conclusions provide an important supplement on Rawls’s

argument that citizens of a well-ordered society regulated by the two principles of justice

would have a desire to avoid the psychological cost of hypocrisy and the desire to have

ties of friendship. These two desires, along with the desire to express themselves as free

and equal beings and the desire to participate in forms of life that call forth their own and others talents, form the grounds of congruence between the right and the good.15

Regarding the first desire, Weithman (2010, 141) points out that it is because of

“the argument in 82” that a typical member of a well-ordered society “would regard the

costs of hypocrisy and deception as high relative to the benefits of the wealth she could

get above her fair share”.16 What is the “argument in 82” according to Weithman? It is

the argument that members of a well-ordered society would not feel envy for those who

have more wealth, because their status is not defined by their relative position in the

distribution of wealth but by the position of equal citizenship. If they know that others

respect them as equal citizens, they would not be moved to seek wealth and economic

status as a means to self-respect. So, the fundamental assertion in Rawls’s argument is

15] The final congruence argument in TJ is that persons who have these four desires would also have a desire to act justly, because by doing so they promote their good.

16] Weithman argues that the idea that members of a wel -ordered society would regard as very high the cost of hypocrisy is not obvious and it needs to be explained. For Weithman, when Rawls says that the cost of hypocrisy would be higher in a wel -ordered society he does not mean it in absolute terms. Instead, he implies that they would be higher relative to what citizens could get by paying them, for example, the greater wealth they would enjoy by cheating on their taxes.

Alexandros Manolatos

39

that “the position of equal citizenship answers to the need we might have thought people

had for economic status” (Weithman 2010, 142). Τhe same holds for the second desire, the desire to have ties of friendship. The members of a well-ordered society would judge

that the potential costs to those with whom they have ties of friendship give them strong

reasons to treat their sense of justice as supremely regulative, since they don’t need more

wealth for self-respect.

Freeman (2007, 153) believes that the argument from the absence of envy is just one

part of the “peculiar array of arguments in chapter 9 of Theory” that shows that the sense of justice is not “in many respects irrational and injurious to our good”.17 In particular,

he maintains that in the final chapter of TJ, Rawls argues that the sense of justice is not arbitrary, entirely conventional and self-destructive, is not grounded in a self-debasing

submission to authority, it accounts for the good of community and it doesn’t mask a lack

of self-worth and a sense of failure and weakness. This array of arguments, in which the

absence from envy is included, is presented by Freeman as part of Rawls’s main argument

for the good of justice, the congruence argument.

Even if Weithman and Freeman were right18 and the absence of envy plays a role

in the congruence argument, this would not be a proof that Rawls treats the problem

of envy as an intrinsic part of a col ective action problem. There are numerous passages

in TJ where Rawls presents envy as a serious threat to the stability of a well-ordered society, a threat which is distinct from the hazards of a generalized prisoner’s dilemma

and cal s for a distinct solution. The destructive character of envy introduces a difficulty

that goes beyond the generalized prisoner’s dilemma. It is not only that we don’t have

the assurance that others are doing their share, but it is also the sidelong glance we cast

at one another, taking an interest in others relative position in the distribution of wealth, income and social status.19

In the sections 80 to 82 Rawls demonstrates why the two principles of justice

al eviate this threat, at least more than the principle of utility. The congruence argument

on the other hand does not deal with the disruptive effects of envy. The argument that

the sense of justice is compatible with a person’s good can be an answer to the problems

of mutual assurance and isolation but is irrelevant to the problem of special psychologies.

17] Freeman responds to Brian Barry’s claim (1995) that the acquirement of a sense of justice is sufficient to prove stability within Rawls’s framework.

18] I believe that the absence of envy is one of the reasons that citizens see their political society as a good, but I don’t think that it functions as a “supplement” argument in the way presented by Weithman.

My claim that we have to treat the absence of envy as a distinct argument for the stability of a wel -ordered society doesn’t mean that it doesn’t have a supportive role in the congruence argument. The mitigation of envious feelings contributes to the good of the citizens of a wel -ordered society. But this shouldn’t over-shadow the fact that Rawls treats envy as a distinct source of instability which is inextricably linked with distributive justice.

19] This point is stressed by Wil iam A. Edmundson (2017, 105) who claims that envy and the special psychologies introduce a new kind of difficulty.

40

Rawlsian Stability and the Hazards of Envy

III. THE ARGUMENT FROM THE ABSENCE OF ENVY

I have argued that the game-theoretic view underestimates the importance of envy

in Rawls’s account of stability by not recognizing it as a distinct source of instability. I

have also argued that the proponents of this view treat the congruence argument as the

culmination of Rawls’s overall argument for stability.

My thesis is that we can have a better understanding of Rawls’s reasoning on

stability if we see the congruence argument as only one part of a larger argument.

Another important part is the argument from the absence of envy. So, on my

interpretation, the overall stability argument is developed in three parts. In chapter

8, Rawls presents a moral psychology designed to show how people in a well-ordered

society can acquire a sense of justice. Ιn chapter 9, Rawls argues that a) members of a

well-ordered society would not be moved be feelings of envy and b) that their sense of

justice would be congruent with their good. The argument from the absence of envy

aims to show how the two principles of justice mitigate the destabilizing feelings of

envy. The congruence argument purports to remove the hazards of the generalized

prisoner’s dilemma.20

I will try to present a detailed reconstruction of the argument from the absence

of envy and its connections with the bases of self-respect. I will emphasize how it

supports the justification of the two principles of justice not only in comparison with

the utilitarian principle but also with a more egalitarian conception. Consequently, I

will look at the survival of this argument in Justice as Fairness: A Restatement. 21

In TJ Rawls argues that self-respect is a primary good and “perhaps the most

important” one (Rawls 1971, 396). This emphasis reveals the importance of self-

respect in the choice of the two principles of justice from the original position. It is

equally important though for the relative stability of justice as fairness as a conception

of justice. In section 29 Rawls defines self-respect as the sense of one’s own worth. It

is the sense that the plan of life we have chosen is worth carrying out. He gives a more

nuanced definition in the chapter “Goodness as Rationality”. There he claims that self-

respect or “self-esteem” has two aspects. The first aspect, is how we sense our own value,

the conviction that our life plan is worth carrying out. The second one, is the confidence

we have in our ability to execute this plan (Rawls 1971, 440).

20] In chapter 9 Rawls (1971, 513) discusses “various desiderata of a wel -ordered society and the ways in which its just arrangements contribute to the good of its members”. Ηe argues that justice as fairness demonstrates the objectivity of judgments of justice, something that can assure us that our sense of justice is not arbitrary and conventional. He shows also that justice as fairness is not grounded in a self-debasing submission to authority, that it can be combined with the good of community and that it enables citizens to express their nature as free and equal human beings. These are also considerations in favor of the stability of justice as fairness. The main difference is that the argument from the absence of envy and the congruence argument correspond to distinct sources of instability.

21] Cited hereafter as JFR.

Alexandros Manolatos

41

This is the reason that makes self-respect a primary good and perhaps the most

important one. Without it “nothing may seem worth doing, or if some things have value

for us, we lack the will to strive for them […] and we sink into apathy and cynicism”

(Rawls 1971, 440).

Rawls stresses that there are two circumstances that support the first aspect of

self-esteem, the sense of our own worth. The first one is having a rational plan of life that satisfies the Aristotelian principle and the second one is finding that others appreciate

who we are and what we do (Rawls 1971, 440). So there is a reciprocal feature on how we

secure our self-respect. Our self-esteem is dependent on how we think our fel ow citizens

value us. Rawls’s strategy is to show that the citizens of a well-ordered society regulated

by the two principles of justice would be immune to destabilizing feelings such as envy

because they would have a strong sense of self-respect.22 In section 81, Rawls claims that

the conception of justice as fairness supports the self-respect of citizens, because they all have the same basic rights and are treated as equals. This is based on the assumption that

in a well-ordered society liberties and rights are more important for the self-esteem of

citizens than their income share.23 Rawls (1971, 545) gives two reasons why liberties and

rights should have priority for securing the primary good of self-respect. First, if their self-respect was anchored in their wealth and income, then the pursuit of status and self-esteem

would be a zero sum game, where the improvement of one person’s position would lower

that of someone else.24 Second, it would be irrational to accept equal division of wealth to

secure equal status and self-esteem, since there are compel ing grounds for al owing an

unequal distribution of wealth. Thus, it is more preferable to support the primary good

of self-respect by giving priority to the basic liberties and defining the same status for al .

Rawls offers two additional points on why justice as fairness would secure self-respect.

The first is that in a well-ordered society the less favored know that the greatest advantages others enjoy work also for their benefit. The difference principle permits deviations from

strict equality only if this would make the less advantaged worst of. This reciprocal feature of the difference principle makes it easier for them to accept the disparities between

themselves and others.25 The second point is that justice as fairness does not associate the

distribution of income and wealth with moral virtue and excel ence. So the less fortunate

22] Rawls makes a straightforward connection between envy and self-respect by assuming that the main psychological root of the liability to envy is a lack of confidence in the worth of our plans of life and our ability to execute them. By contrast, someone with a robust self-esteem has no desire to level down the advantages of others.

23] “The basis for self-esteem in a just society is not then one’s income share but the publicly affirmed distribution of fundamental rights and liberties. And this distribution being equal, everyone has a similar and secure status when they meet to conduct the common affairs of the wider society” (Rawls 1971, 544).

24] This is another point where Rawls uses some aspects of game theory in his overall discussion of the problem of envy.

25] It is a principle which expresses the ideas of fraternity and reciprocity, since citizens feel that the others care for their good and they don’t try to take advantage of their bad luck.

42

Rawlsian Stability and the Hazards of Envy

have no reason to view themselves as inferior. In addition, Rawls (1971, 537) notes that

given the background institutions of a well-ordered society, inequalities are not extreme

and that the various social unions which flourish in a well-ordered society reduce

the painful visibility of these inequalities, because citizens tend to compare their

situation with others that hold positions similar to their aspirations. These features

make it less possible for the less advantaged to experience humiliation.

For all the above reasons, Rawls concludes that justice as fairness is not

challenged by outbreaks of envy and that it seems relatively stable. In the end of

section 81 he states that so long “as the pattern of special psychologies elicited by

society either supports its arrangements or can be reasonably accommodated by

them, there is no need to reconsider the choice of a conception of justice” (Rawls

1971, 541). Τhis could lead to the false conclusion that the argument from the

absence of envy is applied by Rawls only to show that justice as fairness is a stable

and feasible conception that would not be destabilized to a troublesome extent by

destructive feelings of envy. There is no doubt that one of the main aims of Rawls is

to demonstrate how justice as fairness removes the hazards of envy, in the same way

that the congruence argument removes the hazards of the generalized prisoner’s

dilemma. But the absence of envy is also an argument for the relative stability of

justice as fairness. Ιn the third part of TJ and in parallel with other considerations regarding the problem on stability, Rawls compares the relative stability of justice as

fairness with other conceptions of justice. This comparison serves as an important

confirmation of the arguments in favor of the two principles of justice made in the

first part of the book. As Rawls (1971, 498) notes, “other things equal, the preferred

conception of justice is the most stable one”.26

One of the reasons the two principles of justice are more stable from the utility

principle or from a conception of strict equality, is that they lead to social structures

in which envy is not likely to be strong (Rawls 1971, 144). In the third part of TJ, in the section “The problem of relative stability”, Rawls (1971, 499) argues that in a

well-ordered society regulated by the two principles of justice, citizens know that

others don’t take advantage of their bad luck and that they have an unconditional

concern for their good and this caring strengthens their self-esteem. The utilitarian

conception instead, is destructive of the self-esteem of those who rank low in

26] There is an ambiguity in the justificatory role of stability in TJ. There are passages where Rawls (1971, 498) claims that relative stability is crucial in the justification of the two principles: “There seems to be no doubt then that justice as fairness is a reasonably stable moral conception. But a decision in the original position depends on a comparison: other things equal, the preferred conception of justice is the most stable one. Ideal y, we should compare the contract view with all its rivals in this respect, but as so often I shall only consider the principle of utility”. Βut a few pages later Rawls (1971, 504) writes: “These remarks are not intended as justifying reasons for the contract view. The main grounds for the principles of justice have been presented. At this point we are simply checking whether the conception already adopted is a feasible one and not so unstable that some other choice might have been better”.

Alexandros Manolatos

43

the distribution of wealth and income. Given how crucial self-respect is for the

psychological immunity against destructive feelings of envy, the two principles of

justice are more stable than the principle of utility. The greater stability of the two

principles is already implied in the first part of TJ, in the section “Main grounds for the two principles”, where Rawls (1971, 178) claims that one of the reasons for the

choice of the two principles of justice in the original position is that they give greater

support to self-respect and this increases the effectiveness of social cooperation. If

they chose the utility principle they wouldn’t have the support that the reciprocal

character of the two principles provides to their self-esteem.

The test of envy is also important for the comparison of the two principles of

justice with a conception of strict equality. Although, such a conception is initially

excluded in the original position, the parties would have reason to reconsider it if

the inequalities allowed by the difference principle are so great that excite envious

feelings to a dangerous extent. This could be the case for example “if how one is

valued by others depends upon one’s relative place in the distribution of income

and wealth” or if wealth, income and other goods are “fixed and cannot be enlarged

by cooperation” (Rawls 1971, 545). Rawls examines this possible scenario in the

section “The Grounds for the Priority of Liberty” and he concludes that strict

equality should not be considered as a solution, since in a well-ordered society the

self-respect of citizens is secured by their equal civic status.27

IV. THE REVISED ACCOUNT OF STABILITY

The case that the third part of TJ contains an argument from the absence

of envy, apart from the congruence argument, is supported by Rawls’s account of

stability in JFR.

Ιn this book Rawls reformulates the presentation and defense of justice

as fairness, integrating the changes he made in PL and distancing himself from

the partially comprehensive view of the good that he presupposed in TJ. This

reformulation shows how justice as fairness can be understood as a form of political

liberalism and not as a comprehensive doctrine. A comprehensive doctrine is a

set of beliefs that “covers the major religious, philosophical, and moral aspects of

human life in a more or less consistent and coherent manner” (Rawls 2005, 58). Ιt is

comprehensive in the sense that it covers a wide range of values and is not restricted

to political ideals. Ιn TJ justice as fairness was presented as a comprehensive

27] It is worth mentioning that Rawls acknowledges more than once that a socialist regime could be considered as a possible solution to the problem of stability. Ιn his paper “Fairness to Goodness”, he writes that “the principles of justice do not exclude certain forms of socialism and would in fact require them if the stability of a wel -ordered society could be achieved in no other way” (Rawls 1975, 546). In JFR, Rawls raises the question if a liberal socialist regime would have a better chance of stably realizing justice as fairness than a property-owning democracy.

44

Rawlsian Stability and the Hazards of Envy

doctrine because it contained ideals of personal conduct.28 Rawls recasts all the

basic arguments and ideas of TJ and presents them in a way that is consistent with

a political conception of justice. A political conception of justice is not derived

from a single comprehensive doctrine but from ideas implicit in the public political

culture of a democratic society and it is compatible with a wide range of different

comprehensive doctrines.

One of the arguments he revises is of course the stability argument. In PL

Rawls makes a radical change in his account of stability, introducing the idea of an

overlapping consensus between different comprehensive doctrines and repudiating

the idea of congruence between the right and the good. As expected, this change is

preserved in JFR. Rawls (2001, 181) writes that one of the main questions regarding

stability is whether in view of the general facts that characterize a democracy’s

political culture, and in particular the fact of reasonable pluralism, the political

conception can be the focus of an overlapping consensus. The attempt to show

congruence between the right and the good is abandoned, since it can’t be assumed

that citizens accept a particular comprehensive view to which justice as fairness

belongs (Rawls 2001, 187). Along with the congruence argument, Rawls abandons

in JFR the whole game-theoretic view. There is not any mention to the prisoner’s

dilemma or to any other kind of games.29

But although Rawls has removed the congruence argument in JFR, he still

affirms that the two principles of justice should be tested against the destabilizing

effects of envy and other special psychologies. In particular, Rawls (2001, 181)

writes that the parties in the original position must check whether people who grow

up in a well-ordered society acquire a strong sense of justice and are not moved to

act by envy and spite. This is one of the two criteria for the stability of a conception

of justice, along with the possibility of an overlapping consensus.30

If the test of envy was just a part of the congruence argument, one would expect

that Rawls would stop using it after the revisions he made in PL. The fact that he

28] These ideals are based on the Aristotelian principle and the Kantian conception of the person.

In TJ Rawls assumes that citizens of wel -ordered society would form their plans of life by giving priority to the cultivation of their talents and to their autonomy.

29] There is a reference to the problem of mutual assurance, although it is not presented in a game-theoretic context and is viewed more as a necessary condition of stability and less as a distinct threat. Rawls (2001, 196) says that citizens are ready and wil ing to do their part in those arrangements provided they have sufficient assurance that others will also do theirs. This assurance is given by the existence of an overlapping consensus, since citizens know from past experience that others comply with liberal arrangements and come to have increasing trust in one another (Rawls 2001, 197).

30] Rawls notes in JFR that the discussion in sections 81 and 82 of TJ addresses sufficiently the problem of envy and doesn’t need substantial changes. The only addition to the argument from envy is the general remark that the more citizens see their political society as good and the greater their appreciation of the political conception in securing the three essentials of a stable regime, the less they will be prompted by envy and other special attitudes (Rawls 2001, 202).

Alexandros Manolatos

45

maintains this test as a criterion of stability in JFR, which was published in 2001,

supports the view that Rawls treats the destabilizing effects of envious feelings as

a distinct problem from the hazards of a generalized prisoner’s dilemma. In TJ the

argument from the absence of envy solves the first problem and the congruence

argument the second.

V. THE POLITICAL TURN

In PL Rawls abandons any attempt to prove that justice as fairness is a stable

conception because it enables the congruence between the right and the good. He aims to

show instead that justice as fairness can be the focus of an overlapping consensus between

opposing conceptions of the good.

Despite of this sweeping change, the central elements of the account of stability

presented in TJ remain intact in PL. Rawls still holds that we have a capacity for a sense of justice and that under the favorable conditions of a well-ordered society citizens will

develop this capacity. Furthermore, he still views stability as a moral problem which is

distinct from the Hobbesian concern for social order.

But does he still present the problems of assurance and isolation as possible sources

of instability? In Why Political Liberalism? On John Rawls’s Political Turn Weithman argues that in PL Rawls deploys the idea of overlapping consensus so that he can solve the mutual assurance problem and the prisoner’s dilemma, this time taking into account the fact of

reasonable pluralism. The problem now is that in a liberal democratic society there is a

plurality of different comprehensive doctrines and each citizen needs an assurance that

other citizens’ conception of the good doesn’t provide sufficient reason to act against the

demands of justice. The existence and public knowledge of an overlapping consensus

solves according to Weithman (2010, 297) this mutual assurance problem.

In PL however there is not a single mention on the prisoner’s dilemma or any other

col ective action problem. One would expect that if Rawls had in PL a game-theoretic

approach to stability he would have presented the nature of the problem he tries to solve

in a game-theoretic way.

Rawls mentions though something else in the introduction of the second edition of

PL which sheds more light on the problem of stability he tries to solve in PL. He notes that TJ and PL deal with two different sources of conflict (Rawls 2005, lvi i):

There are three main kinds of conflicts: those deriving from citizens’ conflicting

comprehensive doctrines; those from their different status, class position, and

occupation, or from their ethnicity, gender and race; and final y, those resulting

from the burdens of judgments. Political Liberalism mitigates but cannot eliminate

the first kind of conflict, since comprehensive doctrines are political y speaking,

unreconcilable and remain inconsistent with one another. However, the principles

of justice of a reasonably just constitutional regime can reconcile us to the second

kind of conflict. For once we accept principles of justice or recognize them as at least

reasonable (even though not as the most reasonable) and know that our political and

46

Rawlsian Stability and the Hazards of Envy

social institutions conform to them, the second kind of conflict need no longer arise,

or arise so forceful y. I believe that these sources of conflict can be largely removed by

a reasonably just constitutional regime whose principles of political justice satisfy the

criterion of reciprocity. PL does not take up these conflicts, leaving them to be settled

by justice as fairness (as in Theory) or by some other reasonable conception of justice.

Conflicts arising from the burdens of judgments always, however, remain and limit

the extent of possible agreement.

It is my contention that we can have a better understanding of the political turn if

we see it as an attempt to address a source of conflict that didn’t concern Rawls in the

third part of TJ. In PL, Rawls doesn’t mention income inequalities, the alienation of less privileged citizens and the problems that arise from the division of labor, not because he

doesn’t believe that they pose a threat to the stability of a well-ordered society, but because he focuses on the conflicts that arise from inconsistent and unreconcilable comprehensive

doctrines and especial y between religious and liberal comprehensive doctrines. This

is the source of instability he is concerned with in PL. The extensive revisions he made to TJ serve the purpose of presenting a liberal conception of justice which can address this source of conflict. If we see these revisions as a more realistic attempt to solve the

generalized prisoner’s dilemma presented in TJ we don’t grasp that PL marks a shift of focus in Rawls’s project.

It is of course possible to describe the conflicts between religious and liberal

comprehensive doctrines in game-theoretic terms. In a society with a plurality of

comprehensive doctrines citizens can be uncertain as to whether one doctrine may seek

to achieve national preeminence. They need an assurance that others are going to respect

the demands of justice. If not, the mistrust between the different comprehensive doctrines

might weaken citizen’s commitment to their sense of justice. But this description fails

to capture the real character of the political turn. It undermines the change of focus in

Rawls’s thinking. In TJ the problem of reasonable pluralism is ignored and there is not any discussion on how the values of a liberal democratic society can be compatible with

the values of religious comprehensive doctrines. If we describe the conflicts between

different comprehensive doctrines as a special case of a col ective action problem, then we

risk trivializing their depth.

VI. CONCLUSION

A fundamental question that Rawls addresses in TJ is that of political and social

stability. Institutions must not only be just but they must generate their own support

over time. If a just conception of justice fails to achieve this, then another one must be

considered.

Rawls’s argument for the stability of justice as fairness is developed in two stages.

First, he aims to show that a well-ordered society regulated by the two principles of justice would bring about in its members an effective sense of justice. Second, he claims that

their sense of justice would be strong enough to outweigh propensities to act otherwise.

Alexandros Manolatos

47

This claim is based on the idea of congruence. The members of a just society would have a

strong sense of justice because they would affirm that it is part of their good.

According to a game-theoretic view of Rawls’s account of stability the congruence

argument is the culmination of his overall argument for the stability of justice as fairness.

This view is based on the assumption that Rawls’s aim in the third part of TJ is to present a solution to a generalized prisoner’s dilemma and the related problem of assurance. It finds

textual support in section 86 of TJ where Rawls writes that the hazards of the generalized prisoner’s dilemma are removed by the match between the right and the good. But other

passages from TJ indicate that Rawls treats envy as a distinct source of instability which is not part of a col ective action problem. In the sections 80-82 of TJ he shows that the two principles of justice would not generate feelings of envy to a social y dangerous extent.

My thesis is that the overall stability argument in TJ is developed in three parts.

In the first part Rawls claims that people in a well-ordered society would acquire a sense

of justice. He then argues that members of a well-ordered society would not be moved

by feelings of envy and that their sense of justice would be congruent with their good.

The last two parts of the argument respond to two different tendencies that might prompt

citizens to act against their sense of justice.

This reading of the problem of stability in TJ can deepen our understanding of

Rawls’s political turn and is aligned with the revised account of stability in JFR.

manolatosalex@yahoo.gr

REFERENCES

Barry, Brian. 1995. John Rawls and the Search for Stability. Ethics 105 (4): 874-915.

Edmundson, William. A. 2017. John Rawls: Reticent Socialist. Cambridge: Cambridge

University Press.

Freeman, Samuel. 2007. Justice and the Social Contract. Essays on Rawlsian Political

Philosophy. New York: Oxford University Press.

———. 2003. Congruence and the Good of Justice. In Cambridge Companion to

Rawls, edited by Samuel Freeman, 277-316. New York: Cambridge University

Press.

Galisanka, Andrius. 2017. Just Society as a Fair Game: John Rawls and Game Theory

in the 1950s. Journal of the History of Ideas 78 (2): 299-308.

Kant, Immanuel. Religion within the Bounds of Bare Reason. Translated by Werner S.

Pluhar. Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Co, 2009.

McClennen, Edward F. 1989. Stability and the sense of Justice. Philosophy & Public

Affairs 18 (1): 3-30.

Quong, Jonathan. 2014. On the Idea of Public Reason. Ιn A Companion to Rawls, edited

by David A. Reidy, and Jon Mandle, 265-81. Chichester: Wiley Blackwell.

Rawls, John. 1971. A Theory of Justice. Cambridge MA: Harvard University Press.

———. 1975. Fairness to Goodness. The Philosophical Review 84 (4): 536-54.

———. 2005 [1993]. Political Liberalism. New York: Columbia University Press.

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Rawlsian Stability and the Hazards of Envy

———. 2001. Justice as Fairness: A Restatement. Cambridge MA: Harvard University

Press.

Thrasher and Vallier. 2015. The Fragility of Consensus: Public Reason, Diversity and

Stability. European Journal of Philosophy 23 (4): 933-54.

Weithman, Paul. 2010. Why Political Liberalism? On John Rawls’s Political Turn. New

York: Oxford University Press.

Public Reason 10 (1): 49-68

© 2018 by Public Reason

capabilitarianism without Paternalism?

Jens Peter Brune

University of Greifswald

Abstract: Despite the exceptional growth of interest in the Capability Approach (CA) in specific fields of application, the approach has yet to clarify certain basic concepts, such as freedom, functioning, and, in particular, its key concept of capability. (1.) Taking two basic tenets of CA as my starting point, I would first of all like to (2.) contribute to the clarification of these central concepts. It thereby becomes apparent that “capability” is, on the one hand, an essential y hybrid concept with both an internal and external aspect. On the other hand,

it addresses the freedom of choice between various lifestyles as a second-order competency.

(3.) Against this background, this paper offers a suggestion to correct the terminology used by Martha C. Nussbaum in her concept of capability, and subsequently it will outline a basic model of the transformation of resources into forms of being and activities with reference to Ingrid Robeyns. In conclusion I will couple this rather static perspective with two critical points: (4.) First of al , a more dynamic view reveals hitherto barely considered aspects of freedom in everyday human lives. (5.) Secondly, the idea of capabilities opposes the attempt at a separation of capabilities from functions in order to avoid paternalism, as suggested by Nussbaum.

Key words: capabilities, functionings, substantial freedom, 2nd order competence, paternalism.

I. TWO CENTR AL IDEAS OF CA

Over the past 30 years, the Capability Approach (CA) has evolved into a reference

framework for diverse and interdisciplinary areas of research. It has been applied in

the fields of welfare economics, developmental policy, gender studies, and educational

research. It has proved especial y fertile in the area of poverty research and has been put to use in various countries and regions.1 In terms of philosophical discourse, CA rivals other

theories of justice, is acknowledged in specific spheres of ethics, such as economic and

environmental ethics, and has also been raised the debate on animal ethics (Nussbaum

2004, 2006; Wissenburg 2011; Melin and Kronlid 2016). At the same time, its advocates,

who I shall henceforth refer to as “capabilitarians”, adopting the term used by Ingrid

Robeyns (2016) in the title of one of her essays, admit that despite the conceptual

resources at its disposal, CA has yet to develop a comprehensive theory of justice. This

has resulted in a longstanding debate as to whether it is even a uniform approach and, if

so, what are its basic defining elements (cf. Crocker 2008, 55; Nussbaum 2011a, 18-19;

Robeyns 2016 [2011]).

1] In addition to Amartya Sen’s early studies (Sen 1977, 1981) and his studies on India pub-

lished together with Jean Drèze (Drèze und Sen 1997, 2002), here are just a few examples: Volkert (ed.

2005) and Arndt et al. (2006) on Germany, Krishnakumar and Ballon (2008) on Bolivia, Panzironi and Gelber (2012) on the Asia-Pacific region, and Vollmer (2013) for Mozambique. Additional case studies can be found in Deneulin, Nebel, and Sagovsky (2006), Ibrahim and Tiwari (2014), as well as Otto, Walker, and Ziegler (2018).

50

Capabilitarianism without Paternalism?

Nevertheless, we can discern two aspects that, when formulated in a sufficiently

generalized manner, clearly apply for all normative (ethical) sophisticated variants of

CA. The first aspect focuses on the supposedly simple matter of what people actual y do with their lives and who they can be.2 The primary aim of this question is to analyze the

conditions under which people have the opportunity to realize their particular conception

of a good and flourishing lifestyle or individual well-being. The second key aspect is to

frame the normative requirements, the actual social, political, and economic conditions,

in such a way that all individuals have an equal opportunity to realize their conception of well-being or a good lifestyle, at least to a certain threshold level.3 This is the crucial chal enge faced by CA in establishing a theory of justice.

II. FUNCTIONINGS, CAPABILITIES AND FREEDOM

What individuals actual y do and who they are capable of becoming is general y

expressed in CA with the help of three central concepts: capability, functioning, and

freedom. In his 1993 essay, Capability and Wel -Being, Amartya Sen provides a preliminary answer to the question of what is meant by “functionings” and “capability,” as well as

how they are related. His answer is meant to serve as the starting point for a step-by-step

expansion of the approach with the goal of achieving a basic model:

Functionings represent parts of the state of a person – in particular the various things that he or she manages to do or be in leading a life. The capability of a person reflects the alternative combinations of functionings the person can achieve, and from which

he or she can choose one col ection. (1993, 31)

Here, the term “functioning” stands for everything that a person actually does and

has accomplished in their life. It stands for realized activities (“doings”) and states of affairs (“beings”). This last category includes such heterogeneous conditions as having health

insurance or not, being a citizen or being stateless, and being law abiding or a criminal.

Sen designates those activities and states of affairs that could be realized by a person at a particular point in time as an individual’s “capability” (in the singular form). It is

comprised of the individual pool of attainment opportunities, thus an individual power or potential to realize various combinations of activities and states of affairs (cf. Robeyns

2017, 91-92). As the “ability to achieve” (Sen 1987, 36), capabilities are likewise regarded

as positive freedoms:

2] “What are people actual y able to do and to be? What real opportunities are available to them?”

(Nussbaum 2011a, x; see Robeyns 2005, 94).

3] There is certainly no consensus among capabilitarians that the approach should focus on a threshold level, thereby accepting a sufficiency rule as a principle of distribution. This position is advocated to one degree or another by Anderson (1999, 2010) and Nussbaum (2006). Others, such as Arneson (2006), instead tend to support an egalitarian solution, while Robeyns (2016) does not exclude a prioritarian distribution principle along the lines of Rawls’ Difference Principle.

Jens Peter Brune

51

Functionings are, in a sense, more directly related to living conditions, since they

are different aspects of living conditions. Capabilities, in contrast, are notions of

freedom, in the positive sense: what real opportunities you have regarding the life

you may lead. (Sen 1987, 36; cf. 1999, 74-75)

Nussbaum similarly places freedom on the side of capabilities and, in this respect,

concurs with Sen’s position:

In contrasting capabilities with functionings, we should bear in mind that capability

means opportunity to select. The notion of freedom to choose is thus built into the

notion of capability. (Nussbaum 2011a, 25)

In essence, the step of actualizing a realization option takes the form of a “choice”

of activities and states of affairs that a person “has reason to value” in light of their

idea of a good life (Sen 1999, 14, 18, 73, 293, passim; 2009, 231). As far as I can see, all

normatively discerning versions of CA designate this evaluative moment of individual

selection to realize or not to realize being and activity possibilities as the paradigmatic

location of freedom.4 However, one can only refer to a substantive freedom of a person to transform their existing capabilities into concrete forms of being and activities if certain

additional and various requirements – each depending on the nature of the situation – are met. For example, a woman possessing a good physical constitution may nonetheless be

extremely limited in her mobility if the laws of her country or local traditions prevent her

from leaving the house without a male chaperon. Someone else might find themselves

unable to obtain a desired job despite having the best qualifications, only because they

are a member of a stigmatized minority. At this point, of significance are two references

concerning terminology and one reference to the priority given to the evaluative moment

as a moment of freedom:

(1) Ambivalent use of the term “capability” : It is impossible to find a consistent use of the term “capability” in the relevant CA literature. Instead, its use varies between two main

meanings and their derivatives. The main meanings can be seen to concur with Aristotle’s

differentiation of two modalities of possibility: In the Metaphysics (1019b34), Aristotle differentiates between a possibility and a potency. In the first case, the possible state of

affairs has no reference to a capacity and is therefore merely logical y non-contradictory (a possibility), while the second case is a real possibility that has reference a capacity (potency).5 In fact, capabilitarians regularly employ the term “capability” in accordance

with either only one or a combination of the two fol owing basic meanings6:

4] In addition to this concept of freedom that is tailored to individual life opportunities, Sen recognizes a second aspect of freedom that is related to (political) decision-making processes (cf. Sen 2002, 585).

5] What I refer to here as ‘potency’ corresponds to what Alan Gewirth characterizes as ‘capacity,’

which he distinguishes from ‘capability’: While capability is “primary active,” capacity can “be passive as well as active; it is an ability not only to develop but also to be developed in certain ways” (1998, 63, n. 5).

6] In this respect, compare the analysis given by Crocker (2008, 171-77), who investigates the use of terminology by Sen and Nussbaum. Crocker comes to the conclusion that for Sen “a person’s capability (for a particular functioning) is a possibility, option, freedom, or opportunity ‘facing’ the person. But this

52

Capabilitarianism without Paternalism?

– that of a “possibility” in the sense of a logically possible option, which actually ensues as a contingent “opportunity”;

– as an “ability” in the sense of a potency inherent in an individual, which, in

turn, can be differentiated in terms of being active or passive, as well as poorly or

strongly developed.

We refer to a “potency” in an active sense when we mean a capacity, a certain know-

how, or even a skil . I will call this a capability in the narrow sense of the term (cf. Sedmak 2011, 32). Inasmuch as capabilitarians also include physical and psychological traits or

characteristics of individuals as capabilities (see below), it appears that what is meant in

this case are passive rather than active capacities. Regarding the transformation of such

traits and characteristics into functionalities, one could again turn to Aristotle and speak

of dispositions (attitudes). A capability in the narrow, active sense can then be regarded as the individual potency that can exert influence on external circumstances or internal

states (feelings, thoughts, dispositions). The fundamental distinctions are summarized in

Figure 1.

Figure 1. Internal differentiation within the concept of capability

It is quite obvious that one’s activities can exert an influence upon one’s feelings and

dispositions. Conversely, there is no denying that feelings and dispositions can have an

enabling, encouraging, or even an inhibitory effect upon our active abilities. As a case in

point, James J. Heckman and Chase O. Corbin have demonstrated how various active

capabilities reciprocal y enhanced each other during ontogenetic skill formation within a

dynamic model (2016, 344-48).

At first glance, the possibilities offered by a combination of an actual opportunity (O), either arising or not from external circumstances, and a capability (C), understood in the

narrow sense of an ‘internal’ potency, are rather straightforward: C ^ O, C ^ ¬O, ¬C ^ O,

and ¬C ^ ¬O. On second glance, however, opportunities as well as capabilities – whether

active or passive in nature – can be quantifiably assessed: Something can be more or less

advantageous, something else can be more or less defined. Although I have easy access freedom may be due to a variety of internal factors, including abilities and other personal traits, as well as external factors” (2008, 172).

Jens Peter Brune

53

to sturdy building materials, for instance, my capability in the narrow sense (know-

how, skil s) to ensure that I am “well-sheltered” (Sen 1992, 45) is not notably developed.

Conversely, a skil ed but impoverished bricklayer or carpenter in a Manila slum cannot

properly employ his skil s if he only has plastic sheeting and corrugated sheet metal at his

disposal. This bifurcation of the concept of capabilities is likewise reflected in the concept of freedom.

(2) Equating freedom and capability: There is a tendency, if not an explicit attempt, in many capabilitarian texts to use the terms “substantial” or “real” freedom and capability as

semantic equivalents. To mention but a few examples: Sen makes reference to “substantive

freedoms – the capabilities – to choose a life one has” (1999, 74) and to “the capabilities

that a person has, that is the substantive freedoms he or she enjoys to lead the kind of life he or she has reason to value” (1999, 87; emphasis added by the author). Nussbaum speaks

of “capability, in the sense not of coerced functioning but of substantial freedom to choose

and act” (2011a, 24). Clearly intended as an explanation, Robeyns adds “capabilities”

in brackets when referring to the term “substantive freedoms”: “substantive freedoms

(capabilities)” (2005, 93, 111). Keleher mirrors “[o]ne’s capability set, including un-chosen options” with “an individual’s freedom to engage the world and make significant decisions

about what she will be and do in her life” (2014, 62). Asserting such an equivalence,

however, is by no means unproblematic, neither intensional y nor extensional y.

This is an apt moment to take a look at the intensional aspect of this equivalence:

When we think of capabilities as substantial freedoms, then it clearly fol ows that at a

particular point in time “t” we possess the greatest freedom of choice of activities (doings) and states of affairs (beings) when ‘C’ and ‘O’ are ful y combined as ‘C ^ O’ in t, such

that an individual could uncompromisingly realize their conception of a good life at that

particular point in time. Viewed in this light, the normative objective of CA must be to at

least achieve the threshold level of C ^ O permanently and to the greatest possible extent

for all cases of C ^ ¬O, ¬C ^ O, and ¬C ^ ¬O. Yet, since C is an internal aspect and O

is an external aspect that to a certain extent7 can be quantifiably gauged independently of each other, there must be a threshold value for C and one for O. As such, capability as a substantial freedom is basical y a hybrid concept that always includes both an internal and an external aspect. Irrespective of whether the scope of justice is applied according to the

distribution norms of egalitarianism, prioritarianism, or sufficiency theory (Kaufmann

2006; Davis and Wel s 2016; Nielsen and Axelsen 2017), a uniform standard for the

hybrid concept of substantial freedom cannot suffice.

(3) Significance of the evaluative moment: As a welfare and development economist,

Sen leaves the evaluative moment and its reasons completely up to individuals

themselves, and, in contrast to conventional welfare economics, treats this as part of the

expanded data base of his theory. Sen would prefer to leave any discussion of relevant

7] The restriction “to a certain extent” is due to the possibility that capabilities in the narrower sense can be lost if, in the long term, there is insufficient external opportunity to exercise them.

54

Capabilitarianism without Paternalism?

value considerations and the assessment of their underlying reasons to the democratic

decision-making process (Sen 1999, chap. 6; cf. Crocker 2008). By contrast, Nussbaum, in

adopting certain Aristotelian arguments, initial y understood her theory as a suggestion

as to what elements constitute a good life – even though substantial y divergent views on what the good life entails has since led her to adopt a political liberalism along the lines of Rawls (see below).

Despite this arguably greatest difference between the two, both Sen and Nussbaum

have introduced their approaches as an alternative to the various versions of resourcism:

inasmuch as John Rawls, Charles Beitz, and Thomas Pogge, on the one hand, and Ronald

Dworkin, on the other, direct their focus on the fair distribution of more or less primary

goods and services, they are thereby subject to the initial criticism of merely dwel ing on

the means to an end and not on the end itself:

An important problem arises from the fact that primary goods are not constitutive of

freedom as such, but are best seen as means to freedom […]. (Sen 1992, 80)

By referring to “freedom” as the actual, final end, Sen disavows any welfare

theoretical and utilitarian determination of goals in the form of well-being, welfare, or

utility (happiness, desire fulfilment, or preference satisfaction). As all the varieties of CA consider that primary goods, including negative freedoms (freedom from y, that is, from external despotism and repression), serve as a means to realize positive freedoms (cf. Crocker 2008, 121-22), the question immediately rises as to what kind of freedom (freedom to do what?) is actual y meant here. Insofar as positive freedoms are understood as realization

opportunities that can be embodied in capabilities, one is left to pose the analogue

question in terms of capabilities: What kind of capabilities are ends in themselves and not

merely further means to some higher-level goal?

Opinions differ sharply with respect to the answer to this question. The first, liberal, and material y parsimonious answer provided by Sen is that the purpose of freedom is

to al ow every individual to decide for themselves what they want to do and to become.

Robeyns formulates this point as fol ows:

What is ultimately important is that people have the freedoms or valuable

opportunities (capabilities) to lead the kind of lives they want to lead, to do what they

want to do and be the person they want to be. (2005, 95)

Simply put, those who are in the position “to lead the kind of lives they want to lead”

have the substantial freedom (capability) to transform those capabilities into functionings

that, from their point of view, they have “reason to value.” In this sense, Sen also designates in The Idea of Justice (2009) freedom as an end: “primary goods are merely means to

other things, in particular freedom […]” (2009, 234). How should this be understood?

For il ustrative purposes, let us imagine someone who would like to lead a simple life

consisting of optional y eating, sleeping, reading a book, riding a bike, or spending time

with friends. Let us further assume that at a particular point in time, this person has

Jens Peter Brune

55

the capability of freely choosing between these five options, as well as combining and

organizing them at her own discretion with the aim of realizing their idea of the good life.

This person would therefore possess the relevant internal potencies (abilities = capabilities in the narrow sense) and the external opportunities “to lead the kind of life she wants

to.” From this perspective, freedom of choice here is clearly related to the performance

of a decision-making competency (cf. Leßmann 2011), namely a second-order capacity that pertains to the available specific first-order capacities (to eat, sleep, read a book, etc.): Capability reflects a person’s freedom to choose between alternative lives (functioning

combinations), and its valuation need not presuppose unanimity regarding one

specific set of objectives (or, as Rawls cal s it, ‘a particular comprehensive doctrine’).

(Sen 1992, 83)

According to this interpretation, the determination of (final) ends lies in the hands

of every individual – or in the hands of a democratical y constituted society. The liberal version of CA thereby finds itself in a state of latent tension with respect to alternative, yet potential y more controversial options. These alternatives maintain that the actual end

must somehow entail a specified concept of the good life or a successful lifestyle, as Nussbaum original y did with her “thick vague conception of the good” (1990, 217 ff.). There are a

variety of starting points to arrive at such specifications. One could turn to sources in the history of civilization in order to attain an idea of humanity8, which could subsequently

be broadened to include a concept of a good or flourishing life. This would then permit us

to inquire as to which capabilities are embodied in this lifestyle (Nussbaum 1987, 1990,

1992, 1995). One could equal y begin with an analysis of human abilities, identify criteria

for particularly excel ent capabilities (i.e. key capabilities, Sedmak 2011), and then make

explicit the very nature of humanity embedded within these capabilities. Ultimately, both

of these approaches lead to a quarrel about a consensual view of a successful lifestyle,

which Sen would preferably eschew in order to create room for second-order capabilities.

Since any lifestyle pre-determined to be good or flourishing certainly cannot be based on

arbitrary capabilities chosen at the discretion of individuals or of democratical y elected legislators. According to Nussbaum, it should be the task of philosophy to distinguish a

qualified and therefore invariably limited spectrum of worthy capabilities, and in this way ensure

the philosophical underpinning for an account of basic constitutional principles that

should be respected and implemented by the governments of all nations, as a bare

minimum of what respect for human dignity requires. (2000a, 5, cf. 51, 116)

8] “What are the features of our common humanity, features that lead us to recognize certain others, however distant their location and their forms of life, as humans and, on the other hand, to decide that certain other beings who resemble us superficial y could not possibly be human?” (Nussbaum 1990, 219).

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Capabilitarianism without Paternalism?

It should be noted that the tremendous aspiration to specify capabilities as the object

of general y respected and implemented constitutional principles concerning the exercise

of political power would inevitably restrict the second-order freedoms of individuals: The basic choice that Nussbaum leaves to individuals and communities is how to

specify and implement the ideal of human flourishing that she – the philosopher –

offers as the morals basis for constitutional principles. (Crocker 2008, 162)

Then again, a normatively ambitious CA, which demands the col ective promotion

of capabilities for all mankind, either through the state or international organizations,

could not seriously uphold a strict neutrality with respect to the diversity of human capabilities. At the very least, CA should provide selection and evaluation criteria in order to al ow for debate. Three brief comments should suffice at this point: If we make

provisions for general conditions of shortage, the first question would concern the

relevance of any capability with respect to the opportunity of a good or even only a decent

lifestyle (Nussbaum 2000a, 13, 76; 2000b, 222-23; 2006, 44, 53; 2011a, 15, 29-42). For example, an extensive system of primary schools should be implemented before setting

up schools for ventriloquists. Secondly, there are all kinds of functionings (such as shelter, medical care, and mobility) that can be realized through various capabilities and therefore

could be evaluated in terms of efficiency and sustainability. Lastly, we would have to consider the moral quality of capabilities: “Many capacities inherent in our nature are bad (e.g. the capacity for cruelty)” (Nussbaum 2011b, 25; cf. 2000a, 83; 2011a, 61; Robeyns 2016, 406).

A closer inspection of the dark side of human nature (Claassen und Düwell 2013, 496-97)

reveals that under the surface of derogatory designations such as “cruelty”, there exists a

broad range of capabilities with highly ambivalent potential: the expert cut into human

flesh can equal y serve to heal (surgery) or to torture (cruel infliction of harm). Many

competencies that distinguish a good diplomat engaged in a difficult mission are those also

shared by notorious swindlers. And the expert with a solid training in computer sciences

can secure data from hostile attacks or alternatively engage in such attacks. The list of dual-use capacities is optional y expandable and can be easily expressed in the terminology of

freedom. CA should therefore provide criteria that would aid in distinguishing between

moral y good, moral y neutral, and evil realizations of capabilities.

III. NUSSBAUM’S CONCEPT OF CAPABILITIES AND A SIMPLE BASIC MODEL OF CA

In terms of capabilities, Nussbaum’s variant of CA essential y differentiates “basic

capabilities,” “higher-level capabilities,” with which she clarifies the internal differentiation between “internal” and “combined capabilities,” and “central capabilities.”9 As, in my

opinion, the ongoing discussion concerning Nussbaum’s list of central capabilities does

not contribute anything essential y new towards the clarification of a basic model of

9] Nussbaum employs this terminology (at the latest) with her essay “Capabilities and Human

Rights” (Nussbaum 1997, 289-90).

Jens Peter Brune

57

capabilities, I prefer instead to concentrate here on explanations and offer corrective

suggestions on terminology concerning (1) basic and (2) higher-level capabilities in

order to, along with Ingrid Robeyns, establish the connection between the central

concepts of CA (3).

(1) Keeping with the spirit of early poverty research (Charles Booth, Benjamin

S. Rowntree; cf. Gil ie 1996), Sen still understood “basic capabilities” as those that

correspond to more or less essential functionings needed for survival in situations of

extreme deprivation, such as “the ability to be well-nourished and well-sheltered, the

capability of escaping avoidable morbidity and premature morality, and so forth” (Sen

1992, 45; cf. 1999, 36). His language maintains the characteristic style of approaches

focusing on those basic needs and goods that primarily affect discernible physical

living conditions.

In Nussbaum’s writings, the terminology shifts to a more pronounced ontogenetic

perspective, which is directed towards the individual development of humans in a

psychophysical unity. As representative of “basic capabilities,” she lists “the capability

for speech and language, the capability to love and gratitude, the capability for practical

reason, the capability to work” (Nussbaum 2000a, 84). Assuming that these can already

be at the disposition even of an infant, Nussbaum understands the term “capabilities”

here in the sense of very general y delineated innate equipment or innate powers

(Nussbaum 2011a, 23). It should then be possible to differentiate and scale such powers,

such as whether they require many years of practice or, to a certain degree, are ready to

function from the very start, such as the capabilities of seeing and hearing (Nussbaum

2000a, 84). Without a doubt, the capability for practical reason and the capability

to work are among those particularly requiring intensive practice. If we still wish to

include these in the category of basic capabilities, the term “capability” seems to refer to

a predisposition to a capability, thereby understood as a kind of potential to a potential. It is likely to be the case that basic capabilities as well as predispositions to capabilities do not simply develop autonomously but require an appropriate environment. Evidence

for this can be seen in the widespread phenomenon of stunting, particularly among

infants and young children in developing countries. Malnutrition and undernutrition

can lead to developmental disorders even in the fetus, which can have an impact on

the later training of motor and cognitive capabilities (cf. Handa and Peterman 2006;

Grantham-McGregor et al. 2007; Groppo 2015).

(2) In terms of higher-level “trained or developed traits and abilities”, such as the

capability “of participating in politics” or “to think critical y or speak publicly” (Nussbaum 2011a, 22), Nussbaum recommends distinguishing between internal and combined

capabilities: “I use the term combined capabilities for the combination of trained

capacities with suitable circumstances for their exercise” (2008, 357; cf. 2000a, 84-85;

2011a, 22). Accordingly, the internal capacities include being able to think critical y,

be political y active, to speak in public, and to organize, which are all essential for the

external guarantees of the freedom of speech, assembly, and association. Furthermore,

58

Capabilitarianism without Paternalism?

Nussbaum includes individual characteristics, such as “personality traits, intel ectual

and emotional capacities, states of bodily fitness and health, internalized learning, skil s

of perception and movement” 2011a, 21) to her list of internal capabilities. These are

dynamic phenomena, and in order to flourish as combined capabilities, their training

and maintenance require accommodating social, economic, and political framework

conditions. Yet, even those capabilities classified by Nussbaum as “basic” require suitable

external conditions in order to flourish (recall stunting), and, as substantial capabilities, would therefore also be “combined.” As such, I would prefer not to use Nussbaum’s

classification of internal capabilities as combined, but instead distinguish them from

“basic” capabilities with the designation of capabilities developed to a higher level. The second step leaves terminological generalists free to interpret the general possibility of participating in social life as a “capability” (Brighouse and Unterhalter 2010, 69),

whereas terminological specialists can, for example, speak of someone possessing the

professional competence to serve as a judge if that individual has passed the second

legal state examination (bar exam). Of course, the borders between a generalized

and a specialized perspective on capabilities are fluid, and the complex interaction

between internal potential and external circumstances at all levels of development and

specialization explain to no small measure the difficulties in measuring and comparing

capabilities (Comim 2008; Nussbaum 2011a, 61). Nevertheless, for the sake of clarity,

the generalists should be al owed to speak of capability sets for their purposes, while the

specialists can refer to the specifying singular.

(3) In order to clarify the interaction between internal potencies and external

conditions in the constitution of capabilities as substantial freedoms, I would recommend

making use of what Sen referred to as “conversion factors” (1992, 79-87), namely those

factors that co-determine if and how a capability or a set of capabilities can be transformed

“into freedom of choice over alternative combinations of functionings […]” (1992, 81) at

a particular point in time with the help of actual y available resources. Robeyns broke

down these conversion factors according to personal, societal, and environmental factors

with regard to the capability set of an individual and situated these capabilities in a social context (cf. 2005, 98-9; 2016). She has thereby arrived at a non-dynamic basic model of

the transformation of resources into achieved functions by means of individual capability

sets. Figure 2 adopts her representation, although it simplifies two aspects of the model.10

10] The first point is that on the input side of her representation, Robeyns also breaks down the sources through which people can obtain or finance goods and services: non-market production, market production, net income, as well as transfer in kind. The second point is that element that I have labeled as “personal preferences” is differentiated by Robeyns according to “preference formation mechanism”

and “social influences on decision making” on the one hand, and “personal history and psychology” on the other (see 2005, 98). As these sources and differentiations are irrelevant for my considerations here, I have discarded them.

Jens Peter Brune

59

Personal conversion factors include individual characteristics, such as intel igence, talent and skil s, physical condition (state of health), gender, and basic biochemical

parameters,

such as metabolism rate. When it comes to social conversion factors, a whole range of heterogeneous social characteristics and conditions come into play, ranging from laws,

conventions, hierarchies, and cultural practices and traditions (including discriminatory

attitudes based on gender or ethnicity) to public goods, such as infrastructure, educational

system, and so forth. Also included here are those external guarantees of freedom of

speech and assembly invoked by Nussbaum, which complement the internal capabilities

of critical thinking and being political y active, enabling them to become combined

capabilities and therefore de facto operative capabilities (freedoms). Environmental

conversion factors include not only long-term climatic conditions and geographical

locations, but also catastrophes occurring in the relative short-term, such as earthquakes,

severe weather, hurricanes and floods, and drought.

IV. UNDERESTIMATED MOMENTS OF FREEDOM

Having regard this basic model of CA I would offer one brief explanatory comment

and two lengthier immanent-critical remarks. The keywords here are (1) interdependence,

(2) variability and (3) freedom.

(1) Interdependence: Numerous causal and epistemic relations, as well as correlates

of responsibility, can clearly exist between the various types of conversion factors.

60

Capabilitarianism without Paternalism?

For example, environmental catastrophes may be causal y attributable to col ectively

interconnected activities, including social factors. And the severity of the consequences

of such environmental events for persons affected depends to no small measure on the

extent and quality of the prognostic, preventative, and response resources deployed. In

terms of personal factors, there is sufficient evidence to show that individual access to education as well as a balanced diet are dependent on social parameters, such as ethnicity,

class, and gender. And with respect to recurrent political disputes on international trade

agreements, the antagonists are nonetheless united in their acceptance of the premise

that institutional factors exert a considerable influence on the work and living conditions of the affected populations – in either a positive or negative sense.

(2) Variability: Secondly, it is significant that, typical y, the possibilities of realizing capabilities or even sets of capabilities are dependent on personal conversion factors.

Under other circumstances, in a varied instantiation of the schema, these capabilities

or sets could be similarly subsumed under personal conversion factors or even under

achieved functionings. A vivid example deals with what Nussbaum classifies as an

essential capability: “Being able to participate effectively in political choices that govern one’s life” (Nussbaum 1997, 288; 2003, 42; 2006, 77; 2011a, 34, etc.). It encompasses, as a

combined capability, the fundamental and actual guarantee of political rights, including

a sub-type of social conversion factors, which can, for example, be implemented in local

environmental political activities (functionings), i.e. activists seeking to prevent the

destruction of ecological y valuable marshlands as a result of road construction. Should

the protest to maintain the biotope prove successful, the activists would thereby also

prevent a local restriction upon their exercise of a further capability, similarly classified by Nussbaum as being essential, namely, “being able to live with concern for and in relation

to animals, plants, and the world of nature” (1997, 288; 2003, 42; 2006, 77; 2011a, 34,

etc.). Inasmuch as combined capabilities concern substantial freedoms, the activists

could have devoted their “substantial” political freedom to uphold ecological preservation to another substantial freedom – the freedom to be able to develop a relationship to other

living beings and to nature as a whole. The freedom/capability to engage in political

activities is retained as long as the relevant parameters (legal frameworks, passive

and active dispositions, conversion factors) do not change for the worse. In addition,

the protagonists have gained the freedom to experience nature, which, presumably,

would have been lost had they not intervened. According to this interpretation, we are

dealing with an increase in freedom relative to a conceivable situation where there is a lack of political freedom. Looking back, the original political capability (in the full sense of a substantial freedom) could thus also be interpreted as a conversion factor for the

capability to develop a relationship with nature. At the same time, this example of a

variable instantiation il ustrates a synergy effect, which, according to Heckman and

Corbin (2016), can produce an interaction of various capabilities. This synergy effect

can be formulated both in terms of capability as well as in terms of freedom.

Jens Peter Brune

61

(3) Freedom: As we have seen, CA situates the freedom of a person in their individual choice between alternative combinations of doings and beings against the background

of existing capability sets. These capabilities embody, as it were, that what a person is in a position to achieve (freedom to achieve) at a particular point in time and under the given

contextual conditions. The contextual conditions, in turn, can be analyzed on the one hand

in terms of accessible resources as the means to pursue a particular way of life, and on the

other hand in terms of institutional frameworks, the value systems and norms of the local

community, natural environmental conditions, personal traits and characteristics, and

so on. In particular, the extent, orientation, and scope of these possibilities for doing and being appear to be the determining factors in establishing what a person may achieve at the

moment of decision. They condition the latitude of freedom intrinsic to the capabilities yet appear to be peculiarly detached from any access by the individual. What thereby emerges

is a depiction of persons whose ways of life tends to be reduced at any time to a given

inventory of realization opportunities in conflict with internal and external experiences.

Capabilitarians’ professional y widespread preoccupation with and concentration on the

poor and poorest of this world may have assisted in the promotion of such a depiction.

Nonetheless, this could advance the de-differentiation of the two moments of meaning in

the guiding term “capability” as external opportunity and internal potency.

Without any further explanation, Robeyns designates her schema of a “person’s

capability set” as a non-dynamic depiction. A more dynamic view of the connection

between functionings, capabilities, and freedoms emerges when we take into account

the previously discussed interdependence of conversion factors and the variability in the attribution of capabilities under capability sets, functionings, and conversion factors.

Speaking from a first-person perspective, through the decision to realize lower-level

capabilities into actual functionings, I frequently develop, under ontogenetic auspices, the

potential to other or higher-level capabilities and functionings. The moment of freedom

that arises in the first choice is simultaneously passed on to the next level, which al ows for the development of further and higher-level capabilities and functionings. Final y, this is

reflected in personal conversion factors or even institutional norms (laws)11, which, in the

form of framework conditions, will then al ow me (or not) to employ a then given set of capabilities in the functionings I prefer.

While this potential for freedom is systematical y underestimated in Robeyns non-

dynamic model, it nonetheless appears to me that the freedom to decide on capabilities to be realized, seen as the paradigmatic location of freedom, is prone to misunderstanding

and overestimation. One view, let us say one that is semantical y naïve and empirical y

uninformed, could imply that between a given capability set, on the one side, and

optional functionings (doings and beings), on the other, there existed a clearly defined

11] Correspondingly, Sen (1999, 36-40) differentiates between a “constitutive role,” which, for instance, political freedoms have on development, and an instrumental function of freedom that “concerns the way different kinds of rights, opportunities, and entitlements contribute to the expansion of human freedom in general” (1999, 37).

62

Capabilitarianism without Paternalism?

and genuine leeway space, which would provide individual freedom to choose a solid

and straightforward position to protect from paternalistic encroachments. CA would

reserve this leeway space for every individual so that they could realize their preferred

functionings in accordance with their own conception of the good life. Such a conception

is certainly evoked by the previously mentioned semantic equivalence of capabilities with freedoms. In conclusion, we will examine one of Nussbaum’s ideas to demonstrate that

this simplified picture simply does not hold true.

V. HOW AN OBJECTION TO PATERNALISM CANNOT BE AVOIDED

Initial y, Nussbaum recommended that political incentive measures should

exclusively concentrate on capabilities (1997, 287). She later conceded that such a

restriction was simply mistaken when considering certain groups of people. Basical y,

Nussbaum wants to adopt a political y liberal standpoint along the lines of Rawls, namely

one that al ows for a plurality of conceptions of a good life, as she recognized that the

promotion of functions in the case of ‘normal’ adults “were precluding many choices that

citizens may make in accordance with their own conception of the good, and perhaps

violating their rights” (2000a, 87; cf. 2006, 171-72). This affirmation of political liberalism that perceives itself as being anti-paternalistic admits certain exceptions:

(α) In the case “of people with severe mental impairments,” who do not,

for example, have the capacity to decide upon a designated medical treatment

and therefore cannot be ‘informed’ in order to provide a possible ‘consent,’ they

should rather be supported in their actual functionings (state of health) instead of

capabilities (Nussbaum 2006, 172-73).

(β) Supporting functionings also remains a priority when this facilitates

the development of certain adult capabilities in children. This presupposes the

promotion of certain functionings in childhood, which in themselves serve as

prerequisites for later capabilities: “exercising a function in childhood is frequently

necessary to produce a mature adult capability” (Nussbaum 2000a, 90). Such a

desired paternalism is reflected in compulsory education (Nussbaum 2006, 172,

377, 395; 2011a, 26, 148, 156).

(γ) Final y, Nussbaum is wil ing to al ow for exceptions to the ban on paternalism

when functionings are of key importance for the development or maintenance

of other capabilities. Above al , she includes health, security, and environmental

protection among the relevant spheres of life (2000a, 91; 2006, 172, 294).

At this juncture, I am not prepared to enter into the wide-ranging debate concerning

various forms of paternalism (cf. Leßmann 2005; Nelson 2008; Claassen 2014). Instead,

in two steps, I would prefer to show why Nussbaum’s theory can hardly avoid the objection of paternalism, whether justified or not, because her primary focus is on capabilities and

only in supposedly exceptional circumstances on functionings.

Jens Peter Brune

63

(1) The difficulties begin with the identification of capabilities and functions and

their categorization along the lines of “basic” and “internal” capabilities. The characteristic of being “basic” can be understood along with Sen and early poverty research in the sense

of being urgent for survival or the avoidance of “absolute deprivation” (Sen 1981, 17):

“Basic capabilities” would then be those capabilities that ensure survival or, as the case

may be, physical health within one’s environment (see above: 3. (1)). From the viewpoint

of a developmental theory approach, however, basic could also be understood as a Prius

[ previous]. Accordingly, a capability would then be labeled basic in relationship to higher-level and/or more specific capabilities that build upon it (see above: III. (2)). Taken from

this point of view, Nussbaum’s “capability to work” could now be seen ontogenetical y

as higher-level, even when perceived in a rather broad sense. At the same time, it could

also be classified as “basic” in the sense of being “urgent,” to the extent that we assign

normal adults as being in a “mature condition of readiness.” By contrast, in the case of

small children, people with certain mental disabilities, or very old persons, we do not

presuppose a mature capability to work nor – a fortiori – its urgency.

From a philosophical point of view, we could certainly leave the difficulties of the

intensional and extensional delineation of a capability concept to relevant specialist

disciplines, such as evolutionary psychology and learning theory. One thing, however,

seems perfectly clear to me: The partitioning of capabilities according to types and levels

is not something that is plainly apparent from the nature of the subject matter. Rather,

it is dependent on theoretical positions and is thereby subject to particular interests.

In particular, it provides absolutely no response to the fol ow-up question, which is of vital interest to any resource al ocating entity, as to whether a person has developed a

particular capability to a certain threshold level, without the person having even activated

this capability: The kind and degree of development of capabilities cannot at all be recognized, irrespective of relevant functionings.

(2) I thereby come to the actual crucial issue: the differentiation between capabilities

and functionings. The simple picture that clearly delineates capabilities from functionings

is just not applicable for all those capabilities or even bundles of capabilities the acquisition of which could fit under the motto of “learning by doing.” Here, one could easily invoke

examples of very heterogeneous capabilities of various difficulty and aggregation levels:

being able to read, write, perform arithmetical calculations, make music, dance, swim, ride a bicycle, maintain social relationships, experience sexual satisfaction, as well as program

computers, solve legal cases, or draft political programs. All of these capabilities require

for their development that we actual y exercise the relevant functionings (activities) to

a particular degree – even if initial y we are inept or amateurish – because it is only in

this way that we can acquire the “tacit components” (Polanyi 1962) of the corresponding

knowledge. As previously noted, Nussbaum does concede that “exercising a function in

childhood is frequently necessary to produce a mature adult capability” (2000a, 90). Yet,

in this case, it could appear as if the close interconnections of capabilities and functionings involved in learning were merely a specific feature of childhood. This would be misleading,

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Capabilitarianism without Paternalism?

however, as empirical evidence makes amply clear: Widespread functional il iteracy

among adults is not only explained by the circumstance of never having learned to read and write. Quite frequently, already acquired skil s in reading and writing can be lost as

a result of a protracted lack of practice (Buddeberg 2012, 206 f.; Sturm and Ziegler 2014).

As such, it appears to me that a much closer interconnection between capabilities and

functionings exists, namely one that spans the whole life cycle of an individual into old

age. This also explains the basic thesis of CA as to why those capabilities fal ing under the heading of “learning by doing” as an internal potency or disposition will still always depend on suitable external conditions. Then, without actual opportunities for practice in the form of functionings, these capabilities can neither be developed nor be maintained at a

previously achieved level. The idea of understanding capabilities as substantial freedoms

requires exactly this interplay between external opportunities and internal potency (or

rather capabilities in the narrow sense) and is thereby opposed to Nussbaum’s separation of capabilities from functionings in the name of avoiding paternalism.

In conclusion, if it is true that capability, understood as substantial freedom, is a

hybrid concept that invariably includes an inner as well as outer aspect, then those

versions of CA that base their normative ambitions more on external opportunities for the realization of internal potencies, tend to conform to views of Rawls. Therefore, along

with “rights, liberties, and opportunities, and income and wealth” (Rawls 1999, 79),

they also take into consideration a broad spectrum of basic goods. By contrast, those

capabilitarians who place greater focus on supporting the internal aspect of capabilities

by advancing a kind of “educational approach of justice” (Andresen, Otto and Ziegler

2010, 188), will thereby always take into account and promote functionings. As such,

they, in particular, will be obliged to observe the sort of neutrality necessary to avoid the objection (legitimate or not) of paternalism.

brune@zedat.du-berlin.de

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Public Reason 10 (1): 69-79

© 2018 by Public Reason

The Problem of Explanation and reason-Giving Account of

pro tanto Duties in the rossian Ethical Framework

Hossein Dabbagh

Doha Institute for Graduate Studies & Institute for Cognitive Science Studies

Abstract: Critics often argue that Ross’s metaphysical and epistemological accounts of al -

things-considered duties suffer from the problem of explanation. For Ross did not give us any clear explanation of the combination of pro tanto duties, i.e. how principles of pro tanto duties can combine. Following from this, he did not explain how we could arrive at overall justified moral judgements. In this paper, I will argue that the problem of explanation is not compel ing.

First of al , it is based on the classical account of pro tanto duties. Principles of pro tanto duties can be understood in another way, i.e. in terms of reason-giving account that might be of help to provide a response to the critics. Furthermore, critics fail to see some evidence in Ross about how we can arrive at moral judgements.

Key words: W. D. Ross, pro tanto duty, al -things-considered duty, the problem of explanation, reason-giving account.

W. D. Ross’s contribution idea of prima facie duty has been admired by A. C. Ewing

as “one of the most important discoveries of the century in moral philosophy” (1959, 126).

Ross believes that we should distinguish between prima facie duties and actual duties or a duty proper. He sometimes cal s a duty proper a “toti-resultant attribute” of an action and

a prima facie duty a “parti-resultant attribute” (1930; 2002, 28). Whether an act is a prima facie duty depends on whether it has a moral y-relevant non-moral property. However, Ross believes that “[w]hether an act is a duty proper or an actual duty depends on all the morally significant kinds it is an instance of.” (1930; 2002, 19-20)

Ross does not use the terminology of “prima facie duty” to refer to a duty that seems to be a duty at first sight, though it may turn out to be il usory on further reflection. Rather, the phrase “prima facie duty” is supposed to refer to a duty that comes from part of the nature of the moral situation. This duty that comes from part of the nature of the moral situation must be distinguished from overall duty that arises from the whole nature of the situation.

To il ustrate this, suppose I promise my wife that I will go out with her tonight;

however, my mother is sick, and I should stay with her. I have then two prima facie duties of fidelity and beneficence. To find out which duty is my actual duty, we have to use

our judgement or perception in an “all things considered” way. We should consider the

whole nature of the situation to reach our verdict. Of course, we may make a mistake in identifying something as a prima facie duty, but we may also make the same mistake in identifying something as an actual duty. Some of what we take to be actual duties may

turn out to be il usory as wel .

Moreover, it is not true that the contrast between prima facie and actual duties

is a contrast between an apparent and a real duty. Prima facie duties are real moral considerations, not ones that seem to be duties at first sight. This leads us to think that a

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The Problem of Explanation and Reason-Giving Ac ount of pro tanto Duties in the Rossian Ethical Framework prima facie duty, in fact, is not a type of duty. But it is related to duty in a particular way. Ross explicitly writes in this regard that:

[The prima facie duties] suggest that what we are speaking of is a certain kind of duty, whereas it is in fact not a duty, but something related in a special way to duty. (1930;

2002, 20)

So, Ross’s distinction between prima facie and actual duties is not the distinction

between apparent and real duties. I think the terminology “pro tanto duties” for prima facie duties and “all-things-considered duties” for actual duties is less misleading. Hooker, for

instance, writes:

[T]he term “pro tanto” is less misleading than “prima facie”. For the idea is that a duty

or consideration is overridable, not that it can be seen at first glance but on closer

inspection may prove to be an il usion. (1996, 534, fn. 6)

The idea behind pro tanto duties is that certain properties or features of situations count moral y in favour or against action. Of these properties, some are more important

in some case, but others are more important in other cases. For example, suppose that

A borrows a gun from his friend B promising to give it back as soon as B asks. After one

week, B asks for his gun. But A knows that B wants his gun to kill someone. On the one

hand, A should keep his promise and return the gun to B. On the other hand, A has a pro

tanto duty of non-maleficence. So relevant here are A’s two pro tanto duties of fidelity and non- maleficence. We come to believe on reflection that of course A’s all-things-considered

duty is not to keep the promise.

I. THE PROBLEM OF EXPLANATION

We can distinguish at least three claims in the Rossian ethical framework, i.e. two

metaphysical claims and one epistemological one (Stratton-Lake 2002, x-xi ; Audi 2004,

21). According to the:

1. first metaphysical claim: There are several (five) pro tanto duties or principles which are general. These principles determine the moral status of actions and contribute to the

moral evaluation of concrete ethical situations.

And according to the:

2. second metaphysical claim: There is no hierarchy for these pro tanto duties, i.e. it is not the case that some pro tanto duties automatical y outweigh any other in cases where they conflict. Pro tanto duties combine together and contribute to the deontic evaluation of different cases in such a way that we cannot know what would constitute the ultimate

outcome (all-things-considered duty) in advance or even afterwards.

The second claim is controversial and must be explained. The issue is whether there

is some way of thinking of pro tanto duties as a flexible hierarchy. For example, Dancy, as a commentator, believes that there is no structure to Ross’s five basic pro tanto duties.

Dancy thinks no sense can be given to the claim that promises are more important than,

71

say, good production. So, in his view, it is not true that one duty is more important than

another. This leads Dancy to hold that there is no hierarchical order between pro tanto

duties. Instead, we have a formless list of duties. Dancy writes:

There is no general ranking of the different types of prima facie duty. [. .] There is just a shapeless list of them [. .]. (1991, 221)

However, Dancy’s interpretation might be wrong. In The Right and the Good, Ross

lists five duties. He thought that these five basic duties or principles are the minimal

number of such duties or principles (Ross 1930; 2002, 21, 27). Ross says that some pro

tanto duties are more stringent than others, and in fact he offers a flexible hierarchy for them. He states that the duties of non-maleficence, fidelity and reparation are weightier

than beneficence (Ross 1930; 2002, 22, 30). Elsewhere, in the Foundations of Ethics, he says that the pro tanto duty to keep a promise can be cancel ed under certain conditions, and in those circumstances the fact that one has made a promise carries no deontic weight

(Ross 1939, 188). Yet, the duties of non-maleficence, fidelity and reparation do not always outweigh beneficence. All Ross can say is that reparation, for instance, can be overridden

only by a significant amount of well-being for others. However, an account of “significant”

can vary from case to case (Stratton-Lake 2002, xxxvi-xxxvi ).

Thus, the bottom line is that, on the basis of Ross’s position, we cannot produce a

higher-order principle to establish which pro tanto duties are more important than others.

In fact, “the importance” or weight of each duty turns out differently in different contexts.

So, we can restate the second claim this way. According to the:

2a. second metaphysical claim-revised: There are no rigid hierarchies (such as a lexical ordering) between pro tanto duties according to which one is always more important.1

Although there is no such thing as a rigid hierarchy for pro tanto duties, there might be a flexible hierarchy for them.

One can think of a sort of flexible hierarchy for pro tanto duties as in many cases; for example, we can imagine that non-maleficence, fidelity and reparation generally outweigh beneficence. But it is not the case that we have a rigid hierarchy in that for example fidelity always outweighs beneficence. What is supposed to be the difference between the original version of the second metaphysical claim and the revised version is that although neither

version accepts a rigid hierarchy, the second metaphysical claim states that there is no

hierarchy for pro tanto duties but the revised version states that there might be a flexible hierarchy for them.

Final y, according to the

3. epistemological claim: The basic principles of pro tanto duties are self-evident in the sense that they can be known directly though sometimes they need reflection.2 We often are 1] Audi (2004, 28) prefers to read Ross based on the second metaphysical claim; however, Stratton-Lake (2002, xxxvi-xxxvi ) prefers to read Ross according to the revised version of second metaphysical claim.

2] Although Ross took all the pro tanto duties to be self-evident, one can ask why we should assume that they all are. However, since every system of morality takes some propositions to be self-evident, for the

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The Problem of Explanation and Reason-Giving Ac ount of pro tanto Duties in the Rossian Ethical Framework justified in believing these moral principles non-inferential y.3 In order to arrive at a moral judgement about our all-things-considered duty in a concrete moral situation, we have to

use our rational judgement; however, these judgements are not self-evident.4

Taking some principles as self-evident does not entail that they are obvious and that

there is no debate about them (Ross 1939, 188). We conclude what the ultimate outcome

of the combination of principles of pro tanto duty is by looking at the case and reflecting on it in more detail in order to arrive at a moral judgement. Note that this is not a matter

of non-inferential knowledge. The reason is that there is no such thing as a higher set of

moral rules that can guide us to arrive at moral judgements (Ross 1930; 2002, 29).5

However, based on these claims, critics such as John Searle (1987, 81-90) object that

Ross’s metaphysical and epistemological accounts of all-things-considered duties, and the

way in which different pro tanto duties are combined together and contribute to the moral evaluation and judgement in moral conflict cases, are vague and unclear. Let us call this: The Problem of Explanation: Ross did not give us clear explanation of the combination of pro tanto duties, i.e. how principles of pro tanto duties can combine. Following from this, he did not explain how we could arrive at overall justified moral judgements.

This, however, needs to be qualified. As I have shown above, in the Rossian

framework we cannot determine in the abstract what would be the ultimate outcome of a

case in which, for example, fidelity is combined with another pro tanto duty, say gratitude, because the ultimate outcome strongly depends on the details of the case. Yet, as there is

no rigid hierarchy for these principles of pro tanto duty, we have to judge how they combine together and contribute to the moral evaluation of the case. In order to do that, we pick out the outcome of the combination of several principles of pro tanto duty when we look at the case careful y and through further reflection on more details. So, according to Ross, in

order to arrive at an all-things-considered judgement in a concrete ethical situation, one

has to consider all the principles of pro tanto duties and think about the whole case and its characteristics insofar as one can. Let me elaborate this with an example of:

The Manager Case: Suppose that a manager of a company arranges an appointment

that is crucial for the company, financial y speaking. However, just half an hour

before the appointment, he learns that his mother has been hospitalised fol owing

a car accident.

What is his all-things-considered duty? Would he be justified in cancel ing his

appointment to go and see his mother in hospital or should he fulfil his promise, leave his

mother on her own and ask somebody else to see her? According to Ross, the manager

sake of argument, I assume that Ross is right and will not argue about this.

3] I say “often” because Ross holds in one of his papers that we can arrive at intuitive judgements even inferential y. See Ross (1927, at 121).

4] Ross thinks that there are no principles for al -things-considered duties.

5] Elsewhere, I explained what non-inferentiality entails in moral intuitionist framework, see Dabbagh (2017 & 2018).

73

has two different pro tanto duties, fidelity and gratitude (or beneficence), which come into conflict in this case. On the one hand, fidelity, which rests on the previous action of the

manager, requires him to fulfil his promise. On the other hand, gratitude, which rests on

the previous actions of his mother, requires him to stay with her in such an important

situation. If the manager asks Ross how he can arrive at a justified moral judgement in this

situation, what would Ross say?

The manager has to use his judgement to determine the outcome of this conflict

of pro tanto duties. He must look at the case and reflect on it in more detail and consider everything that is moral y relevant. So, one can understand how different pro tanto duties are combined and how we can arrive at a tenable moral judgement by looking at the case

and reflecting on it in more detail. In fact, there is no other thing here to which we can

appeal. Just exercise more reflection on the case, use your judgement and decide.

Critics, however, are not persuaded by the above Rossian story, because they are

confused how “reflection” or “looking” is an explanation of anything. Consider again the

manager case provided above. Later on, if the manager says that he still cannot see the

point, what should he do to grasp the weightier principles of pro tanto duties? According to above story, the manager has to look at the case again, look again, and use his judgement.

That is al . He cannot say anything else. So, the manager has to look at the case over time

to arrive at a justified moral judgement. Nevertheless, the manager can say, “I am still

perplexed, and I do not know straight off what to do”.

Critics believe that the manager is not, in effect, offered an account that tel s him

which is the most important of the conflicting pro tanto duties. Although the Rossian metaphysical account of the combination of principles of pro tanto duties in moral conflict cases and their contribution to the moral evaluation of different cases is understandable,

the epistemological Rossian account is obscure. Thus, it seems that the Rossian account of

how we could arrive at justified moral judgements in moral conflict cases has to be revised.

The problem of explanation is not, I think, compel ing. First of al , it is based on the

classical account of pro tanto duties, i.e. the first metaphysical claim (Dancy 1981). Principles of pro tanto duties can be understood in another way, i.e. in terms of reason that might be of help to provide a response to the critics (Scanlon 1998, 1-13; Stratton-Lake 2013; 2011b,

178; Audi 2004, 23-24). Furthermore, critics fail to see some evidence in Ross about how

we can arrive at moral judgements. Let me explain.

II. REASON-GIVING ACCOUNT OF PRO-TANTO DUTIES

In his Second Thoughts in Moral Philosophy, Ewing talks about pro tanto duties and all-things-considered duties with reference to reason. He distinguishes between good and

conclusive reason for action (Ewing 1959, 63, 110). Having a pro tanto duty to do an action provides a good reason to do (or not to do) it. To have an all-things-considered duty for

doing an action provides a conclusive reason for doing or not doing that. Of course, it is

not the case that wherever there is a good reason to do X there is also a pro tanto duty to do

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The Problem of Explanation and Reason-Giving Ac ount of pro tanto Duties in the Rossian Ethical Framework X. That is, it is not the case that if one has good reasons to do things, then one has real duty of any kind to do them. For instance, I have a good reason to take a painkil er right now,

but no duty to do so. Although one can think that duties (or obligations) provide reasons,

it is not plausible to say that reasons provide duties (or obligations), and hence we cannot

accept that there are duties iff there are reasons. As another example, imagine that I have

been very generous to Oxfam. I nevertheless have a reason to send even more money to

that charity, the reason being that even more will do even more good. However, if I have

already made very big contributions at a large cost to my own good, I have no duty to make

further contributions.6

Fol owing Ewing, Urmson and Stratton-Lake, I believe that understanding pro tanto

duties in terms of reasons, i.e. as providing moral reasons to do acts, is more persuasive

than the classic understanding (Urmson 1975, 112-13; Stratton-Lake 2011b, 147-150).7

Principles of pro tanto duties specify facts that provide moral reasons for certain actions and explain why certain acts ought or ought not to be done. This is a kind of reply that

Ross can give with regard to how pro tanto duties are combined.

However, one might object that it is not helpful to convert talk of pro tanto duties into talk of reasons. This conversion makes us pay a theoretical cost. All pro tanto duties are universal, although can be outweighed. They are defined in terms of their force and have

an element of insistence in them (Owens 2012a and 2012b). But reasons purely as such do not have such an element. As a response, to be sure, some reasons explain and justify but do not insist, and others do insist.8 The moral y important reasons are mainly the ones

that insist. For the sake of argument, by “moral reasons” here I mean the insisting ones.

Talking about insistence, again, lends some credence to the point I made above about

duties providing reason, and not vice versa.

Principles of pro tanto duties specify moral reason-giving facts. These principles

state which facts provide reasons. I am not claiming that duties themselves are facts which

provide reason. The duty might be “to meet you at 1:30”. The fact that provides the reason

is “that I promised to meet you at 1:30”. Hence, the pro tanto duty of fidelity entails that the fact that I have promised to Φ gives me a moral reason to Φ.

This understanding of pro tanto duties in terms of reasons al ows us to think of the conflict of pro tanto duties as a conflict of moral reasons. Therefore, to put my understanding of principles of pro tanto duties in a general form: if F is the feature that is pro tanto right and contributes in making Φ your all-things-considered duty, then:

6] See the papers by Darwal , Wal ace and Little in the festschrift for Dancy, edited by Hooker, Bakhurst and Little (2013).

7] Audi (2004, 104) also believes that Ross’s basic pro tanto duties are not only self-evident, but also provide independent moral reasons.

8] Talk of reasons can be classified into two categories as “insistent” (obligatory) and “good ground”

reason. Likewise, Dancy (2004), for example, talks about a distinction between two categories, i.e. “entic-ing” and “peremptory” reasons, that capture different normative relations.

75

“If F explains why you ought to Φ, then F gives you a reason to Φ” (Stratton-Lake

2011a, 369).

Thus, fidelity, for instance, is a right-making feature. In other words, there are facts

that provide reasons arising from fidelity; fidelity has an invariant deontic valence; and

it contributes to the moral evaluation of different cases in the same way (Stratton-Lake

2002, xli i). But has the explanation problem been solved?

It is true that Ross said that looking at a moral case and reflecting on it gives us

an account according to which we can arrive at a tenable judgement. This is how Ross

expresses the point:

When I am in a situation [. .] in which more than one of these prima facie duties is incumbent on me, what I have to do is to study the situation as ful y as I can until I

form the considered opinion (it is never more) that in the circumstances one of them

is more incumbent than any other; then I am bound to think that to do this prima facie

duty is my duty sans phrase in the situation. (1930, 2002, 19)

However, this is not the whole story. In some complicated cases, Ross would suggest

that where relevant, we should aim to get further information, which might (for example)

involve asking people what they are up to. He said that reflecting upon other cases might

help us. Consider the fol owing quotes from Ross:

The general principles of duty are obviously not self-evident from the beginning of

our lives. How do they come to be so? […] we see the prima facie rightness of an act which would be the fulfilment of a particular promise, and of another which would

be the fulfilment of another promise, and when we have reached sufficient maturity

to think in general terms, we apprehend prima facie rightness to belong to the nature of any fulfilment of promise. What comes first in time is the apprehension of the self-evident prima facie rightness of an individual act of a particular type. From this we come by reflection to apprehend the self-evident general principle of prima facie duty.

(1930; 2002, 32-33)

In my view, we can develop the Rossian account by using the notion of “seeing other

similarities” and seeing things as similar. Although Ross did not use these terminologies, I believe they already have a place in the Rossian framework. So, we can say that in the

Rossian framework, looking away at other similar cases is an indispensable ingredient to understanding. Sometimes, just looking at one case and reflecting on it might not help us to reach a justified moral judgement. I believe looking away is important because one of the most significant and familiar forms of moral thinking involves thinking about cases like

the one at hand but with the crucial difference that the roles are reversed − e.g. we have

to think of ourselves as being on the receiving end of what we are considering doing to

someone else. Let me explain my view with the fol owing example.

The Robbery Case: Consider the case of a man chatting to his friend that one day when he was in rush to his meeting, he saw two boys hitting an old woman to steal her

money. Having seen this scene, he decided to stop them but he also wanted to be

punctual at his job. When he tel s the story, his friend responds that the man should

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The Problem of Explanation and Reason-Giving Ac ount of pro tanto Duties in the Rossian Ethical Framework have helped the women even if he was in rush. The man tel s his friend that he was

trying to keep his promise to be on time. His friend however gives the man some

more details by citing examples that what he would do if he sees his mother or sister

getting robbed. His friend also says some more examples to il ustrate that helping

people in danger is more important than punctuality.

In fact, the man’s friend tries to convince him that he would not do the same in the

case of his mother’s robbery. His friend also tries to convince him by referring to other

similar cases that helping people in danger is more important than being on time. His friend does not appeal to common properties and intrinsic features of stealing to improve

his argument. So, instead of just looking at this case, the man has to look away at similar and dissimilar cases and ask other people to arrive at the judgement.9

According to Ross, different pro tanto duties are combined together and contribute

to the moral evaluation of cases in different ways. But, on the basis of the element that I

highlighted in the Rossian framework, we can give an account to resolve the problem of

explanation: looking away at similar combinations of pro tanto duties in different cases and getting opinions from other people can help.

We now have an account of how we behave reasonably in different ethical contexts

that is grounded in the way in which we are engaged in looking away at similar cases. In doing so, our behaviour in different contexts makes sense. One can understand how

different principles of pro tanto duties are combined and how we can arrive at tenable moral judgements by looking at other similar cases, by asking other people and by reflecting on the different comparable reasons in more detail.

In the robbery case, the more the man looks away at similar cases, the more he can see whether he should have helped the woman. Similarly, in the manager case, he will arrive at the justified moral judgement to the extent that he is engaged in seeing similar cases.

There is no theoretical account available that can be used to crank out the justified moral

judgement. Rather, he has to look away at similar cases to see what has to be done in the case. For example, if the manager sees other similar cases, it is very likely that he comes to the conclusion that he should abandon his promise under the new condition.

However, there is one possible objection here. One might ask: does not “looking

away”, “reflecting on other cases” or “getting opinions from others” just generate a regress?

If our object is the judgements of others or merely other similar factual situations, the same problem arises. As a response, although there are some complex situations, ones where our

reaching a final judgement is difficult and we might need to ask others’ opinions, Rossians

would believe that this does not necessarily create a regress. Almost all pluralists and at

least some monists (e.g. Kantian Contractualists and Rule-Utilitarians) might do the

9] Although “looking away” might not be the best terminology, it does not make it sound as though one is ignoring the facts rather than thinking about them. This terminology came to my mind in the discussion with Soroush Dabbagh. For more details, see Dabbagh (2006, Dissertation). Using Hare’s terminology, one can also say that in going from prima facie duties to actual duties, we use our capacity of apprehendation, but also a “social consensus” (2000, 88), and this is similar to my solution of looking away.

77

same in reaching the final judgement. So, this is not a special problem – if it is at all – for intuitionists. They all need to think about the difficult case and consult with other people.

In the cases where the judgements of others or similar situations are at stake, the only

plausible answer which Rossians can advise is to practise more and more. All we have, in

these cases, is to practise reflection, comparing cases and getting opinions from others.

But looking away at some other cases (such as cases in which you are in my shoes and I

in yours) and getting other people’s opinions might be enough to stop an infinite regress

as they give us plausible reasons to reach judgement. Although there is no such thing as a

valid principle for resolving all regresses in different moral cases, it does not fol ow from this that nothing can be said to explain how to deal with such regresses.

III. PR ACTICE BRINGS YOU MASTERY

Having seen that the problem of the explanation of how different principles of pro tanto duty are combined can be removed, the same approach can be assumed with regard to the way in which we become competent with the principles of pro tanto duties. We can see that promise-keeping is right with practice and through seeing the similarities and

dissimilarities, e.g. through seeing that that is a promise, that this is a promise, that that is not a promise, and so on.10 The more we are engaged in seeing moral cases, the more we see

what the principles of pro tanto duties are. For instance, if we are wondering whether or not the new situation with which we are dealing can be regarded as an example of gratitude,

we have to look away at other cases of gratitude and compare the case at hand with them.

According to Ross, we arrive at moral principles about pro tanto duties by seeing what features of actions count either moral y for or moral y against actions in different instances.

Perhaps, when Ross is talking about sufficient mental maturity and its vital role in grasping a pro tanto duty, he has something similar in mind. Consider the fol owing quotes:

[…] when I reflect on my own attitude towards particular acts, I seem to find that it

is not by deduction but by direct insight that I see them to be right, or wrong. I never

seem to be in the position of not seeing directly the rightness of a particular act of

kindness, for instance […]. (1939, 171)

Seeing a number of examples, for Ross, helps us to see the rightness or wrongness of promise-keeping (or seeing the fact which states the reasonableness of promise-keeping).

One could arrive at the general principle that promise-keeping is a pro tanto duty by seeing different cases. The more we see different promise-keeping cases, the more we see what

promise-keeping is. In effect, we come to know, in Ross’s ideas, the rightness or wrongness of moral duties or principles by knowing particular instances. For instance, we come

to know that promise-breaking is pro tanto wrong by becoming acquainted with some

particular cases of promise-breaking. (Ross 1930, 2002, 32-33)11

10] For more on practice theories, see Thompson (2008). For an alternative view, see Owens (2011).

11] See Hooker (2002) for an alternative view.

78

The Problem of Explanation and Reason-Giving Ac ount of pro tanto Duties in the Rossian Ethical Framework The whole point is that the procedure of grasping a moral principle is open-ended. It

does not fol ow from this that there is no such thing as principle. What does fol ow is that

the more we are engaged in seeing different cases, the more we see what the principle is.

In other words, the more we are engaged in seeing different reasons, the more we acquire mastery of how the reasons can contribute in different moral cases.12

IV. CONCLUSIONS

The Rossian ethical framework, critics have argued, has a problem concerning

explanation. According to the problem, the way in which different principles of pro tanto duties are combined together and make all-things-considered duties, both metaphysical y

and epistemological y, is vague and unclear. In order to tackle the problem, I introduced

the reason-giving account of pro tanto duties and suggested that by bringing in the notion of “looking away” and “seeing other similarities”, which already exist in the Rossian

framework, we can give an account of how we arrive at a justified moral judgement in

a concrete situation. The Rossian notion of principles of pro tanto duties can be better understood in the light of such il umination.

Acknowledgment

I would like to thank Philip Stratton-Lake and Brad Hooker, and the editor and

anonymous reviewers, for their critical comments.

hdabbagh@dohainstitute.edu.qa

REFERENCES

Audi, Robert. 2004. The Good in the Right: A Theory of Intuition and Intrinsic Value. Princeton University Press.

Dabbagh, Soroush. 2006. Moral Reasons: Particularism, Patterns and Practice. Warwick University Dissertation.

Dabbagh, Hossein. 2017. Sinnott‐Armstrong Meets Modest Epistemological Intuitionism.

Philosophical Forum 48 (2):175-99.

———. 2018. Intuiting Intuition: The Seeming Account of Moral Intuition. Croatian Journal

of Philosophy 18 (1):117-32.

Dancy, Jonathan. 1981. On Moral Properties. Mind, 90: 367-83.

———. 2004. Enticing Reasons. In J. Wal ace, P. Pettit, S. Scheffler, M. Smith (eds.), Reason and Value: Themes from the Moral Philosophy of Joseph Raz. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

———. 1991. An Ethics of Prima Facie Duties. In P. Singer (ed.), A Companion to Ethics.

Oxford: Blackwel : 219-29.

Ewing, A. C. 1959. Second Thoughts in Moral Philosophy. London: Routledge & Kegan Paul.

12] Scanlon and Stratton-Lake believe that we can define moral concepts such as good and bad in terms of reasons. In the same way, I think, the more we are engaged in seeing different cases, the more we find reasons.

In effect, reasoning is a kind of practice. See Scanlon (1998, 96 & 96ff) and Stratton-lake (2002, xx and 2004).

79

Hare, R. M. 2000. Sorting Out Ethics. Oxford University Press.

Hooker, Brad. 2002. Intuitions and Moral Theorizing. In P. Stratton-Lake (ed.), Ethical

Intuitionism: Re-evaluations. Oxford: Oxford University Press: 161-83.

Hooker, Brad. 1996. Ross-Style Pluralism vs. Rule-Consequentialism. Mind, 105: 531-52.

Hooker, Brad., Bakhurst, David., Little, Margaret. 2013. Thinking about Reasons: Themes from the Philosophy of Jonathan Dancy. Oxford University Press.

Owens, David. 2012a. The Value of Duty. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society Supplementary, Vol.

86 (1): 199-215.

———. 2012b. Promises. The International Encyclopedia of Ethics. H. LaFol ette (ed.). Blackwel , pp. 4143-4155.

———. 2011. The Problem with Promising. In Hanoch Sheinman (ed.), Understanding

Promises: Philosophical Essays. Oxford: Oxford University Press: 58-79.

Ross, W. D. 1927. The Basis of Objective Judgments in Ethics. International Journal of Ethics, 37: 113-27.

———. 1939. The Foundations of Ethics. Oxford: Clarendon Press.

———. 1930 [2002]. The Right and the Good. P. Stratton-Lake, (ed.), Oxford: Clarendon Press.

Scanlon, Tim. 1998. What We Owe To Each Other. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.

Searle, John. 1987. Prima facie Obligations. In J. Raz (ed.), Practical Reasoning. Oxford University Press: 81-90.

Stratton, Philip. 2004. Introduction. In P. Stratton-Lake (ed.), On What We Owe to Each Other.

Blackwel , Oxford: 1-17.

———. 2011a. Recalcitrant pluralism. Ratio, 24 (4): 364-83.

———. 2011b. Eliminativism about derivative prima facie duties. In T. Hurka (ed.),

Underivative Duty. Oxford University Press: 146-65.

———. 2013. Ross, W. D. In H. LaFol ette (ed.), The International Encyclopedia of Ethics.

Wiley-Blackwell.

———. 2002. Introduction. In P. Stratton-Lake (ed.), W. D. Ross’s The Right and the Good.

Oxford University Press: ix-xlix.

Thompson, Michael. 2008. Life and Action: Elementary Structures of Practice and Practical Thought.

Harvard University Press.

Urmson, J. O. 1975. A Defence of Intuitionism. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, 75: 111-19.

Public Reason 10 (1): 81-100

© 2018 by Public Reason

Feminism, Agency and Objectivity

Adelin Costin Dumitru

National University of Political Studies and Public Administration

Abstract: In this article I defend the capability approach by focusing on its built-in gender-sensitivity and on its concern with comprehensive outcomes and informational y-rich

evaluation of wel -being, two elements of Sen’s work that are too rarely put together. I then try to show what the capability approach would have to gain by focusing on trans-positional

objectivity (as Elizabeth Anderson does) and by leaving behind the narrow confines of states in favor of a more cosmopolitan stance. These preliminary discussions are followed by two more

precise applications. At first, I show how a gender-sensitive capability approach that respects the criteria of trans-positional objectivity and cosmopolitanism can enhance the agency of

women inhabiting third-world societies. I turn next to show how mainstream feminism can

insulate itself against criticisms such as bell hooks’ by switching to trans-positional objectivity in public reasoning.

Key words: agency, capabilities, gender-sensitive theory, informational parsimony, open impartiality, positional objectivity.

The capability approach was proposed as a way to account for the ubiquitous

element of human diversity (Robeyns 2000, 6-7). Sen’s background in social choice led

to the development of an approach to justice that sacrifices simplicity for the sake of

providing more adequate answers to the problems human beings encounter. In order

to accomplish that objective, the capability approach is concerned not merely with

the outcomes of applying distributive principles, but with what Sen cal s comprehensive

outcomes, which assess consequences as well as “social process, including the exercise of duties and responsibilities” (Sen 2010, 22). Furthermore, the capability approach has a

built-in gender sensitivity that lacks from many other accounts of justice.

The capability approach thus has various elements that make it attractive for

feminist theorizing.1 By focusing on real freedom and on comprehensive outcomes, it

can identify and provide adequate answers to problems that have a negative impact on

the well-being of women, such as adaptive preferences (Teschl and Comim 2005). The

main claim of the paper is that feminist studies would have much to gain by focusing on

another, less discussed aspect of Sen’s work, the concept of trans-positional objectivity

(Sen 1982; 1992; 1993; 2010, 155-74). Furthermore, unlike current extensions of Sen’s

work on positional objectivity to feminist deliberative democracy (Anderson 2003), I

argue that we must renounce at the arbitrary confinement of the scope of justice to states

and instead advocate a global scope. Albeit Sen endorses open impartiality and public

1] I have in mind here Western feminist theories, committed to the idea that women are oppressed in various ways in patriarchal societies and that this should cease to be the case. I do not refer particularly to one or another feminist theory.

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Feminism, Agency and Objectivity

reasoning at a global scale, certain feminist applications of the capability approach have

the aforementioned shortcoming.2

In order to accomplish this objective I proceed as fol ows. In the first section

I introduce the various lines of Sen’s arguments, focusing on his criticism of

informational y-parsimonious theories of justice and on his defense of capabilities as the

proper metric of distributive justice. In the second section I present Sen’s case for trans-

positional objectivity and his criticism of Rawls’ “closed impartiality” (Sen 2010, 128).

In the third section I argue that focusing on a narrow scope of justice, the state, flaws

Anderson’s application of Sen’s work on positional objectivity. The fourth section shows

what mainstream feminism would have to gain by incorporating the aforementioned

considerations. At first, I show how a gender-sensitive capability approach that respects

the criteria of trans-positional objectivity and cosmopolitanism can enhance the agency

of women inhabiting third-world societies. I turn next to show how mainstream feminism

can insulate itself against criticisms such as bell hooks’ by switching to trans-positional

objectivity in public reasoning (hooks 1999). Section V concludes.

i. EscAPiNG iNFOrMATiONAl PArsiMONY – A JUsTiFicATiON FOr THE cAPABiliTiEs

APPrOAcH

One of Amartya Sen’s far-reaching contributions has been the emphasis on

informational constraints in social choice theory, political philosophy or ethics. Although

the focus of this paper is on the latter two, Sen’s work on social choice theory plays an

important role in understanding some of his criticisms regarding utilitarianism. In

his main contribution to the field of social choice, Sen showed how the anonymity

and neutrality conditions left out important information regarding relations between

individuals or the intensity of agents’ preferences3 (Sen 1970, 198-99). In the field of justice, Sen similarly showed how moral principles exclude certain categories of information and

that usability of information is highly dependent on what principles are chosen (1985,

169-184; 1993, 73-88). For instance, utilitarianism proposes a flawed evaluation of well-

being, since it comprises three distinct elements that combined reduce its informational

scope, i.e. consequentialism, welfarism and sum-ranking (Sen 1985, 175). Sen argues

that utilitarianism is informational y parsimonious and that it lacks the means to judge

adequately the goodness of states of affairs. The main problem is with the welfarist

component, which deliberately ignores all information that is not based on utility when

evaluating end states, which reverberates on its muteness pertaining to evaluating actions:

“had welfarism not been additional y imposed, consequentialism could have coexisted

2] I refer here mainly to Anderson, as she is the most prominent theoretician who has linked feminist problems with Sen’s work on positional objectivity.

3] For an account of the lessons that can be learned by feminists from social choice and vice versa see Peter (2003).

Adelin Costin Dumitru

83

with taking note of such things as the values and disvalues of actions through the valuation

of states, which include these actions” (Sen 1985, 182)4.

What motivates Sen’s (and Nussbaum’s) capability approach is human diversity,

which is purportedly not satisfactorily taken into account by other approaches. The

human diversity aspect is strongly related to the evaluation of states of affairs. Capabilities have been proposed as replacements to other metrics of justice – what Sen cal s evaluative

space (1992, 20) and Cohen “currency of justice” (1989) – because those are severely

limited by informational constraints. For instance, Rawls’ primary goods approach5 is

inadequate because it would give nothing to a cripple who has access to primary goods.6

Rawls’ contractarian theory of justice is based on the premise that rational and reasonable

parties placed behind a veil of ignorance will choose the principles of justice as fairness7

(which stand in a lexicographical order) – the principle of an equal right to sets of equal

basic liberties and the second principle, comprising the fair equality of opportunity and

the difference principle (2001, 302). Rawls justifies the device of the veil of ignorance

by holding that any personal contingencies have to be removed in order to reach a truly

fair agreement (2001, 15)8. What he proposes is a political conception of justice for a

democratic society, conceiving citizens as free and equal (Rawls 1999, 31) and taking part

in the affairs of a “mutual y advantageous cooperative venture” (1971, 112).

4] Elsewhere, Sen criticizes utilitarianism, for its leading to counterintuitive implications. For instance, utilitarians would distribute more to a pleasure wizard than to a cripple, because the pleasure wizard’s marginal utility is higher than the cripple’s: “the cripple would then be doubly worse off […] both since he gets less utility from the same level of income, and since he will also get less income” (1979, 203).

5] Rawls considers that the index of wel -being should comprise primary goods, which are “al -

purpose goods” that individuals with diverse conceptions of the good would want in the original position, because “other things equal, they prefer a wider to a narrower liberty and opportunity, and a greater rather than a smal er share of wealth and income (1971, 396).

6] Another variant of resourcism, Dworkin’s equality of resources, would uphold distributions to those who lack physical endowments – what he cal s “personal resources”: “Someone who is born with a serious handicap faces his life with what we concede to be fewer resources [. .]. This circumstance justifies compensation” (through his favored hypothetical insurance market) (Dworkin 2002, 81). However, Dworkin’s view faces other problems. For some of the most relevant criticisms, see Burley (2004).

7] Rawls writes that “[…] the principles of justice are the result of a fair agreement or bargain” (1971, 12). The idea of agreement has been interpreted differently. One operationalization of the agreement in the original position does not require ontological y distinct parties. Alexander (1974) argued that Rawls’ is not a contract theory, because it could be replaced by an individual choice theory or a sympathetic observer theory at no loss for its substantial claims. Jean Hampton (1980, 337) holds that because behind the veil of ignorance parties are indistinguishable it is better to interpret the deliberation as being the result of the reasoning of a single party.

8] Earlier (Rawls 1971, 12), he mentioned that parties do not know “their place in society, their class position, social status, intel igence, fortune in the distribution of natural assets and abilities, their conceptions of the good or their special psychological propensities”. In his later work he includes comprehensive doctrines since “not al owing the parties to know people’s comprehensive doctrines is one way in which the veil of ignorance is thick as opposed to thin” (Rawls 1999, 31).

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Feminism, Agency and Objectivity

The definition advanced by Rawls of society as a “mutual y advantageous cooperative

venture” has attracted the criticism of feminists such as Young (2006) for ignoring those

who are not able-bodied and thus are not contributing parts of the society. One related

criticism is that Rawls fails to include in his index care and dependency related primary

goods, such as “the understanding that we will be cared for if we become dependent, the

support we require if we have to take on the work of caring for a dependent, the assurance

that if we become dependent, someone will take on the job of caring for those who are

dependent upon us” (Kittay 1999, 102)9. Similarly, Nussbaum holds that caregivers are

disregarded by Rawls’ theory of justice, a deficiency that her capability approach tries to

solve. These considerations are integrated in her own version of the capability approach,

which acknowledges that securing capabilities entails a process of designing the material

and institutional framework “so that it provides the requisite affirmative support for all

the relevant capabilities” (Nussbaum 2003, 51-55). Capabilities are combinations of

functionings, which in turn are doings and beings that a person can achieve if she desires

(Sen 1992, 40). While capabilities represent the opportunity/freedom aspect, functionings

concern the outcome/achievement aspect (Robeyns 2003, 63). In order to differentiate

between these two aspects, the capability approach needed to escape the narrow confines

of informational y-parsimonious accounts of justice such as utilitarianism. Thus, it could

be argued that informational richness and the case for assessing comprehensive outcomes

are the main sources of the capabilities approach.

The capability approach is not a full theory of justice and by itself it proposes just

an evaluative space – the metric of capabilities. According to Robeyns, the capability

approach operates at three levels, being capable of taking various forms according to

one’s needs. It can be a framework of thought, a critique of other approaches to well-being

assessment and a formula for making interpersonal comparisons of well-being (Robeyns

2000, 3). The fact that the capability approach is “underspecified” can be double-edged:

the sensitivity of the approach to gender is dependent on what additional theories are

brought to complement it. Robeyns develops a gender-sensitive capability approach,

which shows what feminism has to gain from resorting to this conceptual apparatus. She

emphasizes 3 elements of the capability approach that make it a good candidate for being

complemented by feminist theories, i.e. i) its evaluative space, ii) the attention given to human diversity and ii ) its employment of ethical individualism. The second of these is of

paramount importance for feminism because it can be seen as a way to internalize Okin’s

(1989) criticism of theories of justice for their failure to acknowledge the way in which the different experiences of females and women affect their subsequent development.

i) One of the reasons why Sen endorses the capability metric and not a functioning

metric is because of what he cal s an “informational y inclusive advantage” of the former,

since focusing on capabilities al ows one to account for the opportunities and choices of

the agent, who is not perceived as a simple recipient, but whose interests and engagement

9] For a defense of Rawls, see Wong (2010, 127-146).

Adelin Costin Dumitru

85

are taken into account in a proper way (2010, 236). This is not without criticism – Cohen

argues that behind the capability approach is a certain “athleticism”, which consists of

“overestimating the place of freedom and activity in well-being” (1990, 377)10. Sen argues

that in assessing well-being freedom, one should look at the capability levels, but concedes

that “limits of practicality may force the analysis to be confined to examining the achieved

functioning bundle only” (1992, 53). This is nonetheless not desirable from a normative

standpoint, and capabilities should be the evaluative space. Of course, going further,

well-being is not the only aspect that people should be enabled to reach – agency plays

an important role too, as I will show later on. For feminists, the capability metric is more

appropriate than a resourcist or a welfarist one because it focuses on people’s doings and

beings and thus has something to say on the inequalities within the family. According

to Nussbaum (2003, 39) “inequalities in resources and opportunities, educational

deprivations, the failure of work to be recognized as work, insults to bodily integrity”

are all hindrances that diminish the capability sets of women and thus should be solved.

The fact that the capability approach is so sensitive to structural injustices affecting the

conversion of bundles of goods into functionings is held to be a powerful argument in

favor of this evaluative space (Anderson 2010a, 87).

i ) Robeyns (2000, 6) holds that the capability approach takes account of human

diversity in two distinct ways: by focusing on capabilities as the evaluative space (assessing thus the opportunities held by people and not imposing outcome desirability) and by

looking at individual and social factors of converting commodities into functionings.11

Among the social factors affecting the conversion of commodities into functionings is

gender discrimination. Furthermore, by looking not only at market processes, but also

at what happens in the private households, the capability approach internalizes another

criticism raised by feminists against other theories of justice (Robeyns 2008, 89-90).

Capabilitarians hold that personal heterogeneities cannot be accounted for by other

evaluative spaces, which cannot deal with feminine experiences such as breast-feeding.

However, there have been arguments that gender-sensitive versions of resourcism could

be developed, which would take into account the needs of the infants. This is closely related to a criticism addressed to the capability approach that it proposes a vertical conception

of the human nature – “that it falsely suggests that women’s terrible and disproportionate

suffering in most of this world is due to their being insufficiently compensated for their

inferior natural endowments” (Pogge 2002, 181-83). One capabilitarian response has

been that this criticism is based on the idea that capability theorists try to compensate

people for bad luck in the natural al ocation of internal resources (Anderson 2010a,

10] Arneson (2006, 37) also expresses concern towards the focus on what he cal s real option freedom – “in many contexts, adding extra valuable options and thus increasing a person’s real option freedom would come at a cost or lesser achieved wel -being, and in these contexts we should favor achieving more functioning. Beyond some point, expansion of real option freedom is wasteful of resources that are better spent targeted at boosting functionings”.

11] Commodities here represent the resources distributed, i.e. income or rights.

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Feminism, Agency and Objectivity

95). While this is a powerful argument, it is based on Anderson’s democratic egalitarian

proposal, which constrains, as I will show, the scope of justice in an il egitimate way.

iii) Robeyns argues that the capability approach is based only on ethical

individualism, which postulates that the fundamental unit of human concern is the

individual. This does not imply ontological individualism, on which it has nothing to

say. It can be complemented by various theories regarding ontology. This is important

for those feminists who emphasize the necessity of accounting in a theory of justice

for the relations between people or between people and nature (Robeyns 2000, 19).

Nussbaum’s (2000, 79) list of central human capabilities includes the capability of

being able to have a connection with the nature, which should make this view attractive

to eco-feminism, for instance.

Having established how the capability approach is responsive to gender, I turn

now to the main concern of this paper, the problem of positional objectivity and its

impact on feminist agendas. In the next section I will briefly present Sen’s arguments

for open impartiality, his account of positional objectivity and his endorsement of trans-

positional objectivity. In order to understand what open impartiality is and why Sen

criticizes Rawls’ contractarianism, it is necessary to explain the relation between justice

as fairness and global justice.

ii. sKEWED iMPArTiAliTY, POsiTiONAl OBJEcTiViTY AND THE BiAsEs BEHiND

PUBlic rEAsON

Although Rawls (1971) leaves an element of ambiguity regarding the scope of

justice12, in later works it becomes clear that justice as fairness is meant to be a political conception of justice for well-ordered peoples. Rawls holds that principles of global justice are to be established fol owing a second original position, where the parties are now

representatives of peoples. The veil of ignorance device is once again implemented and

this time it excludes from knowledge facts such as the size of territory or of the population, the relative strength of the peoples whom the parties represent, the natural resource

endowments, the level of economic development (Rawls 1999, 31-32). The peoples and

their representatives are moved by reasonable interests, which is congruent with a fair

equality and a due respect for all peoples. The idea of public reason is generalized, since

the parties do not invoke principles related to their comprehensive doctrines of truth or

right, but in terms that can represent a common ground to all the different peoples taking

part in the deliberation. More controversial, Rawls includes decent hierarchical societies

along the liberal ones. These are not reasonable, but decent (this is a weaker criterion than reasonability) (Rawls 1999, 83-84). Decent hierarchical societies have a process of public

consultation and minorities are encouraged to have a flourishing life, but are not al owed

12] The scope of justice refers to “the range of persons who have claims upon and responsibilities to each other arising from considerations of justice” (Abizadeh 2007, 323).

Adelin Costin Dumitru

87

to hold offices (in contradistinction with the fair equality of opportunity part of Rawls’

second principle of justice as fairness) (Rawls 1999, 77-78). This aspect is important for

the subject discussed here because Rawls employs a “narrow doctrine of human rights”

(Macleod 2006, 134-49). In one of his examples, a decent hierarchical society can be one

in which women are relegated to a status of second-order citizens, if important reforms

have been undertaken in regard to their rights.

Furthermore, Rawls does not uphold a global difference principle, but a weaker

duty of “assistance to burdened society” (1999, 37). The fact that Rawls includes decent

hierarchical societies and scales down the principles of justice and the requirements of

justice in order to appeal to these has been criticized as an inadequate concession. Kok

Chor Tan (2004, 75) argues that “the normative individualism fundamental to Rawls’

domestic theory is replaced by a communitarianism of a sort that takes societies or

peoples to be the basic subject of justice”. Tolerating and accepting as justified (although

not as fair) decent hierarchical societies leads to ignoring dissenting individuals from

those nonliberal societies (Tan 2006, 75).

Now we can begin to understand Sen’s arguments against Rawls’ closed impartiality.

According to Sen (2010, 182), limiting the original position to peoples inhabiting a

society “extracts a heavy price in the absence of any procedural guarantee that local values

will be subjected to an open scrutiny”. Sen (2010, 125) advocates Adam Smith’s impartial

spectator device, which al ows one to examine values, convictions and principles “at

a distance”. Rawls, unlike Smith, limits the deliberation to a “given focal group” which

might reflect pre-contractarian biases (Sen 2010, 133). In this light, there are several

limitations of the original position device, such as “exclusionary neglect” (people who do

not belong in that society are excluded, although they might be affected by the outcomes

of the deliberation) or “procedural parochialism” (other worldviews are excluded from

considerations, and even the veil of ignorance cannot prevent the decisions from “being

swayed only by local group prejudices”) (Sen 2010, 139, 150). These are some reasons

why closed impartiality is moral y flawed and why Sen endorses open impartiality. It

is important to note here that Sen’s endorsement of open impartiality is partial y (and

implicitly) based on his work on informational constraints.

Sen (1985, 184) engages in a discussion on objectivity insisting on cases that are

position-relative but authorship-invariant. For instance, irrespective of the identity of a

poor-sighted professor, she would not know that the student in the last row is cheating. If

that student had been in the professor’s position, having the same characteristics (poor

sightedness), she would hold the same belief. This is what he later cal s objective positionality (1992), a concept with implications for decision theory, gender discrimination, morbidity

rates assessment and ethics. It is to be distinguished from subjectivity, since it does not

depend on psychological processes peculiar to a person or another – anyone being

in the same circumstances and being endowed with the same quantity of information

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Feminism, Agency and Objectivity

would hold the same view. Later, Sen insists on the relevance of this sense of objectivity,

proceeding with a criticism of Nagel’s “view from nowhere” – type of objectivity.13

Against Nagel, he argues that this view is not “from nowhere, but from a delineated

somewhere” (Sen 1993, 127). This concept is important because it shows how beliefs

can be objective, irrespective of their truth value.14 What values one has, what position in society she occupies, what knowledge she holds, all these elements influence her objective

assessment of the world – Sen cal s these features positional parameters. In order to avoid the inevitable biases associated with this positional relativity, Sen recommends trans-positional assessments, the aggregation of different positional observations into a whole.

Trans-positional assessments transcend the biases of positional parameters by making

more information accessible to others and by al owing the public agenda to be influenced

by opinions who hitherto have been ignored in an objective way (Sen 1992, 6) . Pursuing trans-positional objectivity has important implications for feminism. Sen shows that

living in a society where women are considered second-order citizens and accordingly

paid less than men might contribute to one’s holding an objective positional belief that

women value less than men. It is an objective assessment because anyone living in that

society, having access to the same sources of information, would hold the same opinion.

However, the need for trans-positionality is relevant because this is the only way in which

dissenting views could be taken into account. Trans-positionality al ows criticism to be

internal and not a form of cultural imperialism (Sen 1992, 6). Women who had access

to more sources of information than their male and female counterparts would then be

al owed to expose others to these new sources and maybe to al eviate through public

deliberation the condition of women. Sen argues that a similar procedure is proposed

by Adam Smith, and that the impartial spectator is introduced as a way to obtain such a

trans-positional view (Sen 1992, 5-6).

The connections between positional objectivity and the capability approach are

easy to understand, especial y when one sees through this filter the criticisms raised

against desire satisfaction or happiness-based assessments of the quality of life. Sen gives

the example of self-reported morbidity rates among Indian women. According to Sen,

this reflects not only their lack of education, but also of accepting this state of affairs. Sen (1992, 14) admits that:

by constraining the positional parameters very thoroughly, it would be possible to

attribute positional objectivity to the Indian rural women’s lack of sense of relative

deprivation in health or wel -being. .on the other hand, this positional objectivity,

achieving through extensive constraining, would not readily translate into trans-

positional objectivity of women’s relative deprivation.

13] In which Nagel argues that “the standpoint of political theory is necessarily detached and objective” (1986, 188).

14] “Truth is quite a different issue from the objectivity of the reasoning leading to a particular belief, given the access to information that the person has” (Sen 1993, 127).

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89

Would it be paternalistic or imperialistic to criticize this state of affairs and promote

women participation in public debates? Martha Nussbaum (2000) offers many examples

of how educated women set out to reform their communities, examples which contradict the thesis that this is how the Indian culture is and any attempt to change the state of

affairs would be intrusive. Positional objectivity can and should be transcended in order

to leave behind such cultural biases, nonetheless. I end this section by quoting at length

Sen’s own view on the necessity of trans-positional objectivity, which provides a direct

link to the next section as wel :

“[…] in denying the objectivity of the belief in women’s inferiority one can of course

invoke the need for a trans-positional assessment involving international perspectives,

drawing on observations and beliefs from vantage points prevailing in other societies

where women have more opportunity to show their ability. But the more immediate

issue is the non-necessity of taking an establishment view of feminine inferiority even

for those living in such a society. Contrary views can be taken consistently with living

in such a society, and the critique of that view can be internal” (1993, 139).

iii. WHOsE DEMOcr ATic EQUAliTY? NArrOW scOPE, NArrOWEr cAPABiliTY sETs

In this section I try to accomplish three things: 1. to show how Sen’s concept of

positional objectivity has been applied to deliberative democracy by Elizabeth Anderson;

2. to refute Anderson’s capability-based democratic equality on cosmopolitan grounds

and 3. to argue for a gender-sensitive and cosmopolitan relational egalitarianism. This

section is meant to defend an approach to justice inspired by Sen’s conceptualization

of informational constraints, positional objectivity and capabilities, with further inputs

from global justice theories and democratic equality philosophers. I will briefly present

the central line of argumentation in the next section, so that the uninterested reader can

skip this section.

Anderson interprets Sen’s positional objectivity as a conceptual apparatus that

could reduce the tension between woman perspectives and moral objectivity (2003,

239). She argues that we could place evaluative perspectives on a continuum ranging from

local to global. Those who employ the global perspective hold that local perspectives are

biased, sectarian and inadequate. This is the view adopted, inter alia, by Nagel or Rawls.

The other end of the continuum is occupied, among others, by feminists, and it advocates

perspective pluralism. Each different perspective, being forged in different circumstances,

is unique and brings something new to the debate. For good reason, Anderson quotes

among those holding this position Sandra Harding (1993, 49-82). Harding proposes a

standpoint feminist epistemology that bears resemblance to Sen’s justification for open

impartiality and trans-positional objectivity. According to Harding, the experiences of

those at the bottom of society, disadvantaged on racial, ethnical or gender criteria, should

be brought on research agenda. The fact that their experiences, opinions and values have

been ignored means that what happens in the public sphere lacks comprehensiveness.

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Feminism, Agency and Objectivity

As it accounts for the fact that “one’s social situation enables and sets limits on what one

can know”, her proposed standpoint feminist epistemology is based on the premise that

basing research on women’s lives will generate “less partial and distorted accounts not

only of women’s lives but also of men’s lives and of the whole social order” (Harding 1993,

55-6). Similarly, to Anderson, she contests the view that the only alternatives to “the

view from nowhere” are ethnocentrism and relativism (1993, 58). It is interesting to see

how a version of epistemology feminism has been developed in paral el to Sen’s work on

positional objectivity leading basical y to the same conclusions.

Anderson (2003, 242-43) shows, however, that obtaining a trans-positional account

can be done on distinct grounds, some with more appealing implications than others.

She offers four main such reasons: ascriptive identification (on the basis of gender,

ethnicity, race), sympathy, practical identification and respect. Ascriptive identities refer to relations established by birth (kinship, ethnicity, race, caste) or through religious or

cultural affiliation and are hopelessly parochial and sectarian, creating conflict between

different viewpoints and unable to generate a ful y universal evaluative position. For

Anderson, attempting to obtain an inclusive trans-positionality is meant to solve some

informational constraints of democratic rules. Sen has argued for the inclusion of

“procedural considerations in consequential analysis” (1995, 13) – although they may

seem efficient, some outcomes cannot be judged irrespective of the procedure that led

to their appearance. Democratic aggregative procedures are intrinsical y flawed because

they tend to ignore minorities’ needs from consideration. Sen gives the example of

famines, which would be easily preventable, had people been aware of their occurrence

and recurrence in many parts of the world. However, the fact that less than 5% of the

globe’s population is stricken by poverty and has to suffer the hardships of famine means

that only by public discussion could this problem be solved (Sen 1995, 17). As Anderson

puts it, “only a vivid awareness of the feasibility of alternatives inspires dissatisfaction with normal states of chronic deprivation” (2003, 248).15 Democracy in its aggregative form is

weakly equipped to respond to people’s needs. This is why Sen has endorsed a deliberative

conception of democracy, with broader informational bases (Anderson 2003, 248-49).

Anderson takes Sen’s instrumental arguments for democracy and extends them in order

to make these compatible with her democratic egalitarian framework. Anderson holds

that for Sen democracy is a universal value in that it reflects, promotes and is the result

of practical reason. Anderson provides in this regard the fol owing example: if a society

15] She links this with the problem of adaptive preferences. Subjective preferences are introduced by Sen as a criticism of subjective metrics such as welfarism, which are informational y parsimonious and do not take into account the fact that a person may have rational y developed preferences for her deplor-able state just because she sees no other feasible alternatives. For an interdisciplinary approach to adaptive preferences, which combines the capability approach with research from behavioral economics, psychology and cognitive dissonance, see Teschl and Comin (2005). See also Peter (2003) for an overview of how Sen has attempted to accommodate the problem of adaptive preferences within social choice (and thus to enlarge the informational scope of the latter domain).

Adelin Costin Dumitru

91

afflicted by adaptive preferences problems such as women’s underestimation of their

own problems would become more responsive to public demands for gender justice, this

would have a transformative effect on individual women’s desires: “once women no longer

perceive women’s lesser access to (healthcare) as normal, they may no longer adapt their

desires to this condition” (Anderson 2003, 251). However, raising women’s problems on

the public agenda should not be based on identity politics strategies. Anderson emphasizes

that one of Sen’s concerns is that “resigning to separate, mistrustful identities can be a self-fulfil ing prophecy, entrenching suboptimal parochial self-understandings” (2003, 255).

The incorporation of the concept of positional objectivity in deliberative

democracy implies a cosmopolitan conception. Sympathy and respect are applicable

on a global scale. The endpoint of deliberative processes that bring together different

positional perspectives is a synthesis that can legitimize the decisions. The global trans-

positional outcome is meant to “pay due regard to the interests and perspectives of al ”.

Anderson considers that the political significance of positionality is given by its being

an epistemological mechanism, not “a matter of parochial solidarity” (Anderson 2003,

255-58). All in al , it seems that Anderson takes further Sen’s project by emphasizing the

role of public reasoning in improving disadvantaged individuals’ capability prospects.

However, one problem that has to be solved is what is the scope of justice. If public

reasoning takes place within the boundaries of a state, then it fails to account for the

perspective of those from distant lands. This narrower scope of justice is suggested by

Anderson’s relational egalitarianism.

In several papers (1999, 2007, 2010b), Anderson has endorsed what she cal s

relational egalitarianism or democratic equality, which represents a reaction to the luck

egalitarianism of Arneson (1989) or Cohen (1989). According to Anderson, modern

egalitarian writings have lost their grip with the realworld problems. The political y

oppressed, race, gender, class inequalities, victims of nationalist genocide, slavery and

ethnic subordination, all have been more or less ignored by recent egalitarian thought.

In their attempt to eliminate the effects of brute luck on distributions, luck egalitarians

have forgotten that the purpose of equality is to end oppression and to ensure that people

can effectively stand as equals in the community (Anderson 1999, 288). For Anderson,

luck egalitarians have put the wrong questions, to which they have later given the wrong

answers. Luck egalitarians have searched for states of affairs whose distributions of goods

are moral y desirable. Relational egalitarians are asking what justice demands of each

agent, institutional or individual. Justice, for relational egalitarianism, is constrained

by several elements: principles of justice must be feasible so that agent can realistical y

pursue them (the “ought implies can” maxim), they must be publicly articulable, stable

and satisfying a Pareto improvement condition, in that no action can be forbidden if it

can advance some people’s interests to no one else’s loss (Anderson 2010b, 16-18). Luck

egalitarianism fails to respect the basic principles of any egalitarian theory: that people be treated with equal respect and equal concern. It would leave faulty drivers to die on the

side of the road ( the abandonment of negligent victims objection). It would leave people who

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live in risk-prone areas to incur all costs if they fail to insure, where such an opportunity exists ( problem of geographical discrimination). It considers that the desire to procreate is an expensive taste, and it has no concern for dependent caretakers ( problem of vulnerability of dependent caretakers). The only way it can take care of such problems is by becoming as paternalistic as it gets, tel ing citizens that they lack the ability to conduct their own lives as they should (Anderson 1999, 296-301).

In relational egalitarianism, equality is a notion characterizing a type of social

relations between people, instead of being a distribution of non-relational goods. Equality

entails not a distributive pattern but reflects the idea that all people are equal y moral

agents. Everyone should have the power to develop and exercise moral responsibility,

to cooperate with others according to some principles of justice, to shape and fulfill a

conception of their good (Anderson 1999, 312). To this end, goods have to be distributed

according to principles and processes that express respect for al . Being capable of

functioning as an equal citizen has to be understood in a very broad sense, from having

the ability to exercise specific political rights, to participate in the activities of civil society, in economy. It is linked to being capable of functioning as a human being, which in turn

involves effective access to means of subsistence, such as food, shelter, clothing, medical

care, further backed by the capability to function as a human agent in the proper sense of the term. This involves “knowledge of one’s circumstances and options, the ability

to deliberate about means and ends, psychological conditions of autonomy, freedom of

thought, of movement, access to education, freedom of occupational choice, the right to

receive fair value for one’s labor”. Democratic equality’s purpose is not to ensure effective access to equal levels of functioning, but to guarantee access to levels of functioning

sufficient to stand as an equal in society. Anderson considered that democratic equality

ought to guarantee effective access to a package of capabilities, and that people have to

function as equals over the course of their entire lives (1999, 317-18).

It is unclear if Anderson’s democratic equality is meant to apply just to Western,

developed states, or global y. At one point, she mentions that “the point is to identify the

demands of justice that flow from citizenship in a democratic state […] Citizens have a

claim to a capability set sufficient to enable them to function as equals in society” (2010a, 83). It is obvious, however, that in order for trans-positional objectivity to be achieved, it is necessary to surpass the confines of the modern nation-state, towards global democratic

deliberative processes. Achieving an equal standing in a modern democratic society could

still mean that the interests of those far from that society would be ignored. If people were to be concerned over securing a sufficient level of capabilities throughout a democratic

state, would they real y be concerned to include distant others’ points of view? If people

were indeed “entitled to access to a level of functioning in virtue of their citizenship”

(2010a, 95), this would be a narrow conception of justice. Such a narrow scope would

restrict the capability sets of the distant others. What is needed is to include all viewpoints in a deliberative process that is global in scope. Furthermore, it seems peculiar to resort to what can be cal ed principle asymmetry – upholding an egalitarian principle of justice at

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93

the national level and a sufficientarian conception at the global level. Anderson mentions

that, on the one hand, all citizens should function as equals, but at the global level, they

should function as humans (2010a, 88) .

Thus, democratic equality should not be perceived as a distributive view confined

to a state, but in cosmopolitan terms. Simply put, cosmopolitanism is based on the idea

that each human being has equal moral worth, and that we have certain responsibilities

towards all human beings qua human beings (Brock and Brighouse 2005, 1-10)16. This

is in the spirit of Sen’s open impartiality, who actively endorses public reasoning at the

global level (2010, 151). Ensuring that democratic equality perceives justice’s scope

as global would be beneficial for those who nowadays are excluded from deliberation

processes and whose viewpoints are (objectively) neglected. Fortunately, there is nothing

in democratic equality that precludes it from dropping this principle asymmetry and

from embracing a global scope.

iV. APPlicATiONs

In the previous section I presented Elizabeth Anderson’s extension of Sen’s

concepts to feminist deliberative democracy. This is a view according to which positional

objectivity – and its associated misdeeds such as women’s neglect of their own problems

pertaining to well-being and health – should be transcended towards trans-positional

objectivity. Trans-positional objectivity is epistemological y richer because it comprises

the values, viewpoints and interests of numerous distinct groups, which are all biased by

their own positional parameters. I argued that although Anderson seems to favor a global

deliberation, her democratic equality approach can act as a counterweight. Therefore, I

argued for the extension of the democratic equality approach to justice at the global level.

I have not provided a particular account, though this should be, based on what has been

mentioned before a gender-sensitive capability approach. In what fol ows I will briefly

present two distinct applications of the Sen-Anderson work on positional objectivity.

Women, agency and objectivity. Once upon a time in a patriarchy

The concept of agency is one of the fundamental differences between Sen’s and

Nussbaum’s capability approach (Nussbaum 2000, 13). While Sen distinguishes

between agency and well-being, Nussbaum considers that the capability/functioning

distinction can accommodate both concepts. Although in some cases this might be

true, problematic here can be those cases where agency promotion comes at odds with

well-being promotion.17 These fringe cases are important in the context of the capability

16] See Dumitru (2017, 234) for some distinctions pertaining to cosmopolitanism and global justice.

17] It seems as if Sen employs the fox’ view, while Nussbaum is more of a hedgehog: “the hedgehog

[…] has faith that all true values form an interlocking network, that each of our convictions about what is good or right plays some role in supporting each of our other convictions in each of these domains of value”,

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approach because Sen himself has emphasized that one way in which a moral theory can

be criticized is by the case-implication techniques, which sets out to show that in particular circumstances what a normative theory advocates would have counterintuitive results

(1979, 197). In this subsection I will show how women’s agency can be enhanced. The

benefits will accrue especial y for women from disadvantaged societies, societies which in

turn might benefit from this enriched objectivity.

Sen distinguishes between the well-being and the agency aspects of a person. Each

of these can be conceived either in terms of results or of opportunities. Thus, we have four

logical possibilities: well-being freedom, well-being achievement, agency freedom, agency

achievement. Agency refers to “what the person is free to do and achieve in pursuit of

whatever goals or values she regards as important […] A person’s agency aspect cannot

be understood without taking note of his or her aims, objectives, al egiances and the

person’s conception of the good” (Sen 1985, 204). The freedom aspect is emphasized

more in the concept of agency, because it is directly related to people being responsible

for their condition. Agency and well-being draw attention to different aspects of a person’s

life – whereas well-being conveys information regarding a person’s advantage, the agency

aspect provides an assessment of a person’s ability to do certain things in accordance with

her conception of the good (Sen 1985, 204-206).

As mentioned before, the two aspects can come in direct conflict. Imagine a rich

society in which women scored well in terms of well-being freedom and achievement.

Take the particular case of Anne, who is a middle-class citizen whose conception of the

good gravitates around helping the poor. In order to show that Nussbaum’s value-unity

endorsement is flawed, let us further suppose that Anne has reached the threshold in

regard to all 10 capabilities on Nussbaum’s list (2000). For instance, she developed a social network that aims at helping the poor by raising funds (the “Affiliation” capability). She is well-regarded in society, she real y cares about the poor (Emotions). She has been able

to form her own conception of the good, and she holds a degree in Political Philosophy

(Practical Reason). She has Control over her environment, being able to “participate

effectively in political choices that govern one’s life” (Nussbaum 2000, 80). There is no

necessity for trades off between capabilities, because she scores so high in all of them.

However, among those subjects that enter the public debate in which she is involved and

on which she can vote there is no redistribution proposal. Let us suppose that this happens in a paral el universe, where they had no Marx, no Rawls, no Nozick, no Sen, no Nussbaum,

no Anderson. There is an implicit bias towards a voluntarist ideology, and free market

processes are supposed to solve all poverty-related problems. The poor, who could argue

for redistribution, lack the capability Control over one’s environment, because they have

to struggle with their condition and are not able to engage in political deliberation. Thus,

the fact that free market processes are fair is positional y objective, since, had the poor

been in the exact same position as Anne or other rich citizens, they would have had the

while the fox acknowledges value-conflict (Dworkin 2011, 120; Knight 2015).

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95

same Weltanschauung. Nonetheless, Anne feels that something is not right, and she would deeply want to do something more for the poor. Had the poor been helped to engage in

public reasoning and to bring their own positional parameters on the agenda, Anne would

realize that there is in fact something more that she could do in order to help the poor.

Her agency freedom would go up, and perhaps, if she convinced enough of her friends to vote for redistributive programs, her agency achievement would go up too. Nevertheless, her well-being freedom and her well-being achievement would go down a little. This example

shows that there is conflict between agency and well-being. Furthermore, it shows how the

concept of positional objectivity can be used in connection with the capability approach.

Imagine now what could happen in today’s patriarchal societies if women’s voices

had been heard and if they had had a word to say in political decisions. Not only would this

help those particular women improve their life chances and their well-being freedom and

achievement, but many others would have a boost in their agency freedom. Of course, this

process might result in losses of well-being freedom, but as long as everybody’s capabilities remain above a certain threshold – that I will not specify here – this is not an argument

against this reform. In this light, policies to adopt gender quotas can be justified on new

grounds. Furthermore, they would not reflect a subsumption/abstraction strategy, but

a pragmatic-epistemic strategy to dealing with positional differences […] concern

for the representation of disadvantaged groups arises not from a desire to reinforce

parochial group identities as ends in themselves, but from a desire to construct a more

global perspective that can pay due regard to everyone’s interests and perspectives

(Anderson 2003, 253-55).

Peter (2003, 24) draws attention to another usage of the concept of, in Sen’s

reconceptualization of social choice. Peter notes that the informational basis provided by

agency considerations enriches social choice theory. As a consequence of assessing agency

levels, attention is refocused “from problems of aggregation of unexamined individual

preferences to participation and inclusion in democratic decision-making”. According to

Peter (2003, 27), “the chal enge for social evaluation of policy alternatives is to register

and take seriously the interpretations and evaluations of women as situated agents, thus

identifying the means by which their participation in policy discourses can be enhanced

and their effectiveness reinforced”. These arguments should not be too surprising. Sen’s

concept of agency has been considered one of his main contributions for gender-equality

research programs (Qizilbash 2005).

The race, the deliberation and the trans-positional objectivity

No one bothered to discuss the way in which sexism operates both independently

of and simultaneously with racism to oppress us. No other group in America has

so had their identity socialized out of existence as have black women. We are rarely

recognized as a group separate and distinct from black men, or as a present part of

the larger group “women” in this culture. When black people are talked about, sexism

militates against the acknowledgment of the interests of black women; when women

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Feminism, Agency and Objectivity

are talked about racism militates against a recognition of black women interests.

When black people are talked about the focus tends to be on black men, and when

women are talked about the focus tends to be on white women. No where is this more

evident than in the vast body of feminist literature […]. All too often in our society,

it is assumed that one can know all there is to know about black people by merely

hearing the life story and opinions of one black person […]. From the onset of my

involvement with the women’s movement I was disturbed by the white women’s

liberationists’ insistence that race and sex were two separate issues […]. My life

experience had shown me that the two issues were inseparable (hooks 1999, 7-12).

There could be employed several filters through which bell hooks’ words could

be interpreted. I resort now to one of them, which is Sen’s (2010, 122) urge to validate

ethical claims by subjecting these to public reasoning processes characterized by

open impartiality. Sen (2010,123) argued convincingly that in order to achieve such

open impartiality we have to invoke judgments from “others, outside our focal group” .

Similarly, bell hooks holds that the woman liberation movement has been characterized

by a lack of concern for the experiences of the black women. This disregard does not

come from a malfeasance of white women, but from their positional parameters which

disal ow certain kinds of information from entering the public debate. Sen (2010, 169)

argues that the fact that our perception of the world is inevitably tied to our position

in the world affects our understanding and our way of thinking about ethical subjects:

“in the pursuit of justice, positional il usions can impose serious barriers that have to

be overcome through broadening the informational basis of evaluations”. Whereas

Smith has proposed a device such as the impartial spectator, Sen advocates trans-

positionality. We cannot have a view from nowhere, but we can have a view from a

plurality of somewhere. Sen uses a great deal of the space in The Idea of Justice endorsing the idea that “judgments about justice have to take on board the task of accommodating

different kinds of reasons and evaluative concerns” (2010, 395). Although broadening

the plurality of justice might lead to incomplete preference orderings, this is not

necessarily a problem (2010, 398). The richness of human diversity should not be

hidden but taken advantage of.

The implications of Sen’s approach to justice can be shown by listing the

reasons why he considers social choice to be relevant as a “framework for reasoning”:

“recognition of the inescapable plurality of competing principles, al owing and

facilitating re-examination, permissibility of partial orderings, diverse interpretations

and inputs” (Sen 2010, 106-109). These are at odds with approaches that exclude from

consideration inputs from social groups whose preference orderings might be different

than those of the majority. Furthermore, there are numerous biases related to one’s

positional parameters that can be overcome only by switching to a trans-positional

view.These are some of the conceptual tools that can be employed to analyze bel

hooks’ criticisms. Black women’s views have been neglected, since the woman liberation

movement had incorporated only certain parameters – those inspired by the lives

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97

of white women. Albeit discrimination against white women is not to be ignored, it

cannot be considered the only form of discrimination. The absence of black women

voices from public debate meant however that their particular experiences had been

neglected. By advocating the broadening of positional perspectives, the Sen-Anderson

feminist deliberative democracy can internalize bell hooks’ criticism. The concern for

including in the public debate the voice of neglected categories is of crucial importance

for Sen, and this is what provides democratic deliberation with legitimacy (Anderson

2003, 225). Had black women interests, values and opinions been incorporated

earlier into the public agenda, trans-positional objectivity would have characterized

the woman liberation movement. Instead, what happened was that “the efforts of

white women activists to expand employment opportunities for women were focused

exclusively on improving the lot of white women workers, who did not identify with

black women workers” (hooks 1999, 132). Although bell hooks notes that there had

also been a persistent rivalry between white women and black women for access to

the job market, this does not mean that a conciliatory relationship would have solved

anything. No matter how good their intentions, white women could not have known

the positional specificities of black women experiences. In this subsection I have

argued for interpreting this criticism of feminism by resorting to Sen’s conceptual

apparatus. This puts in a new light radical feminists’ criticism of “white woman

feminism” and shows that it is justified both ethically and epistemologically. Although

the white women liberation movement had made objective assessments of the state of

affairs, these evaluations had been hopelessly positionally objective, biased by their

own positional parameters.

V. cONclUsiONs

I advocated in this paper a version of gender-sensitive capability approach which

accounts for positional objectivity. I presented the capability approach, insisting on

Sen’s endorsement for open impartiality and trans-positional objectivity. I fol owed Sen

and Anderson in showing what public reason has to gain from the inclusion of women

problems on the agenda. I held that the capability approach can contribute to women’s

gaining equal standing in society. On the other hand, I have argued for a version of

cosmopolitan democratic equality, which satisfies the criterion of open impartiality

and goes beyond the confines of a narrow set of denizens of the globe. I have not

advanced a specific proposal in this regard, which is a task that I leave for another paper.

However, on a more constructive note, I have shown how we can use Sen’s research on

positional objectivity, agency and social choice in order to accommodate some radical

feminist criticisms of mainstream women’s movements, specifical y regarding bel

hooks’ diatribe against the lack of concern for the black women’s particular situation.

I reconceptualized bell hook’s arguments in Sen’s terms, since her criticisms can be

considered to refer to the informational parsimony of mainstream feminist theories.

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Feminism, Agency and Objectivity

The stake of the paper, however, is not limited to the applications mentioned above.

The concept of positional objectivity can be employed in regard to other issues as wel ,

bridging together feminist theories, political philosophy and social choice.18

adelin.dumitru1@gmail.com

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ISSN 2065-7285

EISSN 2065-8958

© 2018 by Public Reason

Document Outline

- Front Cover

- About Public Reason

- Contents

- Kant’s ‘Bund’: A Voluntary Reading

- I. An Introduction to the International Conditions of JS

- II. Kleingeld’s Developmental View

- III. A Review of the Historical Context of Kant’s Bund

- IV. Kleingeld’s Seemingly Question-Begging Strategy

- V. Conclusion

- References

- Mill’s Political Perception of Liberty: Idiosyncratic, Perfectionist but essentially Liberal

- I. Using Different Freedoms

- II. Prevailing Autonomy

- III. Individuality as Autonomy

- IV. The Core of Mill’s Freedom Is Consistently Liberal

- V. The Role of the State

- VI. Conclusion

- References

- Rawlsian Stability and the Hazards of Envy

- I. The Game Theoretic View of Rawlsian Stability

- II. The Special Psychologies and the Hazards of Envy

- III. The Argument from the Absence of Envy

- IV. The Revised Account of Stability

- V. The Political Turn

- VI. Conclusion

- References

- Capabilitarianism without Paternalism?

- I. Two Central Ideas of CA

- II. Functionings, Capabilities and Freedom

- III. Nussbaum’s Concept of Capabilities and a Simple Basic Model of CA

- IV. Underestimated Moments of Freedom

- V. How an Objection to Paternalism Cannot Be Avoided

- References

- The Problem of Explanation and Reason-Giving Account of pro tanto Duties in the Rossian Ethical ...

- I. The Problem of Explanation

- II. Reason-Giving Account of Pro-tanto Duties

- III. Practice Brings You Mastery

- IV. Conclusions

- References

- Feminism, Agency and Objectivity

- I. Escaping Informational Parsimony – a Justification for the Capabilities Approach

- II. Skewed Impartiality, Positional Objectivity and the Biases behind Public Reason

- III. Whose Democratic Equality? Narrow Scope, Narrower Capability Sets

- IV. Applications

- Women, agency and objectivity. Once upon a time in a patriarchy

- The race, the deliberation and the trans-positional objectivity

- V. Conclusions

- References

- Submission Information

- Back Cover

- Alexandros Manolatos - Rawlsian Stability and the Hazards of Envy.pdf

- Rawlsian Stability and the Hazards of Envy

- I. The Game Theoretic View of Rawlsian Stability

- II. The Special Psychologies and the Hazards of Envy

- III. The Argument from the Absence of Envy

- IV. The Revised Account of Stability

- V. The Political Turn

- VI. Conclusion

- References

Table of Contents

Front Cover

About Public Reason

Contents

Kant’s ‘Bund’: A Voluntary Reading

I. An Introduction to the International Conditions of JS

II. Kleingeld’s Developmental View

III. A Review of the Historical Context of Kant’s Bund

IV. Kleingeld’s Seemingly Question-Begging Strategy

V. Conclusion

References

I. An Introduction to the International Conditions of JS

II. Kleingeld’s Developmental View

III. A Review of the Historical Context of Kant’s Bund

IV. Kleingeld’s Seemingly Question-Begging Strategy

V. Conclusion

References

Mill’s Political Perception of Liberty: Idiosyncratic, Perfectionist but essentially Liberal

I. Using Different Freedoms

II. Prevailing Autonomy

III. Individuality as Autonomy

IV. The Core of Mill’s Freedom Is Consistently Liberal

V. The Role of the State

VI. Conclusion

References

I. Using Different Freedoms

II. Prevailing Autonomy

III. Individuality as Autonomy

IV. The Core of Mill’s Freedom Is Consistently Liberal

V. The Role of the State

VI. Conclusion

References

Rawlsian Stability and the Hazards of Envy

I. The Game Theoretic View of Rawlsian Stability

II. The Special Psychologies and the Hazards of Envy

III. The Argument from the Absence of Envy

IV. The Revised Account of Stability

V. The Political Turn

VI. Conclusion

References

I. The Game Theoretic View of Rawlsian Stability

II. The Special Psychologies and the Hazards of Envy

III. The Argument from the Absence of Envy

IV. The Revised Account of Stability

V. The Political Turn

VI. Conclusion

References

Capabilitarianism without Paternalism?

I. Two Central Ideas of CA

II. Functionings, Capabilities and Freedom

III. Nussbaum’s Concept of Capabilities and a Simple Basic Model of CA

IV. Underestimated Moments of Freedom

V. How an Objection to Paternalism Cannot Be Avoided

References

I. Two Central Ideas of CA

II. Functionings, Capabilities and Freedom

III. Nussbaum’s Concept of Capabilities and a Simple Basic Model of CA

IV. Underestimated Moments of Freedom

V. How an Objection to Paternalism Cannot Be Avoided

References

The Problem of Explanation and Reason-Giving Account of pro tanto Duties in the Rossian Ethical ...

I. The Problem of Explanation

II. Reason-Giving Account of Pro-tanto Duties

III. Practice Brings You Mastery

IV. Conclusions

References

Feminism, Agency and Objectivity

I. Escaping Informational Parsimony – a Justification for the Capabilities Approach

II. Skewed Impartiality, Positional Objectivity and the Biases behind Public Reason

III. Whose Democratic Equality? Narrow Scope, Narrower Capability Sets

IV. Applications

Women, agency and objectivity. Once upon a time in a patriarchy

The race, the deliberation and the trans-positional objectivity

Women, agency and objectivity. Once upon a time in a patriarchy

The race, the deliberation and the trans-positional objectivity

V. Conclusions

References

I. Escaping Informational Parsimony – a Justification for the Capabilities Approach

II. Skewed Impartiality, Positional Objectivity and the Biases behind Public Reason

III. Whose Democratic Equality? Narrow Scope, Narrower Capability Sets

IV. Applications

Women, agency and objectivity. Once upon a time in a patriarchy

The race, the deliberation and the trans-positional objectivity

Women, agency and objectivity. Once upon a time in a patriarchy

The race, the deliberation and the trans-positional objectivity

V. Conclusions

References

Submission Information

Back Cover

Alexandros Manolatos - Rawlsian Stability and the Hazards of Envy.pdf

Rawlsian Stability and the Hazards of Envy

I. The Game Theoretic View of Rawlsian Stability

II. The Special Psychologies and the Hazards of Envy

III. The Argument from the Absence of Envy

IV. The Revised Account of Stability

V. The Political Turn

VI. Conclusion

References

I. The Game Theoretic View of Rawlsian Stability

II. The Special Psychologies and the Hazards of Envy

III. The Argument from the Absence of Envy

IV. The Revised Account of Stability

V. The Political Turn

VI. Conclusion

References

Rawlsian Stability and the Hazards of Envy

I. The Game Theoretic View of Rawlsian Stability

II. The Special Psychologies and the Hazards of Envy

III. The Argument from the Absence of Envy

IV. The Revised Account of Stability

V. The Political Turn

VI. Conclusion

References

I. The Game Theoretic View of Rawlsian Stability

II. The Special Psychologies and the Hazards of Envy

III. The Argument from the Absence of Envy

IV. The Revised Account of Stability

V. The Political Turn

VI. Conclusion

References